“WE WILL REMEMBER YOU, FOREVER!” – REMEMBERING THROUGH (ACTIVE) FORGETTING OF MOO-HYUN ROH IN SOUTH KOREA

BY

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DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

This work is the first to analyze much of the vast body of Roh memory representations, which is an important step for understanding how he is understood by those within his country, caught among multiple scenes of remembering and forgetting.

The initial premise of this dissertation was that an ongoing remembering and forgetting is underway of Moo-hyun Roh's memory. Moo-hyun Roh was committed a suicide at 2009 after the prosecuter's investigation of the bribery. After this sudden death, the cultural memory of Roh is composed of a tangle of medial, temporal, and political relations, revolving around his personage. South Koreans invest him with certain identities, and in turn, he provides transformation and proliferation of those identities. Most notably, memory as such is composed in good part as forgetting: remembering via *dispositif* and the identities it produces change over time. On the one hand, memories must always be anchored in the past; in this case, the other figures of the *minjung* movement form a "fixed point" of cultural memory (Assmann, 1995, p. 129). On the other hand, those identities that are linked to the imagined nation that are generated are more hallucinatory. The memories of Roh are multiple and, what is more, thoroughly contradictory.

This dissertation aimed to illustrate how a collective memory was selected under the norms of covert silence. The selective nature of memory has been known from the beginning; it remained a question how the process of memory's intertwining with forgetting is actually enacted. In fact, the concept of active forgetting (Nietzsche, 1989) allows considerations of the memory–identity–politics nexus of contemporary South Korea. This project shows that identity is, in fact, never purely faithful to the past, but is always trans- and sub-formative for the given conditions, and forgetting plays a role in constructing identity, which is always on the move. Some traces of Roh were erased to provide a pivotal space, open to the other memories. The memory of Roh was influenced by the ongoing events of the present. In other words, remembering Roh by South Koreans becomes a focus of political struggle among the then-government and the various groups of people including mourners, *ilbes*, as well as the strangers who were participating as they were looking for a sole cast to sculpture their desired memories in

the real world. Roh and a large group of sympathizers were produced as antithetical to the then-government, especially its policing policy, reinforcing the identification with the *minjung* movement for the collective emotional memory that has been reproduced continually since the 1970s. Notably, the memory of Roh is based on forgotten memories. With this empty signifier, it opened up the possibility for other memories to become vocalized, through the very community it constructed. Through the practice of active forgetting, individuals in South Korean society undertook their political sovereignty. It also proves that if collective memory were the memory of the contemporary, forgetting would be a huge contribution that makes remembering to be contemporary.

In Chapter One, I argued that forgetting should be regarded as a lens for interpreting memory and temporality. The work of several philosophers on memory was examined, and it was recalled that *anamnesis* is categorized as remembering tied now to action. In this remembering, forgetting is not a bankruptcy of human capability, but the product of a time which often entails that parts of the past be omitted. Here, oblivion, as we imagined it existing in remembering, is a way of molding one's identity as well as giving oneself a greater degree of choice in the flux between selective tradition and the sense of now. As Martin Heidegger (2004, p. 140, 2008) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1997) suggest, forgetting is the process of forging the realization of now-time behind a perceptive yesterday.

The later part of that chapter explores the possible meanings of the fact that contemporary media technology has the power to reshape our ways of remembering and forgetting. Contemporary new technology is rooted in digital *hypomnemata* (Stiegler, 2010, p. 85), meaning that, on the one hand, we can more easily remember by inscribing and recall by re-accessing our memories. However, this cannot secure complete recollection of the past, as changes impose other issues onto our sense of the timeline. Instead of there now being a completely linear time, we now possess plural time spaces. Thanks to this plurality, I argue, the sense of now is blurred and is no longer a singularity. In a way that techno-positivists do not recognize, thanks to the new *hypomnemata*, we are as likely to forget the past as the present.

This theoretical excursion brought us to a point where we could begin to understand the way Roh was memorialized in May 2009, in particular, the *noje* ceremony, not as to efface him but to remember him in a different way, which was the core of Chapter Two. To deal with an

issue of political urgency, Roh's mourners chose to covertly silence the past (Vinitzky-Seroussi & Teeger, 2010). His image was emptied out, and its contents were replaced by another truth. During *noje*, sympathizers imagined Roh using the tropes of collective *ressentiment*, called *han*, and thought of him as a member of the *minjung*, or an oppressed class maintaining an unsettled emotion. To create the imagination of Moo-hyun Roh's life, the ceremony was performed using particular aesthetics. Notably, during the ceremony, many parts of Roh's life that appeared to contradict this freshly imagined memory were silenced. However, with this forgetting practice, room was spared to invite other memories. Here, *noje* functioned as a hallowed symbol, inducing other emotions tied to other unsettled memories of the near past, rather than to Roh's life itself.

Chapter Three depicted a pair of contested memories of Roh that emerged following the funeral. That is, the memory of Roh, which was maintained and strengthened through dialectics between truth and myth, became layered in his mourners by 2010, through the interpretation in popular media content as a variation of Roh's narrative. However, there also began to appear other memories of him. The radical meanings hidden in the memories of Roh, centered in the online community *Ilbe,* were attacked to neutralize them by parodying the contradiction between the real figure and the memory of him. With this practice, opponents attempted to skim the aura from Roh's memory, which was largely done by sympathizers of the government. For them, Roh should not have a role in the present social imaginary. Thus, the mediatized memory of Roh became political, on the one hand, while on the other, it did not function as a stabilizer for further social conversation. Instead of being a publicly owned object (Casey, 2004), Roh's memory existed as fragmented, antagonistically forgotten by different groups of people who refused to talk to each other.

Chapter Four examined the way Bongha constructs the tourist experience, using continually maintained silence regarding certain aspects of the past. This town serves as memory-*dispositif*, putting forward memory aids for Roh that are chosen to selectively highlight his life. The most important point is the following: from my observation of the site, visitors participate in this covert silence by coordinating their behavior into unscripted but noticeable norms. Touring Bongha brings one into an encounter with mediated memory, and the mourners atone and engage in a pilgrimage to this remote site, full of pre-given memories of Roh.

By selectively delinking the past, forgetting edits the memory for "making sense" of the present. Not shaping the present by the past conversely, with selective remembering as well as silently performed active forgetting, collective memory serves the desire of the present. Their divergent interpretations of the past and of emerging events keep bringing up contentions about the personal history of Moohyun Roh, as he who lived in this world with a level of complexity. Regardless of who he really was, the remembering practice to a large extent empowered individual authority to shape an ongoing event, enabling individuals to challenge institutional narratives.

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Introduction. The Time of Mourning

On May 23, 2009, breaking news reports came that Moo-hyun Roh, the former president of South Korea, had thrown himself off Owl's Rock, a mountain cliff near his birthplace in the town of Bongha. Over the following five days, the downtowns in every city in South Korea were filled with thousands of people lining the streets to pay their tribute to Roh, holding flowers and yellow balloons. In larger cities, such as Seoul, the lines on the streets stretched to almost a mile long; it took three hours to reach the front of the line. The faces of those waiting, wearing black suits, bluntly expressed feelings of loss and sadness. Some cried silently, and others were shouting in their confusion. Riot police formed lines, pushing their unsentimental faces against the mourners holding signs pledging, "We will never forget you!"

This pledge may be undercut somewhat by a consideration of last few years of Moo-hyun Roh. In 2006, the last year of his office, Roh's approval rating reached 5.7%, which was the lowest for any president at any point in the history of Korean polling (Tongadatk'ŏm, 2006). As a legitimately elected candidate, he once symbolized a new era for the nation. Having earned a reputation as a human-rights lawyer, he came on the scene with the reputation of a righteous politician, dedicated to democracy. With the support of grassroots citizen groups, he went from the least likely candidate to the hero of the 2002 election. However, betraying the hopes of the left, he spearheaded the nation's rapid transition into a neoliberal economy, creating a flexible labor market and ordering the brutal put-downs of unions, resulting in 137 injured (Park, 2005). In late 2008, journalists learned of Roh's ongoing prosecution and the public became outraged. The route to the Supreme Prosecutor's Office in Seoul was live broadcast by helicopter (Sbs news, 2009). Editorials in newspapers were filled with discussions of the criminal charges facing Roh, most of which treated the outcome as a *fait accompli*.

However, on that Saturday, May 23, 2009, all this hatred appeared to be forgotten. For the six days following Roh's death, more than five million people visited shrines located across the nation, including one in Bongha at the place where he died, where a million visited (Kang, 2010). Since that Saturday, he has been remembered as the greatest president South Korea has ever had. In 2010, a survey found that 45.6% of South Koreans remembered him as the president they supported the most (Kang, 2011). In 2016, when South Koreans were asked which president had contributed the most to the country, they ranked him in first place (Realmeter, 2016). Even now his words and image are often used in criticisms of the current government's unsatisfactory practices. Politicians and celebrities visit his grave to promote their own political activity (Ch'oe, n.d.). The observation of these commemorative practices raises certain questions: Where did the five million saddened faces come from, on the occasion of Roh's death? Had all of them forgotten about Roh's actual tenure in office? If this reaction is a response to something, what allows the accompanying forgetfulness?

This dissertation examines how the memory of Moo-hyun Roh in the culture of South Korea is preserved, forgotten, and re-inscribed. Roh's memory has played a role in the formation and negotiation of the political sense of self among South Koreans. In this process, South Koreans have chosen specific sets of relationships with past and present politics, which then compose the vicissitudes of political memory over time. The case of the contemporary memory of Moo-hyun Roh in South Korea furnishes an opportunity to examine in detail the specific and multiple relationships of remembering and forgetting that have formed cultural memory for over a decade. Questions of media, temporality, and politics are crucial in the emerging field of memory studies, and the case of the memory of Roh provides an opportunity to identify and analyze in what way forgetting is a choice made in the assembly of cultural politics.

It is widely acknowledged that memory is exceptional, but forgetting is banal. That is, much is forgotten, due to the human incapacity to handle the mind's weakness (O'Hara et al., 2006; Ricoeur, 1999, 2004). Using this understanding to assess the massive scale of mourning of Roh, we could easily conclude that it is nothing but further evidence of the bankruptcy of memory. Even worse, it would be possible to judge this to be the result of the immaturity of the mind of the nation, driven by irrational and irresponsible pathos alone.

This project, however, takes the stand that memory and forgetting do not stand in simple contradiction; rather, they are mutually enabling and constitutive factors. There is little question that remembering is selective. In politics, the past is domesticated by the purposes of the present; politicians are called upon to be symbolic, to act as saviors in response to contemporary political issues (cf., Zelizer, 1992; Bunch, 2011). Work in memory studies has identified remembrance as being produced by networks of conflicting meanings and competing claims to the ownership of history and memory among individuals, among groups, and among individuals or groups and the state (Bodnar, 1994; Greenberg, 2006; Rothberg, 2009; Schwenkel, 2006; Sturken, 1997; Verdery, 1999). However, the role that forgetting plays here has been neglected or minimized. This dissertation examines the experience of those who participated in the forgetful remembrance of Moo-hyun Roh, as revealed through textual analysis, interviews, and participant observation, and it thereby contributes to current debates on collective memory, proposing a developed vision of communal memory, that is, of memories that are held by a collective on the condition that other aspects of the past are forgotten.

The following chapters will show memory is fundamentally a product of now; it is updated and reinscribed according to the purpose of the time (Aristotle, 2004; Krell, 1990; Ricoeur, 2004). Further, forgetting functions to allow memory to adapt to the time we live in. By continually refreshing remembering by means of forgetting, we define ourselves as timely and updated. Observing the memories of Roh, from the period immediately following his death in 2009 until the present, I seek to answer the call for a more spontaneous, communal, and phenomenological perspective on collective memory that can be inclusive of forgetting (Casey, 2000; Erll, 2008; Halbwachs, 1980, 1992). Following current debates about mediatization and multidirectional memory (see, for example, Hoskins, 2009a, 2009b; Landsberg, 2004; Rothberg, 2009), this dissertation interrogates the regeneration and transformation of memories, taking the reordering (Verdery, 1999, p. 36) and reinscribing (Greenberg, 2006, p. 129) of Moo-hyun Roh, following his dramatic suicide, into the sense of the here and now, while producing multiple memory traces juxtaposing many past images, from the anti-government movement of the 1980s to the sacrifices of the present. As a symbol, South Koreans' memories of Roh are dispersed, differentiated over time and space. Forgetfulness of who he was in life and how he had previously been remembered is commonly practiced.

Justification for the Study

Three questions relevant to the interdisciplinary fields of memory studies, media studies, and Korean studies are addressed here. First, this study captures social memory in South Korea out of collective imaginaries that have included active forgetting by social participants. The most notable aspect of the South Korean memory of Moo-hyun Roh is that this remembering is intertwined with a silence that is a collective, covert form of active forgetting.

Following the suggestion of Hans Ruin (2015), this dissertation posts a different understanding of memory as a way to "[preserve] this ancient correlation between the ability to hold on to the past," based on what is called "*anamnemonic* subjectivity" (p. 198). The word *anamnesis*, translated as "remembering," features as an important term in Aristotle's discussion of memory in his short dissertation "On Memory and Recollection" (2004), a densely packed analysis of memory in the sense of a mental function. The argument in this document shows that the process of recollection requires being able to attend to differentiations of magnitudes or proportions of the interval between "now" and "before." "The main thing is," Aristotle writes, "that one must know the time" (Aristotle, 2004, p. 177 [452b7]). The starting point for such recollection is, of course, controlled by the person recollecting; nevertheless, during the act itself, several paths are open to reminiscing. In other words, in any given search, as anyone who has done archival research can testify, there is always the possibility of finding something unexpected, going down a false path, or finding nothing at all. Traversing particular intervals of time through recollection is, ultimately, a form of reasoning: it follows chains of inferences from an origin point to a successfully recalled event or object.

Hermeneuticians have learned from Aristotle that memory delineates, in a constant play of attention, recall, and forgetting, the space of awareness and receptivity in which temporality and historicity are enacted. In *Memory, History, Forgetting*, Paul Ricoeur (2004) concludes that forgetting is not the opposite of memory. Rather, forgetting and memory condition each other in a complex interplay, which constitutes the human historical condition. Without a reserve of forgetting, there can be no recognition, no recollection, and no memory. Hans-Georg Gadamer (2006) also adds that "forgetting and recalling belong to the historical constitution of man and are themselves part of his history" (p. 14). Thus, the past, as having-been, transforms the reserve of forgetting into an resource for the work of remembering, making repetition possible precisely

because it does not transform the past into something that is wholly irretrievable and gone. For this reason, forgetting is constitutive for the search process that is *anamnesis*. To understand this interplay that produces memory, the modes of forgetting must be studied.

On a critical level, this dissertation investigates the practice of memory as regards the late South Korean President Moo-hyun Roh's life and death, as mediating the selective past by means of emerging political actors. It is not surprising that the collective memory of the anti-dictatorship movement of the 1980s is yet a factor in our century, the metaphoric meaning of Roh's death remains to be studied, along with how the political engagement of South Koreans reacted to the event. Here, I examine the collective memory practices through which South Koreans incorporated Roh's death, retaining their memories of Roh while forgetting distressing or uncomfortable aspects, and mobilized themselves to strengthen positive memories over time. Forgetting can thus be a precursor of the realization of one's own political sovereignty. The tactical instrumentalization of images of the past images is part of the selective tradition that creates the current culture and is fundamentally a political decision. When authenticity is dismembered, there can be greater openness to the horizon, inviting other memories and creating a sense of common, bonding memories. An interpretation of this sort may appear in many places, both online and offline, in response to malpractice by the current government.

Second, this study explores sites as a *dispositif*[1] of memory, where collective discourses emerge and are contested. The *dispositif* is a constellation of heterogeneous elements within a system and the relationships between them, which together produce a particular tendency. It means a historical formation, and the relations that compose it change over time (Foucault, 1980, p. 200). For Deleuze, the *dispositif* is a method as well as a concept: "Untangling these lines within a social apparatus is, in each case, like drawing a map, doing cartography, surveying unknown landscapes, and this is what he [Foucault] calls 'working on the ground'" (Deleuze, 1992, p. 159).

[1] Here, the term *dispositif* incorporates more than is implied by the English translation of the word, *apparatus*. Moreover, that translation is problematic because it connotes the mechanical and fixity. Further, as Frank Kessler points out, an apparatus in no way incorporates the idea of a disposition, as is implied by *dispositif*, "both in the sense of 'arrangement' and [of a] 'tendency' that the arrangement brings forth" (Kessler, 2013, p. 1).

Through visiting sporadic *dispositif* that mediate the memories of Roh, this dissertation engages current scholarship on media agency as well. New mnemo-technologies allowed memories of Roh to be kept up to date and to reappear in South Korean society. Such new memories bring Roh's metaphoric presence to the fore in multiple narratives that were reproduced in both popular culture and in spontaneous recollection. However, the image delivered is not always a coherent, sacred image of Roh; some parodic or satirical appearances of his memory also emerged to confront the memories of Roh as a martyr and as the unifier of the nation. These humiliating comic images of him were latter attempts to re-amalgamate the meaning of his memory as a failed politician.

Media repertoires and popular culture impinge upon these mnemonic practices. This project captures this tension, or even contradiction, in emergent mnemonic patterns of conduct by visiting the Roh's memorial in Bongha. This study, thus, investigates how these memory practices are in the contemporary moment actively producing knowledge concerning the past, which ultimately attests to their performativity (Lagerkvist, 2013). This focus adds a processual sense to evolution of as yet undefined or unsettled rhythms and memories in such memory practices. With such comparative studies of various *loci* of memory, this study examines how collective memory is developed and diversified in different meaning-making practices.

Finally, this dissertation investigates the incorporation of past memories in responses and contributions to the transformation of political subjectivity in South Korea, in its present post-dictatorship and neoliberal society. To this day, few studies have investigated emotive and sensory responses to Roh's memories and how they have evolved in time and space.[2] This project offers, using a different approach, a remedy to misgivings or gaps in knowledge occurring in previous works on this subject. Examining how mourners can contribute to the memory of Roh in both the myth and the fabric of the past–present imaginary, this dissertation will investigate how sovereignty is imagined and performed in mnemonic practices, including at

[2] Notable studies of this have been published in Korean in an edited book (Wiwŏnhoe, 2009). In this work, Ki-Ho Em (2009) reads the occasion of Roh's death as a space of mourning for others who could not be mourned. Also Won Kim reads the funeral as an emotional rite gone through by the collective, whose participants could not identify where their sadness came from (Kim, 2009). Junman Kang, in addition, views Roh's funeral as a kind of communication to the dead, as well as to the living (Kang, 2010).

Roh's funeral, annual commemorations, and online memorials. While the heroization of Roh currently dominates, a sense of solidarity in various memories has also gained prominence in the testimonies of mourners, memorabilia, and mourning performance. Roh, who was never a farmer, has been painted standing in a rice paddy, wearing a straw hat. An image of Roh was posted online with recent victims of police eviction. This disjointure in representation shows the performativity of remembering, not as planned by the political institutions, and it also invites different memories through being imaged in each rememberer's embodied performance (Connerton, 1989). A recalled past forms a repertoire for performance that "enacts embodied memory [that is] ephemeral, non-reproducible knowledge" (Taylor, 2003, p. 20). I argue that both inscribed, mediatized memory and embodied remembrance take part in creating an individual to reacquire a sense of presentness in politics. The result of this, as we have already observed, is a dramatic reversal in public opinion, which no longer remembers Roh as a real figure but as a political symbol for the strong but plastic identity of an anti-government group.

Aim and Research Questions

This dissertation explores what emerges when memory and the politics of time interact, with a particular emphasis on the performance of spontaneous forgetting and selective recollection. Furthermore, the project attempts to depict the mode of memories, that is, that they consist of both remembering and forgetting, in the space of new mnemotechnology, which brings our imagination to the aid of memory. That memory is selective is well known, but how this selectivity occurs in fact remains an open question and is empirically discussed in this dissertation. The processes explored here are dealt with in four stages, each of which is guided by a different research question; these are listed below.

Chapter One discusses the concepts of memory, that is, remembering, forgetting, time, and technology, to develop a foundation for later exploration in following parts of this document. The research question for that chapter is as follows:

- Why should forgetting be treated as an active aspect of memory? Is it possible to actively forget the past? How do now-intertwined mediating technologies impact remembering and forgetting?

Chapter Two reads an ethnographic site that examines two aspects of Moo-hyun Roh's funeral in 2009, namely, *yŏnggyŏlshik*[3] and *noje*[4], using the concept of active forgetting. The aim is for an overall approach to be established through a decontextualization of history and covert silence in service of the politics of the present among the participants in mourning ceremonies. The guiding question for that chapter is as follows:

- Is it possible to read the mourners' interpretation of the death of late president as active forgetting, which left a space open for other marginalized memories?

The following chapter observes the afterlives of the mediatized memory of Roh. Notably, between 2010–2015, memory-practices about Roh were in circulation that were consumed by different social groups. The analysis of when, where, and how their practices of making memorabilia such as *memes* from counter-memory will be addressed in Chapter Three. This chapter will attempt to investigate how the mediatized memory that came to prominence after his physical death remains political and has resulted in reproductions of other various representations. Through the analysis of each mode of memories, the third chapter also tests the possibility of the convergence of memory, which could create a discursive space in society. The question for this chapter is as follows.

- How did the traces of Roh attract the memory interpretations of different groups? How do their meanings converge internally while not emerging as the memory making of another group?

The final chapter of this dissertation explores further the perspective on performance that Taylor (2003) elaborated by narrating the experience of visiting Bongha, focusing on how memorial spaces are populated by visitors through their own imaginaries. The aim is to develop a greater understanding of tourist performance and its sense of place in relation to mediatized

[3] *Yŏnggyŏlshik* denotes a ritual performed by mourners to give notice to the deceased that he or she will have to "leave this world" forever before the burial (Kim, 2016). This is the more official ceremony in the funerals of well-known figures.

[4] *Noje* is another funerary stage in traditional South Korean culture. Family members, relatives, and bier-carriers stop several times on the way to the burial ground and perform a ritual for the dead soul. For more detail, see Chapter Two of this dissertation.

memory. This chapter also questions whether there is placement of forgiving as a mode of forgetting. This chapter responds to the following question.

- What is the performance of place among tourists at a space related to their reading and understanding of media spectacle regarding that space?

Although it may appear that only one case is used for the length of the dissertation, each chapter examines collective remembering and forgetting in a different time and place and the changes between them. The site of empirical research for this dissertation is the posthumous memory of Moo-hyun Roh. Each chapter adopts a different theoretical approach and uses different methods. Consequently, the empirical material differs from chapter to chapter, ranging from social media forums, to governmental statements, to observations, and to interviews with tourists. While Roh's memory is foregrounded throughout, I view it using different theoretical approaches, spaces, and timeliness. In the introductory chapter, only the central theoretical approaches are explored in detail; other theory is examined more thoroughly in the individual chapters.

Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation includes an introductory section, four main chapters, and a conclusion, followed by a compilation of all references used in the dissertation. Each chapter also includes an auto-ethnographic prelude that conveys the experience of being at the given site. The introduction, as mentioned, provides an overview of Roh's memory in current Korea, presents the aim of the dissertation, and the research questions guiding the remainder of the study.

Chapter One, "*Ars Oblivionalis*," contains a literary review outlining the theoretical framework, which combines media theory with memory and performance studies. Incorporating Nietzsche's work on active forgetting, the chapter elaborates further on the concept of forgetting, while exploring the dynamics of memory and recollection. Furthermore, the chapter also provides an overview of the discussion of media and memory, endeavoring to open up an intellectual space in which performance of memory can be approached as occurring in, as well as with, the media in their mutual co-constitution.

Chapter Two, "Five Days after the Suicide," discusses the moment of commemoration on May 29, 2009. Roh's funeral had two parts, and the chapter interrogates how the memory practice of the 1980s pro-democratic movement resonated with the feeling regarding the anti-government movement among the participants. Memories from the 1980s and 2009 are explored. The *noje* event referenced the past, but did not bring forth the same performativity from the participants.

"Afterlife Memories of Moo-hyun Roh" is the title of Chapter Three, which depicts two conflicting memories of that which followed the funeral, especially those found on online bulletin boards. With the analysis of when, where, and how practices of making memorabilia (or *memes*) occurred, the chapter investigates how the mediatized memory that followed Roh's physical death could remain political and result in reproductions of various representations. The condition for public memory, which Edward Casey isolated as "formation through ongoing interchange of ideas and thoughts, opinions and beliefs" (2004, p. 41), is investigated. The two memories centrally examined in this chapter do not create a public memory which would give a consolidating vision of the past, and my analysis attempts to clarify the reasons for this.

Chapter Four, "Talking to the Small Tableau," focuses on the relationship between mediated memory and embodied performance of Roh in Bongha, where he is buried. Functioning as memory-*dispositif*, this town now attracts a million visitors each year. Through the architectural decisions made in the town and visitors' engagement with it, this chapter will examine how contemporary memories of Roh are laid out, intersecting questions of memorial spaces, vocalized by the visitors in their own imaginaries. I address why particular gestures of dominance and debauchery are so prevalent, analyzing, in conjunction, mediation (inscribed memories), performance (incorporated memories), and space (settings).

The final chapter, Conclusions, presents the findings of the individual chapters and the overall conclusions of the dissertation.

Methodology

The complexity of this analytical research project necessitates the application of multiple methodological designs.

This research follows and expands upon a body of literature in various disciplines, philosophy, memory studies, cultural theory, anthropology, and media studies. This literature shifts attention from representation to embodiment and performance, from intellectual discourse to lived experience, that is, from mediated memories to performances of memory.

An asset of equal importance to the existing work of others is my own experience of the reconfiguration of Roh's memory. I was at Seoul Square at the *noje* in 2009. This experience gave me insight to understand the event, not being limited to reading texts produced later by others. Ever since I have been a follower of commemorations afterwards both online and offline. I was between discussions, doubts, and thoughts that South Koreans generated for remembering and forgetting Roh. All of these experiences may give me the ability to use my own personal and emotional memory as source material for auto-ethnography, an accredited tool to reconstruct affective response and invoke particular emotions and individual memories. Multiple scholars (Denzin, 1997, 2010; Ellis, 2008) have argued that auto-ethnography is an approach to research and writing that seeks to describe and systematically analyze personal experience in order to understand cultural experience. Auto-ethnography creates evocative texts, showing that their design brings "readers into the scene"— particularly into thoughts, emotions, and actions — to "experience an experience" (Ellis, 2008, p. 142).

Agreeing on this intriguing and promising qualitative method, I included my auto-ethnographies from different scenes that I expectedly or unexpectedly encountered while studying this project. These writings are intended to be relevant but independent, named as "prologues" and placed in front of each chapter. Each piece is aimed to be a bridge to the coming chapter that is more dedicated for broader understandings of a sociocultural phenomenon. For instance, I recalled my "first-time" the moment I learnt Roh's suicide in 2009 and the tide of complex emotions out of remembering him before the first chapter. My piece on attending Roh's *noje* was placed before chapter two, that discusses the funeral's differentiated mode of remembering. However, I also purposed it can be read as a complete piece, as I value self-focused, individual memory-writings as the present form of remembering the past. It is my hope that, by recreating specific memories through visualization, my experience could transform the place where the event performed or is still performing memories, illustrating for my readership that the specific structure of feeling around this complex remembering as "something felt both

through strong emotional responses and multi-sensuous experiences...and interactions" (Lagerkvist, 2013, p. 6).

Another principal method of research in this project were observational. Such observations were inspired by the methods and approaches developed in anthropology, including fieldwork, interviews, and participant observation. The purpose of using these observational methods was to create descriptions of what people say and do (Sanger, 1996). Analyses, textual interpretation, fieldwork, the research problem, the research questions, and areas of concern all emanated from experiences and materials gained and impressions gathered from my fieldworks. For instance, I visited Bongha as any other tourist would, though I had already been conducting research. My observations began during during the three-hour journey from Seoul to Bongha and included the hours I spent at the site and on journey back. I conducted observations at Bongha in November 2016, May 2016, and November 2017. I spent seven to ten hours per visit, including the time spent waiting at the bus stop and on the bus and taxi rides. This transit time also provided opportunity for observations, because I could see tourists both before and after visiting the site, as well as while they were there. While the focus of my observation was the performances of the tourists, everything else at the site, such as signs, the shop, the organization of the premises, and so on, was also observed.

The observations were augmented by *ad-hoc* conversations, and these conversations often developed as open-ended inductive research. While there are several critiques have been raised including the lack of transparency in sampling strategy, choice of questions and mode of analysis, interviews still offer an effective way for understanding knowledge, values, beliefs or decision-making processes of stakeholders, and strengthening research design and output (Young et al., 2018). As McNamara (1999) notes, interviews are particularly useful for getting the story behind a participant's experiences. As this project attempts to read the meaning of past-memory as a process which navigates between different levels of experience and embedded in the narratives and texts it produces are the historical and contemporary relationships of power that structure everyday life, people's ruptures and continuities, past events and forgotten episodes can be investigated, not as objective historical occurrences but as constructed and reconstructed accounts of the past acting in and on the present. Interviews may offer a method to acquire how memories of the past are being verbally registered in present form. For this reason, oral

historians have favored qualitative interviewing for the detail and depth that it provides (Keightley, 2010). These interviews are largely conducted on a one-to-one basis, however in many cases couples and small groups were also interviewed together to elicit collective accounts which allow the discursive negotiation of mnemonic accounts to be seen first-hand. Especially the unstructured format allows the participant to lead the discussion and fully explore and articulate their remembered experiences (Keightley, 2010).

To investigate memories of Roh's *noje* (Chapter Two), more formal interviews in 2017 were conducted, a total of nine, ranging from 15 to 30 minutes. The interviews exhibited the interviewees discussing their memories and making meaning from Roh's death in 2009, as well as present-day impressions of the event. The interviews began with the question why the interviewee had decided to participate in the *noje* on May 29, 2009. Depending on the answer received, this was followed up with a variable question, which depended on whether they had been an active supporter of Roh before his death or they had not expected while he was alive to feel this way about him. At Bongha (Chapter Four), the conversations were unstructured. A total of eight casual conversations were noted for the three visits. These conversations began with introducing myself, followed by asking the person why he or she had decided to visit Bongha. I asked how my interlocutors felt about the town and the site, as well as for their memories of Moo-hyun Roh. Most respondents gave a judgment of Roh while responding with their memory of him. In this way, I captured tourists' descriptions of their own actions and of the media products they consumed and used, which I could then relate to their performance and sense of place.

Memories of Roh are extensively expressed in media spaces; for this reason, textual analysis of memorabilia formed a part of this project. This method is often implemented in media studies and other social sciences as "a way for researchers to gather information about how other human beings make sense of the world" (McKee, 2003, p. 1). First, information was collected from a range of online entities, including blogs, community bulletins, user comments on online news articles, and posts and comments from social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter. Official statements, including official eulogies from the mourning ceremonies, press releases, and reports were examined. Media documentaries, news coverage, television shows, and print media (newspapers, journals, and books) were collected and analyzed to illuminate how the

event was framed in traditional media formats as well. This created the core of the analysis in Chapter Three.

Throughout this dissertation, I approached the research object applying mnemohistory. Jan Assmann proposed this approach, which observes “the past as it is remembered” while it “deliberately leaves aside the synchronic aspects” (Assmann, 1998, p. 9). To study the remains of memory, he urges, one must survey “the story-lines of tradition, the webs of intertextuality, the diachronic continuities, and discontinuities of reading the past” (Assmann, 1998, p. 9). The following chapters are the outcome of my attempt to share his view.

Prologue One. “We have to be prepared for this.”

> There is no escape from yesterday, because yesterday has deformed us, or been deformed by us. (Beckett, 1999, p. 13)

It was a bright Saturday morning and I was walking outside. I was attending a friend’s wedding later that day, so I was wearing a black suit, which was unusual. Inside the subway there were not many others wearing the same type of formal clothes. The day was rather good for mountain climbing or a picnic. Then I saw an anchorman on a screen wearing the same black suit. He looked serious. A glaring news alert streamed across the screen: “Former president Moo-hyun Roh found dead.” Soon I received a text from my manager: “Heard this? We have to be prepared for this. Come quick.” I did not understand what he meant. It was Saturday and we were neither journalists nor the police. What should booksellers have to do about the death of a president?

I never liked Roh. Perhaps it was because I did not live through the dramatic moment of his campaign for the presidential election in 2002. I was in an army training camp at the time, where, for the purposes of training, no stories from outside were allowed in. Later, I heard there was something magical about Roh that drove supporters to volunteer to participate in his campaign. They spent countless nights calling their friends, sending endless text messages to anyone they knew, writing blog posts, and commenting in online communities. When the election was called, they cried with joy alongside their candidate Moo-hyun Roh. But this was just what I heard. A friend sent me a letter and said, “The nation may be changed after all.” This declaration surprised me almost more than the election, as he was not the type to speak of tomorrow.

But the change my friend dreamed of never arrived. Instead, I watched as the South Korean government joined the U.S. invasion in Iraq, which resulted in the kidnapping of a South Korean civilian by the Iraqi militia. I watched on the television screen as the victim screamed and sobbed, begging us to pull the troops out of Iraq. “Please, save me. I don’t want to die! I don’t want to die!” Roh refused to meet the kidnapper’s demands, and the man was beheaded

(Spinner & Faiola, 2004). I heard Roh give the government permission to wield law and order against the people during labor disputes, sacrificing his supporters to the deliberately sharpened edge of combat police shields (Hadl, 2011; Kwon, 2016). I heard about the time Roh ordered the military to disperse activists and locals who were protesting against building a new U.S. Army base in P'yŏngt'aek – my friends wielded bamboo sticks against heavily-armed, trained soldiers (Choe, 2006; Yeo, 2011, p. 2). Once when I was sitting on a wooden bench near Kwanghwamun square, I saw the phrase "All this is because of Roh" carved into the bench. That phrase was popular during the time I lived under his government. It was even not surprising to me when I heard that he was under investigation for bribery.

When I returned to the office, after hearing of Roh's death, I found that my co-workers had already designed an aesthetic and mournful banner-image on the main page. My manager was right. Despite my doubts, there were already piles of order-slips waiting to be processed. I joined my co-workers who were already working on handling the orders. Swamped with orders, I had no time to consider the implications of his death, while the banner on our website asked each visitor: "What did Moo-hyun Roh mean to you?"

Something was changed. On my way home that day, I saw many people dressed in black. Some were openly sobbing on the street. This was obscene. It seemed his choice to die by jumping from a cliff had deformed many, including himself. Roh climbed the cliff as a corrupt politician; when his body landed on the ground, he became a question. It was a question about the past, that suddenly flooded to the present. That question, perhaps cannot be answered properly in any way, convoked me into one of them**.** Perhaps one mistake was not asking ourselves that question in the present tense: "What **does** Moo-hyun Roh mean to us?" His suicide was like a nail in the floor; we knew the sharp thing had been there a long time, and finally, when the nail came to hurt us, we looked at our bleeding feet and confessed that we had always known it was there, but we never knew when to bring it up. I never liked him. And my manager was right; we should have prepared for his death. But, in truth, no one ever could prepare something like this, the known-unknown or the unknown(unspoken)-known.

Chapter One. *Ars oblivionis* in the era of networked memory reproduction

> Normally, strange things circulate discreetly below our streets. But a crisis will suffice for them to rise up, as if swollen by flood waters, pushing aside manhole covers, invading the cellars, then spreading through the towns. It always comes as a surprise when the nocturnal erupts into broad daylight. What it reveals is an underground existence, an inner resistance that has never been broken. This lurking force infiltrates the lines of tension within the society it threatens. Suddenly it magnifies them; using the means, the circuitry already in place, but reemploying them in the service of an anxiety that comes from afar, unanticipated. It breaks through barriers, flooding the social channels and opening new path ways that, once the flow of its passage has subsided, will leave behind a different landscape and a different order.
>
> Is this the outbreak of something new or the repetition of a past? The historian never knows which. (De Certeau, 2000, p. 1)

Introduction

This chapter provides the theoretical framework of this dissertation. The roles that Moo-hyun Roh's memory has played recently in the formation and negotiation of South Korean identity are undergirded, as I will attempt to prove in this project as a whole, by specific sets of relationships that make up memory over time. I argue that the eruptive expression of the collective memory of Roh at the time of his funeral was something that previously only "circulated discreetly below"; it "comes as a surprise" and is reemployed by the present (2000, p. 1). A dramatic shift occurred in public attitudes to Roh, who had formerly been called a corrupt politician but was mourned at his death by five million people all across the country.

Is this yet another instance of the failure of human memory? It could be. Does the false identification of Roh speak what had been left unspoken? I say yes: Roh's death and the remaining commemorative culture "leave behind a different landscape and a different order" (De Certeau, 2000, p. 1). Here, I propose that forgetting can be performative (Plate & Smelik, 2013;

Santino, 2004; Taylor, 1989; Van Dijck, 2005). As Laura Basu (2012) notes, enduring collective memories are "never made by politicians, monuments, or individual media representations alone" (p. 2), although power relations in media and politics are essential to their existence. If a performance exposes a strand of cultural memory, what follows it may be allegoric if the narrative performed has twisted relations with the past, or it can be ironic by implicating other occasions that have only weak links to it (De Man, 1979; Derrida, 1989). The selective gesture incorporating the memory of Roh may create an advantageous opportunity to closely examine the specific and multiple relationships of media, power, and time that have formed a cultural memory in recent South Korean society.

The identification of what has been circulating below the surface of Korean society from the year 2009, begins here with an examination of the modes of memories, beginning with chapter 2, where I will discuss specific cultural meta-memories erected by Roh's death. This chapter serves to sketch the theoretical shape of active silence as a mode of existence of forgetting before identifying the particular meta-memory practiced together with forgetting at Roh's death. Questions of forgetting, temporality, and media are all crucial in the emerging field of memory studies, and the case of Roh provides an occasion for identifying and analyzing these factors that are all interwoven in selective forgetting.

The chapter will consist of three parts. First, I will discuss some challenging views on forgetting in the understanding of memory. Memory is taken to be the foundation for an ideal, truth-seeking, and independent identity, and forgetting is denounced as decay or interruption. We are lacking a vigorous discussion of forgetting. The ideas of repression, denial, and amnesia are more commonly mentioned. Taking philosophical ideas on forgetting as a foundation, this part will explore forgetting as a normal part of the memory-making process.

In the second part, I will expand my argument on memory and forgetting to focus on its relationship with temporality. How can we judge the present with forgetting? For Nietzsche, Bergson, and Heidegger, memory creates a space for facing the now. Here, I contend that this must be considered together with forgetting, which empties out what chained the freedom of the individual (Derrida, 1989, p. 35). In this conception, a new projection toward the future is only available on the condition that there is a rupture in our experience.

Then, the omnipresent then-and-now media will be examined as an active agent of a new mode of memory in the present. The precise question in this part concerns the changes to our mode of remembering and forgetting resulting from the shift in media technology. Here I play the mythologist who, according to De Certeau, is "providing the eruption of strangeness with forms of expression prepared in advance, as it were, for that sudden inundation" (De Certeau, 2000, p. 1). Eschewing decisive pronouncements, I will explore the possibilities offered by the new media ecology.

Activeness in forgetting

The banality of forgetting

With the rare exception, such as Daoism (Chen, 2015),[5] our culture finds greater value in remembering than not. This dichotomous conception of human memory has long been dominant, claiming that memory is superior and that forgetting is banal; this is a mere representation of the human incapacity to handle the mind's weakness (Garde-Hansen, 2011; O'Hara et al., 2006; Ricoeur, 2004). It places importance on remembering, while thoughtful consideration of oblivion has disappeared from mainstream academic discussions. Forgetting is frequently related to uncivilized nature; for instance, scholars speak of the mind of "[being] lazy" (Stone, Gkinopoulos, & Hirst, 2017, p. 287). Or, as Anne Whitehead reports, while the memory is viewed first and foremost as a "deposit and storage," forgetting plays no decisive role in this system except to be the result of a "fault in the storage systems or from a decay or misrecognition of the memory traces" (Whitehead, 2009, p. 48). Forgetting is commonly described as water, as Harald Weinrich illustrates in his essential book on this issue, *Lethe: The art and critique of forgetting* (Weinrich, 2004, p. 16). For contemporaries, forgetting is found to

[5] According to Chen (2015), Daoist philosophy highlights the importance of forgetting (*wang*, 忘). The word *wang* appears in many passages of the *Zhuangzi*: "Fish forget one another in the rivers and lakes, and men forget one another in the arts of the Dao" (p. 50). When one forgets, one becomes closer to transforming the self and attaining oneness with the Dao. To nourish the mind and enter Heaven, it is necessary to forget things, forget heaven, and forget the self. This forgetting discussed here implies the breaking away from physical and mental desires that can cause harm to self and others, including the excessive indulgence in material things and judging, using the mind's limited knowledge. In place of rejecting or destroying the world, forgetting is here "a kind of sublation that inherits the position and, through a synthesis, transcends to a higher realm" (Chen, 2015, p. 180).

be an uncontrollable force of nature acting on our consciousness. Modern psychologists, taking this view, consider amnesia as an abnormality of the mind, caused by aging or other negative influences that block the memory system from its proper functioning (Eichenbaum & Cohen, 2004, p. 11). The objective of studies derived from this knowledge exhibits the ambitions of diagnosing and curing memory disorders caused by injury, sickness, or aging. Generally speaking, forgetting is considered a lack, an absence, or an end. These ideas on forgetting and other forms of failure of memory reflect a conception of it derived from the ancient Greek idea of *alētheia*, or not-forgetting, as the truth of memory. The variations on an oversimplified account define forgetting in terms of neglect, failure, and injustice: "the shady villain . . . lurking behind the scenes" (Brockmeier, 2002, p. 15).

Nevertheless, as theorists have increasingly argued in recent years, remembering is currently considered to be inseparable from forgetting. Forgetting is instead something betokening a dialectic "presence by absence" (Singer & Conway, 2008, p. 281; see also, Ricoeur, 2004, pp. 433 and 458). Something forgotten is not misplaced or displaced from our consciousness but rather is a proof of its own past existence. Forgetting "in this paradoxically active sense" is not simply a matter of ignoring events but of being able to ignore them despite their potentially troubling character (Rigney, 2012, p. 52). Echoing this, in a recently published article, Plate proposes the necessity of studies of forgetting (Plate, 2015). In the search of answers to the questions how and why we forget, she suggests, we must understand the discrete "moment and act" of interruption or disruption that is productive of oblivion, as well as what serves to maintain it. She concludes that such study will open "the relationship between memory and knowledge on the one hand, and oblivion and ignorance on the other"; most importantly, it will reveal "how individual oblivion is produced culturally" (Plate, 2015, p. 148).

However, the term forgetting encompasses a vast territory. Ann Rigney calls it an "umbrella term" (Rigney, 2012, p. 240). It signifies many different modes of loss of memory and inability to express, including amnesia, oblivion, silence, and omission (Plate, 2015, p. 148). It can also be used to name a broad range of sources of elimination of memory including repressive erasure of traces, benign neglect, repetition, over-writing by other priorities, self-imposed silence, mutation, to obsolescence (Rigney, 2012, p. 240). One particular mode of absence of memory was called "aphasia" by Ann Stoler, in that for this case, information on the past

remains, but the testimony of the past is not spoken (Stoler, 2011). Jan Assmann, in a way that is at once similar and different, articulates an idea of encrypted memory, according to which memory exists inside a crypt that is held within culture; thus, it is invisible, but it can be revived, either as is or in a different mode of existence (Assmann, 1998, p. 216). Counter-memory, as a practice imposing vernacular memories on top of official ones, is an exercise of forgetting (Foucault, 1980, pp. 160–161, 206–211). To systemize the ways forgetting is treated in the foregoing scattered references, sociologist Paul Connerton (2008) offers a taxonomy of forgetting in seven types.

1. Repressive erasure (Connerton, 2008, p. 60), in which a dominant political regime, e.g., of totalitarianism, remakes history;
2. Prescriptive forgetting (Connerton, 2008, p. 61), which eases conflicts from the past that cannot easily be dealt with in present time;
3. Forgetting that is constitutive in the formation of a new identity (Connerton, 2008, p. 62);
4. Structural amnesia (Connerton, 2008, p. 64), what the collective is aware of but does not speak of, such as patriarchy;
5. Forgetting as annulment (Connerton, 2008, p. 64), e.g., the growth of archives and computers;
6. Forgetting as planned obsolescence (Connerton, 2008, p. 66); and
7. Forgetting as humiliated silence (Connerton, 2008, p. 67).

Connerton's article has provoked a number of negative responses; its categorization caused "initial confusion" as it "illustrated with examples from very diverse areas" (Wessel & Moulds, 2008, p. 288; see also, Singer & Conway, 2008). Scott Timcke (2013), in response to these, recategorized the above seven above into "1) repressive erasure, 2) forgetting as constitutive, 3) planned obsolescence" (p. 376). However, the clear product of this discussion, as discussed above, is the realization that the idea of forgetting is not universal. Instead, "there are a variety of pressures and mechanisms that are at play" when one forgets, and condemning them out of hand is premature (Timcke, 2013),

In relation to the topic here, I will dwell on and expand Connerton's third category, forgetting that is constitutive in the formation of a new identity (Connerton, 2008, p. 62) (in

Timcke's second recategorization, this is forgetting as constitutive, which is nearly identical to Connerton's conception). With this criterion, Connerton suggests that forgetting can be used as a method to build one's identity. He writes

> The emphasis here is not so much on the loss entailed in being unable to retain certain things as rather on the gain that accrues to those who know how to discard memories that serve no practicable purpose in the management of one's current identity and ongoing purposes. Forgetting then becomes part of the process by which newly shared memories are constructed because a new set of memories are frequently accompanied by a set of tacitly shared silences. (Connerton, 2008, p. 64)

Here forgetting is voluntary; groups and individuals consciously create silence on a particular part of the past in forging the identity politics they need. The present necessity forces the recreation of what is remembered and what is not.

This type is the employment of forgetting in the occasion of the creation of a new self. Paul Ricœur depicted a similar process in his work *Oneself as Another* (Ricœur, 2008), where identity is shown to be the product of negotiation dependent on the eradication of previous aspects of life-history. He distinguishes two modes of the sense of identity: *idem* identity is the sameness in the self; it represents the claim not to change during the course of time and before events around the subject change themselves. Change, however, does occur, and one should not deny it but negotiate. This negotiated identity is *ipse* identity. For Ricœur, the difficulty of dealing with changes over time is one reason why identity is so fragile. Here, again, forgetting is not a loss. Rather, it exists as an affirmative force that maintains the identity within a negotiation with the present. This paradigm of forgetting as both a reserve and deletion is at the origin of what Paul Ricœur calls "the disturbing threat that lurks in the background of the phenomenology of memory and of the epistemology of history" (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 412). For him, the best use of forgetting "is precisely in the construction of plots, in the elaboration of narratives concerning personal identity or collective identity"; that is, "we cannot tell a story without eliminating or dropping some important event according to the kind of plot we intend to build" (Ricoeur, 1999, p. 9). Forgetting, in this mode, functions as an offer to reconcile the past and moving forward (Rieff, 2016).

1.2. Active forgetting to enable current action

Friedrich Nietzsche highlights this idea of the must erasure of the past for the sake of the present life. In his famous second meditation from *Untimely Meditation*s (Nietzsche, 1997), Nietzsche coins the expression "active forgetting" (p. 62). In this context, Nietzsche calls for an abandonment of the past, as excessive focus on fossilized remembrance can diminish the value of the present, which "returns as a ghost and disturbs the peace of a later moment" (1997, p. 61). As a radical solution, he proposes critical discourse on the past "that would be attentive to the needs of the present and able to distinguish between what in the past is advantageous and what is disadvantageous for life" (Ramadanovic, 2001).

As Louis Pojman (2001) notes, "the present is fleeting, effervescent, uncatchable" (p. 231), meaning that memory and knowledge of the past provide groups with sense-making processes that form present values and beliefs. What happens next is the hegemon's use of the past to set "hegemonic systems of control" that "become . . . incorporated into everyday life, organising popular sentiments and discourses" (Sue, 2015, p. 115).

Thus, for Nietzsche, forgetting enables human beings to step outside of history and to feel unhistorically. According to Aleida Assmann "active forgetting is implied in intentional acts such as trashing and destroying." She explains that "[a]cts of forgetting are a necessary and constructive part of internal social transformations" (A. Assmann, 2008, p. 97). This differs from censorship, which is a more forceful "if not always successful instrument for destroying material and mental cultural products" (A. Assmann, 2008, p. 98). Active forgetting is elevated for its potential to rescue human beings from their disastrous history. This resonates with Nietzsche's other anti-platonic ideas, including his idea of Dionysian wisdom, which is "[j]oy in the destruction of the most noble and the sight of its progressive ruin: In reality joy in what is coming and lies in the future, which triumphs over existing things, however good" (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 224).

Thus, what Nietzsche "press[es] vigorously forward" (1997, p. 110) was the idea of forgetting as an active force that can help make the future new. Forgetting, here, is a power that is destructive to the past, thus anti-hegemonic, like Walter Benjamin's much-discussed "divine violence," which "boundlessly destroys [boundaries]" (Benjamin, 1986, p. 297) although some

scholars disregard the concept for dismissing "the complex hegemonic mechanisms" (Sue, 2015, p. 113).

Active forgetting offers a different temporal condition, liberation from the time that is dictated by history's legitimacy. In relation to this, Nietzsche rationalizes the relation to the past and renders conscious—so that it can be overcome—all those haunting memories that return to disturb the calm of a later moment. Joshua Dienstag (2004) notes that new time is forecast "as something constantly in flux, constantly in the process of becoming and, thus, constantly in the process of destroying . . . It recommends no cure for the pains of existence, only a public recognition of their depth and power" (2004, p. 87). This is "a moment, nowhere and then gone, nothing before it came, again nothing after it has gone." The moment "nonetheless returns as a ghost and disturbs the peace of a later moment. A leaf flutters from the scroll of time, floats away—and suddenly floats back again and falls into the man's lap" (Nietzsche, 1997, p. 61). Considering that this should be a product of a perspectival shift that sifts through evaluations created from a former perspective to keep only what can be reconciled with a new point of view, active forgetting is Nietzsche's proposal to decolonize the very possibility of memory from the rigid dominance of history. Sarah Kofman characterizes it in this way:

> If time is indeed a necessary condition for the forgetting of the first evaluations, it is not a sufficient one: forgetting only has to occur because new forces have prevailed and been able to make other evaluations triumph. (Kofman, 1993, p. 50)

In Nietzsche's examination of forgetting, the aim is to the destruction of the horizon. It is to escape from its obtrusive regime in culture, whose articulation on the subject is also narrated in another work of Nietzsche's in the following way:

> Only by forgetting this primitive world of metaphor can one live with any repose, security, and consistency: only by means of the petrification and coagulation of a mass of images which originally streamed from the primal faculty of human imagination like a fiery liquid, only in the invincible faith that *this* sun, *this* window, *this* table is a truth in itself, in short, only by forgetting that he himself is an *artistically creating* subject, does man live with any repose, security, and consistency. (Nietzsche, 2000, p. 86)

Time and temporality of memory and forgetting

Bergson and Halbwachs: memory for the active now

Nietzsche's discussion shows that the mode of memory cannot be considered separately from its impact on the sense of time. That is, time and memory—with forgetting included as well as remembering—are two interwoven, inseparable products of our temporal sense. The focus on nowness and individual freedom in recollection—characterized as creativity in the above text and plasticity, describing true possibility (Malabou, 2017, see also, 2010) in Malabou's reading of Nietzsche —has continued to appear in modern philosophy of memory.

Henri Bergson sees memory as a kind of duration that contains within it a past that is always present, that gnaws at the future, a past that we access through leaps into its layers to extricate that which recollection calls up. "Memory," he claims, is "inseparable in practice from perception, imports the past into the present, contracts into a single intuition many moments of duration" (Bergson, 1988, p. 73). That is, recollection is not a work that can be manipulated. Instead of retrieving a specific memory for the particular situation, Bergson suggests, all of our past experiences should always be available to us at any moment and able to impact it.[6] The multiplicity of temporal layers of memories continue to hover around the edges of the present, adding vibrant color and shaping the present intuitions. In other words, through recollection, the sense of the now in the present can be made heterogeneous, because it continues to be made. No matter how fleeting, each instant always contains within it a multitude of remembered elements, which are contracted into recollection.

Bergson's idea strongly contrasts with that of John Locke who finds the very possibility of our sense of subjectivity in the continuity of remembering (cf. Peters, 1989).[7] For Bergson, the

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[6] Here Bergson lays out his position on what would be called the phenomenology of time by Edmond Husserl and Paul Ricœur. Our conscious life is in perpetual oscillation between the dynamics of retention and protention. The phenomenology of time allows us to explore the meaning of our past in a way that is intimately associated with an enhanced understanding of the future.

[7] Locke takes memory to be a power of the mind "to revive perceptions, which it once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them before" (Locke, 1998, p. 182 [II, X, 2]). Locke prioritizes the memory of an individual that can only guarantee the integral subjectivity of the individual, since one who remembers his/her own past can preserve one's own integrity. The agency to form one's present self is also supported by one's past experiences, based on making one's decision to be credible to oneself as well as other people: I

past is not merely a moment in time that slips away and then is recalled later. Instead, all time is ever -present. This offers a rich trove that continuously conditions and enhances our experience. The past image is virtual, before parts of it take the form of recollection—"little by little it comes into view like a condensing cloud," it passes into the actual and tends to imitate perception—"but it remains attached to the past by the deepest roots, and if, once realized, it did not retain something of its original virtuality . . . we should never know it for a memory" (Bergson, 1988, p. 134).

Most importantly, it should not be omitted from Bergson's idea that the present is the *locus* of action. Memories are inert, but they condition now time, which can act: "The past is only idea, the present is idea-motor . . . the past is essentially *that which acts no longer*," and it is, therefore, essential to make "a real distinction between it and the present, i.e., *that which is acting*" (Bergson, 1988, pp. 68–69). Bergson writes that "there is much more between the past and the present than a mere difference of degree. My present is that which interests me, which lives for me, and in a word, that which summons me to action; in contrast, my past is essentially powerless" Bergson (1988, p. 137). Memory and the present are interconnected: the past conditions the present, and the present conditions the past. The past itself may be unable to act, but it works on the present and allows it to operate. The current itself calls up the memory, actualizes it, and helps to give it form.

This is, arguably, an Aristotelian conception of memory, in whose theory the presentness of the time of recollection is emphasized. That is to say, memory–recollection is not reactionary. Recollection does not occur in chronological order but as an untamed, intertemporal, and ongoing activity inside one's many memories. Bergson later defined two senses of memory, as *durée* and as imagination. In his treatise on memory and recollection, Aristotle distinguishes between memory and remembering (*mnēmē* or *mnēmoneuein*), on the one hand, and reminiscing or recollecting (*anamnesis* or to *anamimnēskesthai*), on the other (Aristotle, 2004, p. 449a:4–

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am the one whom I remember in my past (Locke, 1998, pp. 126–127 [II, I, 13]; see also, Ricoeur, 2004, p. 5 and pp. 102–109). No doubt, part of the allure of this position is its connection to the experience of remembering. Moreover, Locke thinks, even if two individuals share a memory of the same thing, the remembered object has the status of something that is viewed from different perspectives. Thus, for Locke, consciousness is an achievement of remembering—a means of integrating the past and, hence, of guiding, organizing, and constructing the self.

453b:11; see also Krell, 1990, p. 13). Like Bergson's memory as *durée*, *mnēmē* is the simple presence or affection of a memory to the mind, which secures its character as an image or representation of something absent. The past was part of the present. In contrast, *anamnēsis* creates a trace in the process of recollection, which is written through *mnēmē*. Recollection flourishes, according to Aristotle, insofar as one *kinēsis* generates another, and we find what we are trying to remember. Kinesis, variously translated as motion, change, animation, or impulse, here means coming-to-presence or self-showing of a being that till now was absent from memory. Thus, while *mnēmē* is a "simple presence to mind" (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 15), in *anamnēsis* is the active, deliberate process of seeking out and bringing to consciousness these imprints or memories. Memory, as *anamnēsis* is based on kinetic movement, our recollection is always possible to become intertemporal. It entails memory or representation of a certain fact that happened in the past (Bergson, 1988).

The idea that the sense of now shapes how society remembers the past is expressed in the notion of collective memory. In a shift from the long-shared Lockean faithful-to-the-past subjectivity, Maurice Halbwachs coined the term collective memory in his 1925 book, *Les Travaux de l'Année sociologique* (1992), suggesting that memory functions according to the rules, norms, and logic of a symbolic order in its preservation and transmission. Memories are social products, as they are

> recalled to me externally, and the groups of which I am a part at any time give me the means to reconstruct them, upon [the] condition…that I turn toward them and adopt, at least for the moment, their way of thinking. (Halbwachs, 1992, p. 38)

The most substantial differentiation here is that one no longer assumes any way memory ought to be. Halbwachs disclaims epistemological history as abstract, totalizing, and dead (Erll, 2008, p. 6). Instead of being loyal to the past, individuals should recall memories within social frames that allow them resources through which they can reconstruct their memories. Memory is collective, but it is not universal or homogeneous. Halbwachs's central idea was to try to understand the various ways in which what we speak of as an individual's memory is, in fact, largely maintained and made possible through that individual's belonging to a community, whether the relevant community be the family, nation, or culture. All these levels function as different frameworks that enable individuals to have memories (Halbwachs, 1992). The

collective forgetting, on this view, can be a dynamic and constructive process: all selective frameworks need to dispose of certain elements before incorporating new ones (Minarova-Banjac, 2018). He uses the example of modern bourgeois societies where couples must form new collective memories from potentially incompatible family memories. He states, “to avoid inevitable conflict which cannot be adjudicated through norms accepted by both, they tacitly agree the past is to be treated as if it were abolished” (Halbwachs, 1992, p. 77).

Thus, collective memory may even be particular, meaningful, and living (Erll, 2008, p. 6). In collective remembering, recollected memory is interpretatively tied to the present, and a necessary part of an account of the past may be deleted or distorted in the service of present needs. As a result, for Halbwachs and scholars of collective memory, the past is tied interpretatively to the present, and a necessary part of any account of the past can be deleted or distorted in the service of present needs; remembrance gives greater emphasis to the social and political contestation that is part of many accounts of the past and, thus, is understood as a phenomenon of the present.

However, this idea of collective memory, focusing just on the presentness of memory, assumes the present to be firm and solid ground where a person is rooted. The general criticism of both static frames of reference and unconstrained flows of living tradition gives rise to new conceptions of the dimensions of time and space within social theory, associated with the attempts to transcend the divisions between structure-oriented and action-oriented theories. Collective memory theorizes memory from within durable social frames at the time of establishment; however, memories are under ongoing contestant aerations; one changes its appearance and often appears reshaped in unexpected ways. Collective memory often puts boundaries on the memories of particular collectives, resulting in rigid ideas, which perhaps undercuts the mobility of memory.

Some concepts that alter these notions, such as Aleida Assmann’s cultural memory, liquidates the inflexibility of the temporality of the notion . By altering the notion of collective memory to cultural memory, Assmann discloses memories that have been passively stored and “deprived of their old existence and waiting for a new one” (2008, p. 103), owing to the fact that they are “no longer needed or immediately understood” (2008, p. 106). Cultural memories based on that achieved memory of futurity are granted relative flexibility; unlike rigid social

(ideological) memory, the plastic nature of cultural memories is the key to surviving the memory itself in its present form, as well as the key to society as a whole. In other words, cultural memory is not about testifying to past events as accurately and truthfully as possible, nor is it necessarily about ensuring cultural continuity. Rather, it is about making meaningful statements about the past in the given cultural context of the present (Holtorf, 2008). Putting the precise point of the rescue on the futurity of memory, Assmann alters what was considered to be "lived" to something that is "be-living." Forgetting here functions as neither absence nor loss. It is instead an apparatus of adjustment for the present, especially for the time of protention. An inevitable and necessary part of cultural memory-making, forgetting can be liberating for individuals and communities that seek to separate themselves from old traditions and memories that continue to impact current politics.

Heidegger: forgetting and the realization of now

Activeness in forgetting can be observed in other respects. As a process of memory, forgetting also functions as a preferable apparatus of adjustment for the present time, such as in Nietzsche's proposal of active forgetting. The value of forgetting is not just as one's ability to acquire agency in time-politics, but forgetting also offers a special moment that may bring forward the intense possibility of understanding the deep relationship between time and memory. The absence of memory is often not a simple loss but a rupture or crisis of our understanding. If we, as Jacques Derrida proclaims in multiple places, accept that our forgetting involves the new in every act of repetition, we must also accept that memory cannot unproblematically retrieve past experiences, reconstruct the past as it was, or be associated with the transmission of unchanging traditions through time.

Martin Heidegger, who without a doubt valorizes *alētheia,* truth as unforgetting, never simply disempowers forgetting. Memory and recollection, for him, are not merely "power to recall"; remembrance is instead a gathering of the things that "speak to us in every thoughtful meditation" (Heidegger, 2004, p. 140). Memory is working on a "constant concentrated abiding with something;" thus our memory is "not just with something that has passed, but in the same way with what is present and with what may come" (Heidegger, 2004, p. 140). What is past, present, and to come appears in "the oneness of its own present being" (Heidegger, 2004, p. 140). Thus, he notes:

> Inasmuch as memory—the concentration of our disposition, devotion—does not let go of that on which it concentrates, memory is imbued not just with the quality of essential recall, but equally with the quality of an unrelinquishing and unrelenting retention. (Heidegger, 2004, p. 140)

This thoughtful meditation of recollection should include the process of forgetting. As Stephan Käufer explains (2011, p. 53), our forgetfulness (*Vergessenheit*) is the inauthentic mode of having been. Forgetting is "not . . . just failure of to remember . . . it is rather a 'positive,' ecstatical mode of one's having been." Heidegger clarifies this:

> Remembering is possible only on that [ground] of forgetting, and not *vice versa*. For, in the mode of having-forgotten, one's having been "discloses" primarily the horizon into which a *Dasein* lost in the "superficiality" of its object of concern, can bring itself by remembering. (Heidegger, 2008, pp. 338–339 [G339, i.e., German p. 339 G]).

In other words, forgetting cannot be about what is forgotten. It is another relationship with the past, which existed as what has been in the present. Using Bergson's word, forgetting is not an absence: rather, it is a memory that is present, as virtual. Then forgetting is within our real essence, *Dasein*, as it meets opportunities in the present.

For Heidegger, forgetting is ambivalent. If Dasein falls into inauthenticity, its existence loses itself in its concerns and becomes absorbed into the daily tasks of living. Rather than being concerned with its own primordial potentiality for Being, Dasein's everyday existence involves the projection of a specific, existential understanding of Being, based on a non-thematic readiness to deal or cope with things. This facility in one's daily activities, Heidegger suggests, corresponds to a kind of forgetfulness. He writes:

> With the inconstancy of the they-self Dasein makes present its "today." In awaiting the next new thing, it has already forgotten the old one. The "they" evade choice. Blind for possibilities, it cannot repeat what has been, but only retains and receives the "actual" that is left over, the world-historical that has been, the leavings, and the information about them that is present-at-hand. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 443 [G391])

However, it does not stop there. For Heidegger, forgetting foregrounds the true remembrance, that is, the historical meaning of *Dasein*, and projects possibilities into the future. Heidegger

believes that time, the essence of being, is given to *Dasein* to be opened. Time does not just flow but offers a true possibility to leap over one's own frame and then articulate the true truth. The past, thus, is not merely facts that happened; rather, it "is first opened up for the present by its direction into the future" (Leichter, 2011, p. 87).

> The ecstasis (rapture) of forgetting has the character of backing away in the face of one's ownmost "been," and of doing so in a manner which is closed off from itself-in such a manner, indeed, that this backing-away closes off ecstatically that in the face of which one is backing away, and thereby closes itself off too. Having forgotten [*Vergessenheit*] as an inauthentic way of having been, is thus related to that thrown Being which is one's own; it is the temporal meaning of that Being in accordance with which I am proximally and for the most part as-having been. (Heidegger, 2008, pp. 388–389 [G339])

Thus, if there is forgetting, it is not simply of past events; in forgetting, Dasein closes itself off from the fact that its Being is questionable, that is, the question of Dasein can never be fully settled. Now one must be opened up to the world, and forgetting partakes of such an opportunity. Put differently, Heidegger claims that remembering is meaningful insofar as it is an attempt to recover something from forgetfulness.

> Only on the basis of such forgetting can anything be retained [*behalten*] by the concernful making-present which awaits, and what is thus retained are entities encountered within-the-world with a character other than that of *Dasein*. . . . The awaiting which forgets and makes present is an ecstatical unity in its own right, in accordance with which inauthentic understanding temporalizes itself with regard to its temporality. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 389 [G339])

Dasein's dispersion among its current possibilities means that it loses both the understanding of who it truly is and any sense of the concealed and forgotten possibilities contained in the cultural tradition it has inherited. Rather than retrieving those possibilities that the past harbors, *Dasein*'s thinking becomes constricted, and the possibilities through which it understands itself and its world are judged according to their usefulness. In this passage, Paul Ricœur explains, having-been refers to "the complete anteriority of the past with respect to every event that is dated, remembered, or forgetting. An anteriority that is not confined to removing it from our grasp, as is the case of the past as expired [*Vergangenheit*], but an anteriority that preserves" (Ricoeur, 2004,

p. 442). This is a past that is always already with us but that cannot be given a specific date in the past. Rather, it is, as Steven Crowell suggests, "spectral," which is to say, incapable of being narrated while also being the ground for narratives (Crowell, 1999). The past, as having-been, makes the reserve of forgetting an immemorial resource for the work of remembering forging repetition possible, precisely because it does not condemn the past to being wholly irretrievable and gone.

Derrida: saying "yes, yes" to affirmative memory

For Derrida, Heidegger's belief that memory enables the emergence of consciousness capable of establishing conditions of autonomy and freedom is naïve. In his work on memory and mourning *Memoires: for Paul de Man* (Derrida, 1989), Derrida finds that the Heideggerian notion of being-in-time still works within the limits of the binary constitution of metaphysics and thus is lacking. He doubts the ability of consciousness to grasp what might be understood as the text within the temporal horizon, while correcting Heidegger's merger of two concepts, which according to Derrida must be considered separately: *Anwesenheit*, or the presence of being-in-general, and *Gegenwartigkeit*, or the presence of being-in-time. Derrida considers it essential to draw this distinction, since it is what allows us to perceive the trace as a prisoner of the text, whereas, in Heideggerian philosophy, being is only a prisoner of itself. The chain, thus, to which we belong is very far from the sense of a continuous flux within imagination (Derrida, 1989, p. 27). What Heidegger imagined for the *Dasein* is rather written by the law, which continues to apply not only to attempts to deal with tradition but also to the orientation directed toward the uncertainties of the unconscious (Derrida, 1989, p. 35).

Memory, then, is neither of the past, nor from the present, but is affirmative. It creates a simple alliance with the sense of now. We can only refer to something being "in memory of"; thus, *différance*, with its letter "a," can play a role in explaining the movement of an ever-continuing production of differences. Memory as an act is inscribed in traces, or survivals of a past, which mark every ongoing inscription. It has no concrete existence in itself, and it is always contiguous to the act of being narrated. However, it does exist and is sanctioned by living peoples who share a moment together, such as for example before the place of mourning. Derrida illustrates how people can hold memory through the tactics of a storyteller who can save it,

weaving tales that promise to affirm the memory of something other, through promising themselves to such an affirmation. Thus, memory is bound by a double yes-saying oath:

> [T]he "yes," which is a non-active act, which states or describes nothing, which in itself neither manifests nor defines any content, this yes only commits, before and beyond everything else. And to do so, it must repeat itself to itself: yes, yes. It must preserve memory; it must commit itself to keeping its own memory; it must promise itself to itself; it must bind itself to memory for memory if anything is ever to come from the future. This is the law, and this is what the performative category, in its current state, can merely approach, at the moment when "yes" is said, and "yes" to that "yes." (Derrida, 1989, p. 20)

The first yes does not occur without the second or its promise, even as the second is the memory of the first, with the yes itself being internally divided into yes, yes. This affirmation of memory, as Maclachlan describes it, thus begins "by calling, without assurance, for repetition, in a series one would hesitate to qualify once and for all as diachronic" (Maclachlan, 2014, p. 250).

Ironically, this exposes memory, for both recollection and forgetting is based on utterance, an oath or a double promise. This memory's very mode is a promise by the one who shares "memory of"; the second is a signature affirming that memory is "being remembered as promised" (Derrida, 1989, pp. 26–29). The fact that this is extremely present-dominant, however, does not imply the delegation of the future or the past. In this double-bounded promise, we can understand that the very nature of memory is performative. Each memory, whether it present (remembering) or absent (forgetting), is a declaration of a status in time and behaves just as it is declared. Forgetting can be, in this understanding, a practice of identity politics. The politics that claims the subject's sovereignty, however, makes a gesture of ambivalence, as it is neither a denial nor an affirmation of the past. Forgetting in this sense becomes performative. In her book *Antigone's Claim*, Judith Butler (2002) portrays Antigone as neither denying nor admitting being submerged into the words of the law. Butler instead depicts the speeches and actions of Antigone as the subversive caesura. Antigone's speech "obeys the demands" of the law, the law of the present, which is the order of the symbolic, "but [only] promiscuously" (Butler, 2002, p. 60). This, as Butler argues elsewhere, "inverts against itself the indictment it would level against the other" (Butler, 1997, p. 190).

To conclude this series of explorations, I assert that forgetting, at least, should not be designated as an incapability or banality in modern life. Instead, through dismantling what constituted the ground of our understanding, forgetting returns power to the people who share the presence or absence of memory. Oblivion may be deliberate, to design the practice of their own identity in actively performed silence or utterance of forgetting. Deeds re-resource the past. Reconfirmation, through a web of plural recollection and forgetting, is required for finding a temporal foundation for the now. The instability of subjectivity is part and parcel of the subject's not having fully been in the past yet not quite but being in the future.

Mediatized memory, mediatized forgetting

Here, issues relevant to our understanding of forgetting are examined through discussion of the recent interventions of technology into our memory processes—the mediatization of our memories. Above, I have examined different approaches to forgetting as a kind of partaking in the realization of now. These approaches can lead us to rethink South Korean reactions in 2009 and determine whether they derived from a failure of consistency or, instead, from anxiety over the present state of politics, resulting in collective action. Within this action, individuals chose not to speak of specific past images. This leads to the following question: is covert silence or denial of representation a response to a new media ecology?

Mediatized forgetting in new media

A proper approach to so-called new media may require a shift from previous grounds for memory and media studies. What is meant when we add the word digital to the pre-existing notion of remembering and forgetting? Indeed, if re-inscribing the past is to update the knowledge to the present era, this issue can be discussed in line with another long-debated conundrum whether media-technology ~~monopolize~~ monopolizes our knowledge. The reply is promptly forthcoming that digital memory offers increased capability of storage and access. However, as Chun notes, "Memory, with its constant degeneration, does not equal storage" (Chun, 2008, p. 148). More space does not simply expand understanding. Likewise, memories using technology cannot be simply understood to bring human beings an improved supplement to the memory.

It is impossible to deny, however, that when a medium appears, it can significantly reshape our remembering. Our access and exposure to media dramatically directed our way of remembering the past. Yet media's effect on human memory and how this affects the way we recall history are less-discussed. While one might assume that more documentation, communication, and modes of delivery would improve memory for historical events, multiple psychology studies observe that media affects the content of memories, the recollection of memories, and the capacity of memory, ultimately influencing the way we remember history (Molokotos, 2018; Sparrow, Liu, & Wegner, 2011; Tamir, Templeton, Ward, & Zaki, 2018).

Media modifies not only what we remember but how we remember. Studies warn of possible inaccuracy in media representation for the past event. It often associates with false information, exaggeration, and dramatizing in recollection. This idea is supported by studies showing that introducing misleading or false information about an event can lead to an inaccurate recollection (Lawson & Strange, 2015; Polage, 2012). Moreover, people's memory of the source for where they learned information is also affected by familiarity. According to one study, people attributed more familiar information as coming from a credible source, highlighting the feasibility of transmitting false information when illegitimate news sources repeatedly present false stories and facts on wide-reaching platforms such as Facebook and Twitter (Fragale & Heath, 2004).

More importantly, studies report media not only affects our ability to recall events clearly; it also impacts our memory capacity by removing the burden of remembering from our biological-self. With the advent of the Internet as the main source of retrieving our public and private past, internal memories for events seem to be no longer necessary. We only need to recall where and how to find information about an event, rather than the event itself. Psychologists refer to this decreased dependency on internal memory storage as the "Google effect" (Sparrow, Liu, & Wegner, 2011). In this study, it shows that people who expected to have access to information later on more readily forget information than those who did not. Furthermore, people show better memory for where to locate the information than the actual information.

Philosopher Bernard Stiegler explains that human memory is irresistibly *prosthetia*. Language is forgetful: instead, objects, what he calls "epiphylogenetic" ones, are required, as we rely on artifacts for our memories (Stiegler, 1998, p. 155). They are nonliving and thus concrete

things that serve as memory supports and thereby as the means by which past experiences, thoughts, ideas, and arguments, to name a few examples of epigenetic memories of the individual, are handed down to successive generations within a particular culture. For Stiegler, "[t]he prosthesis is not a mere extension of the human body; it is the constitution of this body qua 'human'" (Stiegler, 1998, pp. 152–153). Epigenetic memories are "set in advance, already there (past)," as well as comprehended in the context of "anticipation (foresight)" (Stiegler, 1998, p. 152) and hence are directed to the future.

Stiegler examines today's computational technical memory aids in particular; these he calls, digital *hypomnemata*. They differ from industrial *hypomnemata* of technical recording (photography, phonography, cinematography) in that they create an "associated hypomnesic milieu" in which "receivers are placed in the position of senders." Rather than dissociating consumption from production, as broadcast mass media (from phonography to global real-time television) did, today's microtechnologies and the social networking practices they facilitate connect them: if these technologies can be used to consume, Stiegler suggests, they can also be used to produce (Stiegler, 2010, p. 85). This is also why he thinks microtechnologies have more in common with writing than they do with broadcast media like film and television. By renewing the possibility for self-expression and hence for self-exteriorization today's digital *hypomnemata* restore a positive dimension to our coevolution with technics.

Thus, it appears likely that the contemporary is dominated by mediation with a blurred boundary between what traditionally distinguished senders and receivers. However, this should not mean that the media will be destructively subversive in their relationship with human agency. The senses we realized from media that are being shaped, denied, and reshaped continuously.

In his book, *The Bias of Communication* (2008), Harold Innis illustrated how the new media can monopolize knowledge by eliminating the mode of life with old media. "The monopoly of knowledge centering around stone and hieroglyphics was exposed to competition from papyrus as a new and more efficient medium" (2008, p. 35). He claims, for empires in history, it was really the "monopolies of knowledge" which ~~are~~ were at stake in the longevity of power. New media can reconfigure the social division between a mass of the ignorant and a knowledge elite by how much they could adapt this emerging technology unless those media can be enlisted in the service of the previous power structures. "The social revolution involved a shift

from the use of stone to the use of papyrus and the increased importance of the priestly class imposed enormous strains on Egyptian civilization and left it exposed to the inroads of invaders equipped with effective weapons of attack" (2008, p. 35). If priests can gain a monopoly on papyrus and writing, then they will gain power relative to the king who depends on stone monuments. The boundaries of the empire shift, expanding and contracting. The shift of perceptions redefines "knowledge," what those in power claim needs to be known. New allegiances are formed. New monopolies created.

Innis also thought monopolies of knowledge promote tendencies toward instability. Competitors and critics are always looking for ways to subvert monopoly power, and perhaps gain it for themselves. This links to our time's positivism to the Internet. With the emergence of this new technology, people expected such shifting monopolies in the delivery of news to the masses from newspapers to radio to television to the internet.

However, humans can no longer be understood as alienated from technics. The term that describes this close relationship between the human and the technical sphere, "transduction" introduced by Gilbert Simondon (2016, pp. 155-156, see also, Mackenzie, 2003, 2006), means that one term or element cannot be without the other. The subject, or "who", of humanity is thus inseparable from the object, or the "what" of technics. Each of them is not totally submissive to the other. They are joined in a transductive relation.

For Heidegger, the resonances of the Greek, *tekhne* offer the possibility also for thinking of technics as poiesis, or the unveiling of what is concealed (Heidegger 1977, p. 21). What prevents technics from being appreciated as poiesis is the dominance of the instrumental view of technics as a means and the dominance in science of the *causa efficiens*, the efficient cause. Heidegger wants to rethink this historic perception as only little thinking occurs when technics is conceived in this way. Technology, for him, rather has to be linked up with the idea of revealing – of revealing the truth of Being, in fact. Thus, *tekhne* becomes a "bringing-forth" linked to poiesis. Instead of an instrumental version of technics, which would enable humanity to do things in its own interest, Heidegger wants to poeticise technics and in so doing claim it for a thought which allows Being to come into unconcealment. This, for Heidegger, is the ultimate truth (*aletheia*). And this is, I argue, the true meaning of remembering.

Gregory Ulmer has drawn attention to the distinction between 'lived' and 'artificial' memory (Ulmer 1989, pp. 133–134). The idea of lived memory has been extremely influential in the history of thought. With respect to the recall of an experience of an event, lived memory would be the direct and unmediated representation of the perception of the event. In lived memory it is as though the event is being experienced for a second time as if it were the first time. Artificial memory, on the other hand, implies not only that memory entails a certain loss, but also that knowledge, understanding and insight are more important in recall than raw information supplied by perception. Memory becomes the code(s) individuals use to recall. The agency of human, the power to forget selective things, can decide remembering as being thoroughly individualised, derived as it is from biographical and other materials originating in personal experience or historical events. Here memory becomes a form of invention, since a link between the material to be recalled and the mode of recall is created.

Scholars identify that now memories are "on the move" (Blom, Lundemo, & Røssaak, 2017). Often, this type of change appears to occur thanks to our new mediation, leading the analysis to focus on the power of media, as if this is something new. For instance, Andrew Hoskins writes that "contemporary memory is thoroughly interpenetrated by a technological unconscious in that there occurs a 'co-evolution of memory and technology'". For Hoskins, memory is readily and dynamically configured through our "digital practices and the connectivity of digital networks" (Hoskins, 2009a, p. 96, see also 2014, 2016). Particular images of the past are defined in more pervasive ways, as repeating reveal themselves with their prosthetic presences. Hoskins discusses the mediatization of memory, defining it as the extended "impact of the media upon processes of social change so that everyday life is increasingly embedded in the mediascape" (Hoskins, 2009a, p. 29). Media here are no longer the precondition. Media today are powerful agents of memory, and they produce versions of the past. Indeed, memory is lived in a media ecology where the abundance, pervasiveness, and accessibility of communication networks, nodes, and digital media content scale the past in a new way.

Viktor Mayer-Schönberger explains in his 2009 book *Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age* that human forgetting "has become the exception, and remembering the default." (Mayer-Schönberger, 2009, p. 2), which contradicts Ricoeur's conclusion from his study of

history that memory is generally considered exceptional, and forgetting is banal (Ricoeur, 1999). Forgetting, in this immediate technology of time space, is now affordable (Connerton, 2008, p. 65). The change Mayer-Schönberger and Connerton identified is based on the observation that media now have the capacity to store individual memory materials. This could hardly have happened during the broadcast era, when media delivered memories but no space of individual remembrance (Merrin, 2010). In the post-broadcasting era, as Francisco Delich explains,

> Computers have memory but, as far as I can tell from my reading, they have no memories. Neither are they able to forget, since they would no longer have a "raison d'être." It is a perfect memory, which can be destroyed but not self-modified. It can be partly or wholly replaced, intentionally or not, but nothing forgotten will come back, no memory will disturb the perfect order of the system. (Delich, 2004, p. 69)

On the other hand, people in this new relationship do not always wish to remember themselves as they were. Thus, the new media capacity for storing past things does not inevitably mean the completion of memory or allowing us to obtain unforgetful selves. Geoffrey Bowker concludes that in the provision of new ways of archiving and memorializing, new ways to access our past and new temporalities come into play, which he terms potential memory:

> One read on the current set of memory practices is that we are moving culturally from the era of recorded memory to one of potential memory. There are so many and multiple determined traces out there on the Internet, and they are so easily searchable, that I (this is the comedy of the commons) do not have to worry so much about collecting my own books and films, annotating them, jotting down obscure facts and quotes on index cards, memorizing genealogies. (Bowker, 2007, p. 26)

Thus, while a vast amount of information exists in the networked machine, current users of technology abandon their access to personal memory, as it can be suspended (Gudmundsdottir, 2017). In a pioneering text, Lev Manovich predicts, as our memory and recollection rely on what is off the body (externalized) and objectified (Manovich, 2002, p. 74), they are combined into even larger objects. He forecasts that in our time, "by the end of the twentieth century" the problem would be no longer in the representation of memories; rather, it would be "how to find the object which already exists somewhere" (Manovich, 2002, p. 55). Consequently, memory becomes ephemeral (Chun, 2008) as well as constantly updated (Chun, 2017); the memories that

we “loop across a range of media” can be made use of in a variety of ways, most of which we have little or no control over. This impinges on our relationship with the past, possibly refashioning to some extent how we remember and forget. These traces can at times be our own aide-mémoire, which we can google ourselves to remind ourselves when we did, said, wrote, or shared this or that. (Gudmundsdottir, 2017, p. 93).

For these reasons, Hoskins characterizes contemporary memory as precarious. “[It] is principally constituted neither through retrieval nor through the representation of some content of the past in the present. Rather it is embedded in and distributed through our socio-technical practices” (Hoskins, 2009b, p. 92). Scott Lash defines this as the end of collective memory and the entry into the age of “the Proustian perplexity, the undecidability of the novel, the political takes on vastly different contours” (Lash, 2002, p. 133). The political and the meaning of beings and human beings come to appear in a space of undecidability, a space of difference (Grosz, 2004). Here both memory and forgetting are “simultaneously undergoing a social diffusion process and an ongoing series of code-based modifications” (Karpf, 2012, p. 640).

Here recollection, or memory in general, always in search, easily decontextualized and recontextualized, results in immediate and indirectly relevant memories. Here, memories are what Bergson calls has been, that is, none of them are no longer. The temporality of the Internet, here, is continuous and emergent, in distinction from more traditional media technologies, which render our experience of events as punctual (Hoskins, 2014, p. 673). The Internet is also intensely archival, but the archive itself is part of the continuous present: “digital networks simultaneously enable a massively increased availability of all things-past (which Chris Anderson calls ‘the long tail’) and the heightened connectivity of, and in, the present” (Hoskins, 2014, p. 667; see also, Anderson, 2004). Pessach (2008) notes:

> Just enter YouTube, search a newsworthy entry, or any other type of cultural item, and immediately you will notice the novel frameworks and mechanisms through which the various layers of life and people’s experiences are being documented, narrated, situated, contextualized, indexed, classified, and, at least potentially, preserved for future generations. Wars, disasters, political events, public affairs, popular culture, personal items, as well as many other fractions of people’s experiences, encounters, and life-

> hoods, are now being assembled into a network of networks, in which individuals are active participants in the construction of future's past. (Pessach, 2008, p. 83)

The times, with the sign-less cloud of technology called the typewriter

Then, what is the digital punctual (Hoskins, 2014, p. 673) or *punctum* (Barthes, 1983) that media would lead us to?

Mediated memory is "created when needed, driven by the connectivities of digital technologies and media and inextricably forged through and constitutive of digital social networks: in other words, a new 'network memory'" (Hoskins, 2009a, p. 92). It is followed by the porosity of digital memories, the recontextualization of an event by people, in a way that might be inauthentic to history but accurate for those seeking solidarity. Alison Landsberg (2004) mobilizes the concept of prosthetic memory to argue that the cinema can implant memories of events that audiences have not experienced by audiences that are unknown to them. Here, it is proposed that the experience of watching certain kinds of films is indistinguishable from lived experience and has the potential to create long-lasting memories that have the capacity to remold identity. The sense of time here reaches the synchronous. People relate historical memories to each other less clearly but with a greater degree of relation.

Thus, our time has become plural. Yet this plurality leads to other communicational problems. In his lecture *Parmenides* (1992), Martin Heidegger gave close attention to a specific artifact of modern technology, the typewriter.[8] For Heidegger, the typewriter turns the word itself

[8] In the empirical sense, at the level that Feenberg called the ontic (Feenberg, 2000, p. 447), Heidegger would agree that there has been a transformation of humanity by technologies through differences in the temporal sense. Heidegger's assertion is well known that technology's *gestell*, en-framing, is a gathering of things together, doing so through a calling forth of, or a challenging summons to, the human. Human beings are summoned or challenged forth to put in order that which, as Heidegger puts it, is put in standing-reserve (Heidegger, 1977b). In his widely read article on technology, his argument outlines the tension between the human and nature. There, although poetry is given pride of place, above any other craftsmanship, with the right tool, the hand can do a similar thing. In his lecture, he discusses how the hand can only be part of the human being: "no animal has a hand, and a hand never originates from paw or a claw or a talon"—because "the hand sprang forth only out of the word and together with the word" (Heidegger, 1992, p. 86). As Harris and Taylor (2005) note, the hand is thus the prerequisite of language, just as language is that of the hand. Thus, the relation to the hand is in keeping with the nature of the authentic production outlined above, not a relation of ownership but one of co-production or indebtedness; human, hand, and language belong together in bringing forth.

into something other, which "no longer comes and goes by means of the writing hand, but by means of the mechanical forces it releases." Handwriting, a site of the co-production of man, language, and hand, is replaced by typing, which is thoroughly mediated by technology. However, such mediation is never neutral—the typewriter is no mere instrument; instead, the activity it mediates is irrevocably altered, as is the entity that carries out this activity: "Therefore, when writing was withdrawn from the origin of its essence, i.e. from the hand, and was transferred to the machine, a transformation occurred in the relation of Being to man" (Heidegger, 1992, p. 85). The typewriter occludes this relationship, as "it tears writing from the essential realm of the hand." Furthermore, as it is an intermediate thing, occupying a middle ground between tool and machine, the typewriter vividly demonstrates (because of this intermediate status and its proximity to those activities and faculties associated with man's bringing forth) the manner in which technology engulfs the true being of man. The transformation shares the logic of challenging forth; it is characterized by the pressing into service of elements that had previously revealed themselves; this ordering results in a range of technologies that mechanically order language. This ordering reflects Heidegger's fundamental thesis that Being consists in a simultaneous process of concealment and disclosure.

> The typewriter veils the essence of writing and of the script. It withdraws from man the essential rank of the hand, without man's experiencing this withdrawal appropriately and recognising that it has transformed the relation of Being to his essence. [Thus] the typewriter is a signless cloud, i.e. a withdrawing concealment in the midst of its very obtrusiveness. (Heidegger, 1992, p. 85)

Intermediation, with this signless technology at hand, should be thought together with the very possibility of brokerage in transmitting the meaning. Technology grants us a certain degree of liberation. We might even say that technology ordering language fuses mnemotechniques and mnemotechnologies, furnishing artificial supports for individual (and collective) memories existing within and being nourished by a larger mnemotechnological milieu—the system of the Internet. This is also signless cloud because the memory witnessing the presence of the personal digital archive cannot be the same as it was, although we do not use the entire memory collection in digital space. Heidegger admonished the students who sat in front of him, saying, "though well-intended, [you] have not grasped what I have been trying to say" (Heidegger, 1992, p. 85),

because of the typewriter. Martin Heidegger's precaution is still valid. His warning does not stem from a Luddite passion. Rather, at issue here is prosthetic mnemo-techonology, or the temporality of *hypomnemata*. Epiphylogenetic memory has a temporal character.

For Stiegler as well, the question of time is apprehended on the basis of the technological problematic of artificial memory, the memory of the human qua already there. The already there is the pregiven horizon of time, like the past that is mine but that I have nevertheless not lived, to which my sole access is through the traces left of that past. This means that there is no already there, and therefore no relation to time, without artificial memory supports. The memory of the existence of the generations that preceded me, without which I would be nothing, is bequeathed through such supports (Stiegler, 1998, p. 159).

However, for Stiegler's teacher, Derrida, consciousness is never the simple perception of the world as a continuous now, as it is always enmeshed in an improvisatory engagement with the world. While Stiegler tried to resolve such gaps in time through the inheritance of technical programs or anticipations that allow the world to appear in different ways, for Derrida, there is no pure sensory data. As noted earlier, for Derrida, memory of past is irresistibly forgettable; thus, every moment, no matter which technology is relied on, slips past. What we shared as our past is in fact subjective. Memories of the deceased are owned by each individual mourner, neither by the one in the coffin nor the collective. Their narration should be impossible or even fictitious (Derrida, 1989, p. 28).

Stiegler resolves this absence by means of technical programming at the heart of sense, which enables faith, belief, and trust to be possible. Every technical device must be trusted to be used or to be, in Heidegger's terms, ready to hand. This trust is a fundamentally human gesture of faith or belief, the source of morality and ethics, and is just as constitutive of humanity as technics. This faith is pragmatically accepted, trusted, and used by us, something whose history we did not live and have only because it is left for us and is our technical inheritance. In this way, the technical object allows human beings to relate to time while simultaneously anchoring this relation within a history. However, while it can transform our coexistence, technology also causes incommunicability between itself and the human.

Derrida calls this trust noted above the mark of an absolute past or of God. The unknowable past of a technical object, the freedom to believe in it and to use it leaves open a space of life outside programmability, opening the future or that which is to come as an absolute future, but always through technics, through the program: "Empiricity 'invested with spirit'" (Stiegler, 2001, p. 260). For Stiegler, this duality of a technical constitution and a necessary trust or faith in the unknowable past that determine consciousness as extended outside itself, where memory is deposited in technical objects, and determined by the historical epoch of its technical environment. For Derrida, this can only be, again, affirmative, but in any case, it cannot be absolutely reliable.

These determinations create difficulty in the prognostication of the phenomenon of remembering and forgetting. The contemporary might be undergoing a crisis, a development Pierre Nora explored using his famous concept *milieu de mémoire* (Nora, 1989). However, this may delimit the new ironic possibility of the post-modernity of our society, such as Nietzsche's dream of delinking the past from the present, with the hope that a new sense of time could open. A networked memory may partake in a space of action, although its very origin is doubtful. Weakened authenticity would be able to be more empathetic and contemporary, as space is rooted in here- and nowness in current politics, as in the idea of the strength of weak ties developed in sociology, where individuals with more weak ties are found to have greater opportunities for mobility (Granovetter, 1973).

The ontology of remembering/forgetting with new technology: grammartization or amnesty

Here we return to mediatized memory and forgetting within the context of new technology. Within this chapter, I argue that one mode of forgetting may liberate the subject to introduce an action to the contemporary. However, this should not be taken to mean that all forgetting benefits. Ricoeur warns of the danger of manipulated memory, which comes to the fore when higher—i.e., authoritative—powers exploit the blank spaces of memory and "impose a canonical narrative [on social actors] by means of intimidation or seduction, fear or flattery." Then, "[a] devious form of forgetting is at work here, resulting from stripping the social actors of their original power to recount their actions themselves" (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 448). Forgetting becomes, in such cases, semi-passive and semi-active. Social agents, while remaining manipulated to a

degree, still bear a responsibility for their situation, especially where forgetting is avoidance, or a wanting not to know (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 449).

Here lies an undeniable strength of digital memory. On the one hand, new digital memories can be a safeguard for keeping one's memory, to escape from banishment. As Plate argues (2015) "at the level of cultural and collective memory, there are all kinds of lethotechnics that are applied" (p. 148). A number of technologies have been used that are designed to foster collective amnesia. Archives are locked or burned, people are "disappeared"(thrown into the sea, or into oubliettes), sites are destroyed traces are erased, and new names and alternative stories are circulated (Whitehead, 2009, p. 155). Memories in digital media can provide a dwelling place for such endangered memories. However, even in this seemingly irresponsible space, a memory, of what and by whom, can expedite social change or strengthen the political power of a regime. Derrida, in an interview with Stiegler, highlights the necessity of being aware of the double danger of remembering through technology:

> On the one hand, one might be tempted, in a very spontaneous way, to say: We need a politics of memory, we need to set up archives, we need to give everyone, or as many people as possible, access to the archive so that they will be able to know, work, do research. But at the same time, every politics of memory, if the word "politics" has a classical and strict sense, implies the intervention of a state. It's a state that legislates and acts with regard to the nonfinite mass of materials to be stored [a stocker], materials which must be collected, preserved, whatever the current. . . . A politics of memory is necessary, perhaps, doubtless, but it is also necessary, in the very name of this politics of memory, to educate . . . I don't dare say citizens anymore . . . I don't dare, for the same reason, say subjects either . . . it is also necessary to educate or awaken "whomever" to vigilance with regard to the politics of memory. Whoever is in a position to access this past or to use the archive should know concretely that there was a politics of memory, a particular politics, that this politics is in transformation, and that it is a politics. We must awaken to critical vigilance with regard to the politics of memory: we must practice a politics of memory and, simultaneously, in the same movement, a critique of the politics of memory. (Derrida & Stiegler, 2002, pp. 67–68)

Given this awareness, we should find, contra Stiegler's or other expressions of techno-positivism toward prosthetic memories, something familiar: the responsibility of new media for memory/forgetting. In this chapter, I have attempted to illustrate a possible understanding of forgetting as a new ground for action. As Heidegger states in many places, responsibility rests on the human hand. Characterizing the modern sciences as a process of research, as opposed to one of knowing, in which open-ended and ongoing activity occurs, in the essay "The Age of the World Picture" (Heidegger, 1977a), Heidegger suggests that the modern sciences express an unprecedented ontology, determined by their existence within a dual temporality, their previous existence and their coming into being in the modern world. This ontology is encapsulated in the term *subjectum* as described as that which lies before, which is doubly articulated in its ongoing activity and the implied spatial setting of the world.

The notion of the world is further interrogated in its relationship to the notion "picture" (Heidegger, 1977a, p. 134). A seed (technology) is yet unknown to anyone, except a good gardener who wills to hear what is inside. The gardener and the seed should have a free relationship. This relationship comes about as a form of destining, in Heidegger's term. However, this should not be understood as fate, and neither is it an act of individual will. It is a source of freedom to hear and listen to the voice of destining (Heidegger, 1977b, p. 25). Here, agency should be in the human, or in Derrida's witty interpretation, the hand, not in technology. As Feeberg pointed out, a medium only reveals the ontic but not the essentially ontological (Feenberg, 2000, p. 447).

> Technology has never had a single meaning such as enframing which summed up all its potentials. Nor does it make much more sense to describe our culture as uniquely oriented toward domination. The ability of the computer to mediate normal human language is not a startling reversal of ontological trends, but merely an expression of the complexity and flexibility of technology that is revealed as it is appropriated by a wider range of actors. (Feenberg, 2000, p. 449)

Given this, perhaps, it may be that the new spacetime imposed by digital technology would grant us an unchanged role. A rupture in time with a new setting may refer to space that is less historically dominant. While authenticity is less highlighted, filling this contextual gap becomes

the people's role. Individuals are now taking a more active part in the retrieval and distribution of works with cultural and historical significance.

The resulting outcome forms a kaleidoscope of individuals working through culture and creating a bricolage of new paths and directions in collective remembering. With new media technology, memories are not singular; many memories differ from each other. As argued earlier, this may be due to the possibility of our forgetfulness, in that our experience, including the memory-knotting process, does not emerge from a synchronous time frame. Our memory of the past may rather be, in Derrida's characterization, *prosopopeia*, a trace that is individual as well as changing over time, which allows us to witness multiple creations of memory in diversity. Time and space exist in dispersed multiplicity.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued three main points. Forgetting is an identity-creating behavior. It is thus a spontaneous gesture of subversive social activity. Forgetting, like remembering, can offer a space for a new sense of temporality; for Heidegger, this is even an essential process for realizing things anew, behind everyday sensation. Forgetting and remembering are both mediatized in advanced technology, resulting in a different sphere of oblivion.

This leads to the question, which memory is active in Roh's mourning and funeral and the following commemorations? Problems concerning the definition of memory involve differences in the forms of time consciousness that may be related. If the past is understood in a *mnēmē*-nic manner, Roh's previous life should be expected to be more complex than the way it is remembered in the present. However, it is commonly thought that his suicide was individualistic, a kind of admission of shame and thus read as egoistic.

However, although this reading may portray one aspect of Roh's life and death, its findings do not constitute the memory of the people, because it ignores the very ground of such recollection, namely, the present. In other words, in the contemporary memory of Roh after his suicide, memory holders' sense of present politics stem from a deeper level. Here, as noted above, the present is shaped by both what is remembered and what is forgotten, and this has implications in the search for a present identity, as Ricoeur writes (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 448). If

people's memory of Roh is deficient or disdains certain historical facts, this partial oblivion can be read in a number of possible ways. Those who condemn silence as being unfaithful to the past may see that ignorance or denial is a symptom of purposeful amnesia of the humiliating past. This can be understood as structural amnesia if one suspects the culture of the activists. While the categories here are reduplicated, I suggest the existence of an unvocalized past inside the cultural memory of Roh that exercises the desire of memory holders, instead of any other external forces. Details to support my case will be presented in the ensuing chapters.

Prologue Two. "We will remember you forever!"

Tell me what you forget and I will tell you who you are. (Augé, 2004, p. 18)

Six days later, I was standing in Seoul Square and the *noje* was about to begin. I do not remember why I went there. Instead, I remember people on TV kept saying there would be a million people on the street that day.[9] I wore a black shirt and did not tell anyone that I would be in *noje*. I also remember the smells on that day. In Seoul, the capital of our post-colonial nation, almost everything was destroyed during the war, and the senses are often void. The smell of the city usually carries random things. On that day, it was the sweat of a half million other people; a humid, damp, and dank smell that bound us together into a single entity.

I also remember the sounds on that day. Everything was mumbled, like we were in a pool. Some people cried, others murmured, a few were speechless, and several laughed. People were talking on cellphones trying to find each other in the crowd. The old ones, *aigoed*, were mock-crying, tearless wailing in the style of Korean funerary culture. This sound is meant to show that the wailers are going through something emotional. Despite the chaos of all of these noises, the site was weirdly calm. There, with other mouners' stillness, I became, effortlessly, one of them. I never liked Roh before, as I would tell anyone before. Now I became us, the practicianer of *noje.*

From time to time, we cast glances toward the road. A gigantic screen run by the conservative newspaper at Seoul Square seemed to obsess about the number: "A million gathered!" Out of our shared, deformed past, we created a sense of fellowship and mourning, with 2,000 blue, yellow, and red *manjang*s (the traditional funerary flags) waving in the street, whispering, "We will remember you forever."

From the moment of Moo-hyun Roh's suicide, Seoul metropolitan police sent thousands of combat police officers (*chŏn'gyŏng*) into the streets. At one point, they blocked the whole area

[9] After the ceremony, the count was that a half million participated in *noje*.

of Seoul Square until the representatives of *noje* negotiated to lift the barricade. Yet, while the people were allowed to observe the ceremony, thousands of highly trained, armed police troops were waiting inside nearby alleys around the square, each squad forming a tactical formation, ready to march into the square at the moment the voice over the remote transmitter gave the order. We trembled as the troops watched us.

Our fear came from precedent. A year prior, people had taken to the street to say that they did not want Korea to make a free trade agreement with the U.S. and the police came with the sunset. It happened in the same square, Seoul Square, and the police blocked the entire area. After they built a four-sided wall of police shields, they slowly narrowed their gap, shooting water cannons and spraying fluorescent tear gas so they could arrest protesters who were unable to open their eyes while their bodies were glowing in the dark.

Of course, we all saw what happened in Yongsan where former tenants decided to become squatters. They were standing at the top of their building, watching as the police troops raided using an air-lifted container full of officers. A fire suddenly broke out and the flames concealed the whole sector. Someone screamed, “There are humans! There are humans!” We saw that too – on the TV and our computer screens. It was a lesson for us that the police could “accidentally” burn a whole floor yet still charge survivors for squatting, while no police officials were forced to resign (Kim, 2009).

I do not remember why I was in Roh’s *noje*. Instead, I remember those events have become our trauma. Then it became a part of who we are. Perhaps I was there to answer the screaming from Yongsan a year ago, that there were humans. I knew it was too late. It was late for Sun-il Kim, beheaded in 2004. It was too late for Roh as well. Everything was too late.

Yes, the TV said a million would be there to see Roh’s funeral. The number mattered because we knew it was what we would be remembered by. We would also be remembered by the uncountable number of people in the photographs. This is a template of remembrance for us; ever since 1987 and the famous funeral of Han-yeol Lee, the same frame has been used. A later image was taken under the same frame of people cheering during the 2002 World Cup. It was also used for the anti-USA demonstration, the anti-FTA agreement protest, and the so-called protest against mad-cow disease.

Perhaps more important that the gathering of people for a common cause was the sense of spectacle created by such an impressive picture Thousands of people doing the same thing creates an unavoidably eye-catching image that can easily decorate the front page of a newspaper or be highlighted on television news in both domestic and foreign coverage. We knew there had been already a handful of photographers holding their camera on the roof of the old Plaza Hotel located behind Seoul square to take their best shot. The organizers of the ceremony, who themselves were veterans of the democratic movement during the 80s, were also well aware of this; it was the primary reason the *noje* was held in Seoul Square, a historic place in South Korea's modern history. We all knew this spectacle would add more depth to the intertextuality of the site.

The number, one million, had specific importance. This number would make a statement to the police that it would not be easy for them to rule us down. It would be a memory for tomorrow that there were a million people who wanted to say something before the death of one man that day. Seen from another perspective, the number was enough to forget yesterday's Roh and to deform today. For six people, the police could lift one container to the top of a building with a few dozen armed police waiting inside. For one person in despair, the country refused to give way to the terrorists. For few thousand, they shot water cannon and tear gas into the crowds. What could they possibly do to a million of us?

I attended the *noje* to implant more meaning to an empty cast under the the name of Moo-hyun Roh, so that his sculpture could stand by itself and have a shiny bronze surface. This is perhaps why the people carried Roh's picture with a straw-hat. Of course, we all knew he was not a farmer, but we strove to forget that. I, too, was there to forget who he was. I was also there to be remembered in the future. A million will be there, the media told us. We would be remembered by this million. The exact number that the police could not handle. Other things can be forgotten, but not a million of us. I do not remember why I was in the *noje.* I did not worry about who we were there to celebrate; at times, I even forgot who he was.

Chapter Two. Five days after the suicide

Introduction

This chapter delineates aspects of the day of Moo-hyun Roh's funeral. In an earlier chapter, I have suggested a way of theorizing active forgetting as partaking in a moment to realize real time and space. This chapter uses ethnographic observation to provide an example of intentional forgetting to coordinate a subject's sense of now action that represents a political claim. In other words, the forgetfulness of Roh's criminal charge was a kind of covert silence (Vinitzky-Seroussi & Teeger, 2010) opening Roh's death.

Through the performance of particular aesthetics, a *noje* (street rite) attempted to replicate the meta-memory (Conway, 2003, p. 306) of the *minjung,* an active concept during the 1980s, in the context of the democratic agitation that brought about a change in regime in 1987. The repetition of this idea enabled its alliance with other memories that had lost their representative form; Roh's memory could be used as an empty symbol that could be managed to identify something other than Roh himself. Another purpose of this chapter is to trace which memories were provoked and how they were consumed and reflected back by the presence of five million mourners in the street.

The chapter will explore specific moments from the funeral. Its first part compares two different interments as memory apparatuses. Beyond *noje*, another ceremony, called *yŏnggyŏlsik*, was created by the government and whose existence was antithetical to the people's *noje*. Two different apparatuses competed to anchor the deceased's memory into a different field of understanding.

The second part of the chapter examines the role of the mourner as a witness and a participant and how this makes sense of the occasion of the funeral. Participating in the day's rite on the street, I observed that mourners in *noje* understood what the *noje* was expressing. Moreover, they also appeared to invite other occasions to create weak ties with their memories around the time. Such ties were not directly related to Roh's achievements during his life or to

anything to do with his death. Rather, his memory, at this stage, was twisted to bridge differences; the result was a spontaneous omission, which as performative gesture under a political agenda was being faced at that time. A gap in memory existed as a tacit understanding. Individuals' slightly varying memories formed a unity to collide with the regime's propaganda that attempted to consecrate an official memory among the people.

Yŏnggyŏlsik — hegemonic commemoration of a life

On May 29, 2009, Seoul, I, together with half a million others, was at Seoul Square, in front of city hall. Millions more were watching the event on television. This was the day of the funeral, five days after Roh's suicide.

On this day, the national funeral committee arranged two separate ceremonies. We were waiting for the *noje* ceremony. On gigantic screens surrounding the place, *yŏnggyŏlsik*, the other rite, was being broadcast. Both *yŏnggyŏlsik* and *noje* refer to stages in a traditional Korean funeral. In *yŏnggyŏlsik*, members of family bid farewell to the dead before the body leaves their home. The latter, *noje,* occurs later, and it is performed on the street during the funeral cortege. To display the emotional disquiet of the mourners, the coffin stops several times on their way, and a rite including wailing, chanting, and saluting takes place (Mills, 2012; C.-W. Park, 2010). *Noje* and *yŏnggyŏlsik* both serve the purpose of expressing emotion and bidding farewell to the deceased.

That day, however, the difference between the two ceremonies was sharp. It began with color. The people out in public to express *noje* wore yellow: many wore golden-yellow t-shirts, hats, bandanas, or at least a balloon; these were distributed at the gate by volunteers. However, *Kwanghwamun,* the place where *yŏnggyŏlsik* was being held, on the screens was in black and white. Many were dressed in formal suits; some women wore *hanbok,* the traditional Korean outfit, in all white. They were on aligned white chairs, and we were on the ground. They were quiet; we were loud. Cries, sobbing, phone calls to find friends, and songs playing created an unstrained atmosphere, and then, all at once, everyone looked at the screens and saw President Lee Myeong-bak. At the *yŏnggyŏlsik* being shown, no one appeared to be permitted to make a noise: only one member of parliament spoke, standing and demanding an apology from President

Lee. This MP was soon removed from the site. Later, it was learned that the Korean public broadcasting system eliminated this encounter (as "noise") during its live coverage of the event.

Roh's *yŏnggyŏlsik* and *noje* were prepared and serviced for memory making. Both of these ceremonies, forming part of the public funeral, attempted to convert mourning into a unifying political stance for the community. It is well known that a funeral is an occasion to celebrate the shared identity of a community through the use of collective memory, using a highlighted and resketched link with the past (Seale, 1998, pp. 193–210; see also Kang, 2010; Bargu, 2014; Geană, 2005; Greenberg, 2006). The burial of the dead is a social event to initiate a relation of time to the individual to coordinate their perspective with the community's position (Bargu, 2014; Bonilla, 2011; Geană, 2005; van Gennep, 1977).

While most funerals provide one memory-knot at a time by delivering a unifying code to the participants, in this case, each rite served a different, conflicting political aim. The *yŏnggyŏlsik* was an anchoring of memory into the interpretation of the government. The *noje*, on the other hand, contested the *yŏnggyŏlsik*, as a ceremony of the autonomous people (J.-W. Park, 2010). Both functioned as a memory *dispositif,* an apparatus to impose "a constellation of heterogeneous (memory) elements within a system, and the relationships between them, which produce a particular 'tendency'" (Basu, 2012, pp. 2–7). A fierce competition occurred between two conflicting attempts to stabilize Roh's memory.

The *yŏnggyŏlsik* repeated other mourning ceremonies that try to find a higher meaning in death "to obtain some justification for the sacrifice and loss" (Mosse, 1991, p. 5). The government organized the *yŏnggyŏlsik* to represent a hegemonic interpretation. This ceremony was used to prioritize stabilization in the face of crisis and bring this absurd time back to normality.

Many South Koreans believed that the regime engineered Roh's suicide. It was common to hear that the prosecutor's charges were planned to humiliate and disempower Roh from his symbolic political power. There was even a theory that Roh was murdered by a government-hired security guard (e.g., see M.-K. Kim, 2009b). The administration had already experienced millions marching against the free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States only the previous year. The sudden re-appearance of a massive number of mourners on the street was

interpreted as a threatening sign. The government's initial reaction was to retain control by controlling territory using police (Foucault & Rabinow, 1984). For five days, thousands of police surrounded public places throughout the country, including Seoul square, where the *noje* was planned. Many shrines were blocked or patrolled by police. Some were evicted without warning. The head of the Seoul police announced that it was prohibited to possess a stick made of bamboo at the funeral, in the fear that it could be transformed into a weapon to use against the heavily armored police force (Em, 2009). A mourner recalled the day he went to pay tribute to Roh as follows:

> The police were responding to this political death. Barricades blocked the road to the palace (where the altar is located), police made countless rounds of alleys, and they stood at the corners. They also were there during the march, the blocking crowds in on the other side of the road. Remembering [Roh's] death was handled as a matter of public security. (Em, 2009)

Yŏnggyŏlsik was intended to exhibit a hegemonic system of control (Sue, 2015, p. 115). It featured two keywords, namely, "farewell" and "national unity." The first keyword implied the necessity of forgetting the deceased. Regarding the latter, the committee for the funeral continually repeated a given repertoire: invitations were sent to people at every level of society (Haengjŏnganjŏnbu [Ministry of the Interior and Safety], 2009). The ceremony began with a salutation to the national flag, followed by the national anthem. All major religious leaders were invited and performed various services, although Roh was known to be Catholic. This collective practice peaked when Prime Minister Seungsu Han read the eulogy, stressing that the funeral should be the moment for all to say goodbye:

> [Y]ou [Roh] . . . sacrificed your life to your mother nation and people. You were at the forefront of breaking down regionalism and separatism. . . . "Do not grieve for me," you said. But I worry that too many tears from our people might keep you from going. (Chŏnjashinmun, 2009)

The speech then moved on to a familiar South Korean time definition: this is a painful sacrifice, but it is time to move on.

> We, the remaining, will pledge your will again to make a better nation. We promise our best to achieve the concordances and consolidation as you wished so long. We will build a noble, advanced, and developed country. (Chŏnjashinmun, 2009)

As Lee and Yeoh (2004) show, here forgetting was "actively forged as products of the politics of inclusion and exclusion and by power struggles played out among global, national and local actors in globalisation processes" (p. 2296). The prime minister's eulogy overbrushed other memories at the top of Roh's individual life.

Even more interesting in this memory-making process is the nature of the memories brought in to cover other, more threatening ones. Patriotic nationalism, which always highlights national unity and the belief in making a better nation (*kŭndaehwa*, modernization) is often used in South Korean politics to reinforce government legitimacy. The concept superimposes a Westernized image of nation-building, which has been criticized as the original epic, that is reproduced in a variety of meanings with historical twists and turns in state power (H. Kim, 2009; Han, 2000; Jeon, 2009; Nam, 2013). The banner of *kŭndaehwa* led general Chŏnghŭi Pak's army in the coup against the democratically elected government in 1960. The brutal subjugation of labor and the democratic movement by Pak's government were justified by *kŭndaehwa*. In 1980, under the banner of the unity of the nation, the military again rebelled and took political power. The government's *yŏnggyŏlsik* used the same logic, the same repertoire; Roh's individual life was to be absorbed. Highlighting unity and love of country, the ideology expressed at the *yŏnggyŏlsik* was intended to undermine the sense of mourning as a small sacrifice and implement fast development as the highest priority. It also attempted to stifle anger about Roh's death. The prime minister's perplexing eulogy, along with other occurrences, were, in fact, not celebrations of Roh at all but messages to angry South Koreans, urging them to return to their normal life. Forgetting here resulted from "new patterns of development that displace or destroy existing memories" (Minarova-Banjac, 2018, p. 25).

However, although the government's attempt to remember Roh for their benefit, most *noje* participants I observed felt differently about the *yŏnggyŏlsik*. During the rite, people preparing from the *noje* watched the process carefully, but without identifying messages from it. Most responses in Seoul Square expressed dissent, and mourners reacted to the appearance of the then-president with curses.

Repetition of excessive memories in the *noje*

What was repeated? — *noje* on the street, by the people

Noje then countered *yŏnggyŏlsik*. It expressed a collective attempt to settle Roh's memory in a different place. However, this ceremony was also not about Roh's individual life.

The *noje* was mainly directed by volunteers from The People's Commemoration Committee, an ad hoc organization. The leading director of the ceremony claimed that he handed off (or gave up) helping *yŏnggyŏlsik* in any way (M.-K. Kim, 2009a). The yellow clothing of the participants showed them to have been supporters of Roh in the 2002 presidential election, while the dress code of the *yŏnggyŏlsik* appeared more official.

From an aesthetic perspective, the *noje* for Roh directly referred to *noje* from the 1980s. Thus, before explaining the 2009 *noje*, the relation between political suicide and democracy in South Korea must be examined. Beginning in the early 1970s, South Koreans witnessed a series of political suicides. Between 1971 and 2001, there were more than a hundred known political suicides. Analyzing 133 of these, Miri Im (2017) distinguishes two primary motivations for political suicide: some killed themselves out of a sense of duty, which was often related to a political agenda, including the desire for democracy, a better relationship with North Korea, or anti-Americanism. A last type of suicide has the intent to achieving better working conditions, such as halting crackdowns on unions or better wages. Historians and South Korean citizens generally understand such deaths as an expression of dissent and protest against injustice and that pushes history forward (Kang, 2010; Lee, 2009; Manabe, 2015; Tangdae Pip'yŏng Kihoek Wiwŏnhoe, 2009).

Such suicides are called *yŏlsa* and praised as democratic martyrs, whose deeds bring the people, or *minjung*, to consciousness. The *minjung* is the collective identity of the South Korean people. This word signifies an opposition against elites and leaders, and often the educated and cultured, *minjung* has come to signify the oppressed in the sociopolitical system but who also are capable of rising against it. This group shares an emotional status called *han*, which accumulates collective memories through a series of generational experiences, such as unjust violence from those in power and failed resistances (Abelmann, 1996, p. 39; Yi, 1996, p. 57; Doucette, 2013; Suh, 1983; Wells, 1995).

To commemorate *yŏlsa*, during the 1980s, *noje* offered a way of both mourning and demonstrating. During the 1970s and 1980s, funerary rituals were used by protesters to create a new signification for death and to make a reverent reappropriation of the body of the deceased by the community. Such deaths were recognized as invaluable sacrifices for the nation and the loss of the grieving family was also ours. After its time with the family, the *yŏlsa*'s body was placed in a casket and carried on activists' shoulder to a public place, such as Seoul Square. Here, greeted by thousands of other activists, the *noje* could begin, with the salutation for the dead and other martyrs. A shaman performed the *kut*, or ritual for the dead, which soothed the angry soul of the deceased, who departed with the following wish: "I will watch you move forward from the heaven. On the day of great victory, my silent yet heartfelt applause will ring out all over the world!" (H. Kim, 2008, p. 566). The purpose of such an event is to draw the right trajectory between the past and present to guide the direction to the future. The *noje* in this context is thus a service for the dead whose death was related to an anti-government cause, whether the death was a protest suicide or a governmental murder while the deceased was engaged in anti-government activity. With the use of the phrase "the rest is upon us" (S. Kim, 2009, p. 52), the *noje* is taken as a special event making a promise between the living and the dead.

Wailing, hymns, revolutionary songs, and slogans are used as salutations to alleviate the grief of those left behind and provide occasions for the collective venting of anger as a way to cope with loss. Speeches and slogans emphasize calls for justice in the face of what acute injustice perpetuated in a highly asymmetric situation between the state and the present community. Speeches solidly affirm the issues of the present that have been revealed by the sacrifice. This produces a promise of the future: what might have marked an end for a particular protester is transformed into a new beginning for the *minjung* collective, a leap forward in the establishment of strength that arises out of unified action and a shared ideological stance, another step toward victory. In other words, the *noje* of the 1980s was characterized by a strong sense of emotion, which brought about an elevation of the atmosphere. Performances shared sadness on a massive scale. The collective emotional guidance was channeled successfully into certain slogans, hymns, songs, and poems. Within the rite, mourning was constrained, and the expressions of pain and sorrow were expressed in a way that was implicitly yet actively regulated.

How was it repeated? — Roh as an impossible martyr in the post-*minjung* era

Like its predecessors, the 2009 *noje* focused on Roh's martyrdom. As voices asserted that his death was mourned and that he would be remembered "forever" (M.-K. Kim, 2009a), the ceremony began, with the *ch'ohon*, the chief organizers, standing on a crane to call the soul. Shamans were invited to pay tribute to the dead. A traditional dance was performed. Songs, either *minga*, or protest songs, or favorite 1980s songs, were sung. These cultural practices, such as the performances of songs from the 1980s, were introduced from *minjung* culture (Lee, 2003, p. 558).

The first aspect to notice in this *noje* was the sense of time among the participants at the event. Unlike the failure of the government *yŏnggyŏlsik* to create another *kŭndaehwa* out of Roh's death, in the *noje*, the participants shared a sense of temporal background, as if it were still the 1980s. Furthermore, this feeling that appeared autonomous was created before the event. From the performances selected to the very logic of *noje*, which is to lead to the final revolt of the *minjung* against the unjust regime, the whole event seemed to be shared. That is, its revolutionary spirit was why the people who mourned Roh's death chose *noje*. A good illustration of the participants' state of mind can be found in following poem, read during the *noje*:

> [Y]ou jumped off from the train named democracy, which is rushing backward. You jumped, and you were crushed, as easily as a petal. I am sorry I wasn't able to hold this petal in my two hands. I am sorry for not being able to prop it up with my two arms. I am sorry for not being able to embrace you with my heart. . . . I will not speak of sadness, though I am sad. I will not pound the ground, although I resent your death. I will not say "rest in peace" yet . . . So rise! You must set your broken bones; then stand up again so we can rise from this scattered ground. (An, 2009)

The expression that the train of democracy was running backward referred to the judgment that in their time, they were seeing a regression away from democracy. Roh was defined as someone who refused to sit still and jumped off from this tendency. The last line calls upon Roh to be resurrected again, under a similar passion of martyrdom, to rise together with the participants, the 2009 *minjung*. A participant recalled as follows:

> This [Roh's death] was exactly like it was with the college students of the 70s and 80s who killed themselves to oppose Jeon Duhwan or Pak Chŏnghŭi. I remember that day in 1987 because I was in the same place, in front of City Hall. As in 2009, there were waves of people who wanted to pull Jeon out of the blue house so badly. When I heard of Roh's suicide, I immediately recalled that exact moment. It is not a coincidence that we had the ceremony at the same place. . . . History repeats.—Interviewee A

These observations allow us to draw a political implication from the 2009 *noje*. That is, the rites of Roh's funeral performed by people on the street commemorated a human being whose death, as the participants saw it, was caused by governmental injustice. The performance of the *noje*'s particular aesthetics again in 2009 was intended to make the funeral a memory-knot that could define the era. The organizer of the event has written that he intended to engineer Roh's *noje* to convey the community's self-understanding and political message to the world (M.-K. Kim, 2009a).

In contrast to the cases of the 1980s, however, it should be noted that there is a certain irony in taking Roh to be a true *yŏlsa*, a martyr. Beginning with 1987's reform of the constitution, which brought democracy to the country, with the institution of general elections, the concept of *minjung* as the under-privileged from pre-democratic society began to recede from the public sphere (Doucette, 2013, p. 218). Because society appeared to have transformed into a Western-style democracy it came to be called a post-*minjung* (Doucette, 2013) or a post-ideological (Kang, 2012) society. This led to Westernized individuals, as equal members of society, building and maintaining the public sphere (Ch'oe & Pak, 2010).

Roh exhibited internal contradictions. In the strict sense, although Roh came to prominence as a humanitarian lawyer during the 1980s, as the president of the country he acted as yet another neoliberal politician, prioritizing the growth of the market and deregulation. Imposing an ideology of a flexible labor market by force, he took power from unions, brutally breaking strikes using the police, and deregulated industries. From November 22, 2006, to November 11, 2007, his administration filed four claims in court against anti-US-South Korea FTA activist groups which charged the participants the total of 2,428 million won (Im, 2017, p. 233). This eventually resulted in 21 protest suicides, more than that of the administration before him (Dae-jung Kim's administration, 9 suicides) and the one after him (Myung-bak Lee's

administration, 9 suicides) (Im, 2017, p. 39). He reacted to the workers by requesting his staff to "deal with them . . . strictly according to law and order," adding, "in this democratic era, workers' self-immolation should not be used as a tactic, and suicide should not serve this purpose" (Baek, 2003). This and other events during his tenure resulted in massive disappointment with him, and he had the lowest approval rating of any South Korean president.

Thus, it is more logical to say that like the *yŏnggyŏlsik*, the people's *noje* was not about Roh himself, whose very life, even seemed to hinder the attempt to commemorate him. Parts of his life were intentionally forgotten from the moment of death. His bribery scandals were not mentioned, and reporters for public broadcasting and newspapers were evicted from the *noje* for lying when attempting to mention this and other factors. When I interviewed self-identified Roh supporters, their responses to my questions concerning the criminal investigation of Roh followed a pattern, calling the charges a lie, claiming that there was more to Roh than that. This more, however, was never clearly communicated.

The *noje* followed a selective tradition (Williams, 1961, pp. 50–59), which "highlights and foregrounds, imposes beginnings, middles and ends on the random and the contingent. Equally, it foreshortens, silences, disavows, forgets and elides many episodes which—from another perspective—could be the start of a different narrative" (Hall, 1999, p. 221). It dismembers as *aphasia* "a political disorder and a troubled psychic space." (Stoler, 2011, p. 153). Because he was a questionable politician, Roh needed to be dismembered.

As Sigmund Freud found in *Moses and Monotheism* (1961), the biblical memory of Moses was configured as "a statue of bronze," erected on "feet of clay." In his book, Jan Assmann agrees that Freud suspected in Moses a transformed Egyptian memory of Akhenaton, an Egyptian political and religious leader who went against tradition. Here, the mode of recollection is shifted from its history and is fitted into another symbolism. Like Moses for Freud and Freud for Assmann, South Koreans sought an answer to the void in their present. In doing so, they detached part of the real Roh from the memory of him and attached other parts that came from a distance. As a consequence, Roh was erected as the rightful heir of the *minjung* movement. Roh became a species of bronze statue, whose flamboyant appearance is different from its foundation, the feet of clay (Assmann, 1998). For this purpose, Roh's real legacy was minimized.

Allying memory with sadness

Han as *ressentiment* — The unvocalized sadness

A second characteristic of the *noje* was even more significant. Where Roh's real life had departed, sadness filled the emptiness. At many times during the *noje* and later recollections of the day, many participants testified to a sadness, the source of which the participants themselves could not identify. For instance:

> I have a friend who I thought never went to Deoksu Palace to pay tribute. But he said he had gone. So I asked why such a depoliticized person would do such a thing. He said one of his friends who had as little interest in politics as much as himself asked him to go. His friend just kept crying. He asked why. His friend answered "let me cry. I don't know why. But I am sad. Too sad. So let me be." While watching this, he became sad, and he cried too. (Em, 2009, pp. 28–29)

> They are pitiful, their sorrows are sore, they have a thirst in the chest that has been clogged by stuffy reality. . . . One said, "I do not know where my sadness came from, but I now realize that I am emotionally attached to him." (W. Kim, 2009, pp. 52–54)

> I think now that I experience the same feeling of *han* when I think about our president. When I saw his picture and read his speeches or even when the news shows President Jae-in Moon, I feel that something is still unresolved. Something unsatisfactory, but I cannot do anything.—Interviewee B

This unidentified sadness also characterizes the concept of the *minjung*. The political *noje* of the 1980s was founded upon the belief that the *minjung*, an imaginative, collective identity, would rise up against the brutal history. It was portrayed as something holding an unresolved emotional burden called *han* (Doucette, 2013; Suh, 1983; Wells, 1995).

Yuko Manabe, in her pioneering work on 1980s martyrdom, defines this emotion, *han*, by comparing it with the Nietzsche's term *ressentiment*. As Didier Fassin (2013) explains, in *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche (1989) uses the French word *ressentiment* differently from its English translation, resentment. *Ressentiment* is the expression of the morality of the slave, which "directs one's view outward instead of back to oneself" and "needs a hostile external world" (p. 10; see also p. 252). It arises as the product of long historical alienation and relates to long-term oppression and effects of domination. In most cases, it is generational, while

resentment is only temporal dissatisfaction, an ideological alienation that is a direct result of one's current social position (Fassin, 2013, p. 252). Fassin applied these two, ostensibly similar but with a gap between them, to explain the two different phenomena, contrasting Black with White in South Africa's post-apartheid era and rioting minorities with police in France. For instance, if a policeman loses a colleague, resentment may arise; however, they would not gain Nietzschean *ressentiment,* because their loss is not been repeated and performed under unevenly distributed social power over the time. A quotation from Oyoung Kim well summarizes how Manabe distinguishes *han* (*ressentiment*) from *won* (resentment):

> '*Han'* is an emotion that was deposited and stored inside a person. . . . *Han* seethes even if no harm is done. It is a sense of frustration that results from impossibility because either you have what you desire or you have only what you can do. *Han* is a dream that cannot be achieved and a dream that one cannot realize. '*Won'* (resentment) disappears through revenge and release. But *han* is cold. If what is broken is not made complete, *han* remains. *Won* is anger, and *han* is sorrow. Therefore, *won* blazes like fire, but *han* piles up like snow. (Manabe, 2015, p. 49)

That is, *han* is an emotion resulting from a long series of unfair outcomes that have not settled in one's mind. This is a death that cannot be mourned. An outstanding illustration of *han* is given by the novelist Wŏn-Sŏ Pak, in one of her novels, when the main character recalls her brother's murder during the Korean War, she says,

> We—father, mother, and sister—had just witnessed a gruesome, obscenely brutal death, and now we had to clean up. He was unrecognizable from the waist up, and remnant by remnant we, his family, gathered flesh, brain matter, and congealed blood without allowing ourselves the mercy of a single scream. . . . With artful composure, we devoured his death like wild animals consuming the afterbirth of their newborns and lapping up the bloody mess.
>
> When someone dies, we wail . . . And so we, the survivors, are drained; we get fed up, we grow poor serving the deceased, and as we become sick and tired of it all, we develop an undiluted disgust with everyone else, including the dead person. And then for the first time we, the living, are freed from those who are dead.

> But Mother and I had consumed the dead. Clandestinely, treacherously. . . . The deaths I had consumed continued to strangle my innards, an indigestion, a neurosis that interfered with my daily life. My life continued to be uninteresting, flavorless, tedious, as aggravating as shabby clothing infested with lice, and I wished I could strip it off, scrub and pound it clean. (Pak, 2009, pp. 14–19)

This emotion of unsettlement, stemming from unmourned death and the inability to give proper burial, is *han* and is shared as collective memory, or a meta-memory, in which, according to Santiago Arango-Muñoz, "each time the subject is confronted with a memory task and elicits either a positive or negative metacognitive feeling that guides the decision" (Arango-Muñoz, 2013, p. 135). During the 80s, *minjung* and the student protesters shared the same *han*, repetitively experienced through countless defeats by the police, the military, the government, and even foreign nations (Ko, 2007; Lee, 2009). In 2009, the participants in Roh's *noje* shared *han*, a feeling of loss, unmourned death.

Unmourned sadness as an invitation to the other

In interviews and memorials, the term *han* appeared again and again, emerging as the right word to describe the people's emotion of loss. The interviewee also associated something else with it, that can provide another clue to the origin of their sadness.

> I began to weep as soon as I saw the news. Then I began crying. It wasn't about me, I know. It wasn't about my family. But I was sad just as if I had lost something. I was angry that power makes people to give up their lives. I was upset about this. We saw Namdaemun burnt down. We saw Yongsan burnt down. Perhaps I felt sad because of all these incidents together. Because I thought the government ruled in awful ways, as when the FTA was enforced although millions protested. I felt I no longer live in a democratic country.—Interviewee C

From the testimony above, I suggest two possible ways of identifying this empathetic emotion, which relates Roh's death to others'. As scholars have suggested, emotions provide effective motivational forces. Researchers once stressed emotions in social movements (Aminzade & McAdam, 2002; Goodwin & Pfaff, 2001; Jasper, 1997; H Kim, 2002; Melucci, 1996), which implies that emotions are a commitment mechanism through which apathetic bystanders can develop new activist interests and movement activists can sustain and invigorate their activism.

For instance, James Jasper (1997) writes that "ostensibly cognitive concepts such as suddenly imposed grievances, cognitive liberation, frame alignment, and injustice frames are infused with emotions" (p. 129). Thus, he notes, "emotions give ideas, ideologies, identities, and even interests their power to motivate" (Jasper, 1997, p. 127). Following this, Moo-hyun Roh's memory in the *noje* can be empathetic; *han* here was an emotional affect that shaped people's mobilization. The death of Roh was symbolic, offering a space to express unmourned sadness from Roh's or the other deaths. As Alison Lansberg notes (Landsberg, 2009, p. 223), here, an empathic memory allowed "a leap, a projection from the empathizer to the object of contemplating, which implies a distance between the two" (2009, p. 223). The unidentifiable sadness they went through reminds us that *han* occurred in their minds, and Roh's suicide touched these (collective) memories, which seemed to be lost (Em, 2009).

The other way of reading emotion is valuing cultural background more. According to Sang-Chin Choi (Choi, 1998, p. 246), Koreans understand "we" to include "identity, oneness, mutual dependence, mutual protection, and mutual acceptance." In other words, the "Korean's private self (or individual self) and social self (or collectivized self) overlap." The subject "I" is a rather interdependent self in this culture (S. Kim, 2008, p. 70). For Fred Alford's observation, in Korean morality and ethics, the line between "I" and "We" is frequently blurred. For Koreans, the human being is an inter-person (*ingan*), instead of a solitary, inner-directed, self-mastering individual (Alford, 1999, p. 49). Thus when something occurs, Korean mentality is eager to identify the object. The idea of responsibility exists in collective sense This understanding can also be applied to the sense of responsibility. Sungmoon Kim (2008) notes that instead of a collection of individuals, we (*uri*), as interrelated-selves, share a sense of "collective moral responsibility" (p. 71). This could explain the repeated verses in the poem that was read at the *noje*, saying, "I am sorry I was not able to save you" (An, 2009).

As a community, perhaps, this collective experience of politics may increase the possibility of empathetic emotion or *uri* responsibility. I conclude that there was an empathic unsettlement that caused this level of sadness at that time. South Koreans were experiencing a time of repeated discouragement that was brutal and unmerciful to the people. Although there may not have been someone who had been brutalized, a sense of collectiveness, under the sadness, allowed them to engage and heal through the loss of a person.

In the lines about the democracy that is rushing backward, the poet expressed the point of view that in 2009, Korea was in a retrograde position in its politics. This was not true in strict terms, as there had been no change in the political system or constitution since 1987, but it should be noted that, South Korea did experience a number of political struggles. At this time, Roh's death was particularly attritional, which Sian Lazar explains as involving "constant protest or negotiation, the continuance of the day to day of political life" (Lazar, 2014, p. 91). A year before Roh's death, the South Korean left and liberals had been out on the street for more than six months to protest the free trade agreement that would result in beef imports from the US. A number of symbolic losses also transpired during that era. On February 10, 2008, a representative architectural creation of South Korea, the Sungryemun, was burnt down by a middle-aged man who later confessed he was "upset at housing prices" (Choe, 2008). On February 12, 2009, the top Catholic cardinal in the country, Stephen Kim Suhwan, who had been a protector of the democratic movement during the 1980s, passed away. The most tragic of these incidents happened at Yongsan, in central Seoul, only a few months before Roh's death. On January 20, 2009, 40 tenants were occupying a watchtower on the roof of a four-story building, where they had previously run a business, in protest against insufficient compensation for the redevelopment of the neighborhood. Riot police stormed into the building. A fire broke out. Five evictees and one policeman were killed in the fire on live broadcast. No responsibility accrued to the police, while the survivors were imprisoned for their illegal squat. For many, this was traumatic.

During the *noje*, I witnessed groups of flag bearers, holding funeral streamers. One of these placards was extraordinary: it pictured the faces of the Yongsan victims, as well as other union protesters, next to Roh. The protestors had no relation to Roh, but this unusual union was praised by the half million participants, who cried and shouted slogans before the banner. The imaginative relation between Roh's suicide and the Yongsan deaths was recollected in many testimonies:

> We saw what happened in Yongsan few days before Roh was sacrificed. We saw, and I think there should be punishment of the high-ranking officials who ordered it. But we saw nothing. And then we also witnessed Roh. Then what now? It could be you, me, or

> us. I was sad, but also, I was upset. I went a little crazy. And I am still crazy when I think about it.—Interviewee E

Here, the memory of Roh acted like a Möbius strip in the *noje*. From two-dimensional materials, it presents a three-dimensional existence. Like this geometric figure, the memory of Roh has no distinction between inside and outside. If one follows any trail, both sides of the strip are passed. At first glance, this appeared to be another *lieu de mémoire*, replicating the past—the 1987 democratic movement—to the present. This mimicking gesture is part of the picture, the performance of a *minjung* ceremony in the post-*minjung* era. If we track the strip, however, we may realize there is something more, something unspoken, and something emotional here. What appeared to be an irreversible and uncloseable gap was stitched with a twist and then gained another dimension. In *noje*, endless slippage of meaning allows a place for the Other. Forgetting and silencing strengthens the shared sense of community under Roh as the bronze statue, not the feet of clay.

A new time for *ritornello*

At *nojes* in the 70s and 80s, the ritual was dramatically designed for making the attritional time into a historic time (Lazar, 2013). It was the social and performative apparatus of experience, where the masses are called upon to be conscious, revengeful, and historical subjects—in other words, true minjung. The speeches and slogans emphasized the call for justice in the face of what is perceived to be an acute injustice perpetuated in a highly asymmetric situation between the state and the coming community. It was hoped that sadness would be replaced by fury, which, unlike sadness, is mobilizing and generative of further political action. The speech, thus, solidly affirms the dual quality of sacrifice: what might have been an end for particular protester is, at the same time, a new beginning for the minjung collective, a leap forward in the establishment of strength that arises out of unified action and a common ideological stance, another step toward victory. As the present is built upon the sacrifices of the past, the future will be built upon the sacrifices of the present. In speeches and banners, the citation of previous martyrs affirms that true revolutionary behavior, the path to be taken, and the values to live by may all be found in their examples. Displaying the presence of earlier democratic martyrs in commemoration created a diachronic sense of memories and history, thus their invocation attests to the continuing presence and influence of the dead in the world of the

living. The legacy of the martyrs gives meaning and endows legitimacy to new acts of self-destruction, which will be the means by which the struggle is maintained, unity established, and victory reached. The speech repeatedly assures that victory is certain: “we have no doubt, we believe, we will win”. The public interactions with the corpse disseminate its sacredness onto the living members, purifying, elevating, and consecrating them as a community for which the sacrifice has been made. With this collective experience, the remaining South Koreans felt shame and obligation to reveal the true history.

At 2008, *noje* is not for inciting Marxist revolution; the temporal difference between the 1980s and 2009 may support what Francois Hartog (2015) called a “regime of historicity;” Hartog argues that contemporary Western societies have recently entered a new temporal order in which the present has become omnipresent. Hartog calls this regime of historicity “presentism” and defines it as an invasion of the present into the realms of the past and future. For instance, Hartog notes that the conception of the past as a bygone time has recently been replaced by that of memory, which revitalizes in the present what would hitherto have been considered as dead or obsolete. Memory thus appears as a “presentist instrument,” allowing for a “presentist use of the past” (2015, p. 184).

Instead of meta-narrativist understanding of the history, what can be found is performative memory. Unlike Marxist historicism during the 70s, people’s memory making practices were rather “portable” (Kockelman & Bernstein, 2012), so their meaningfulness was widely applicable while contextually independent. At *noje*, Roh’s name was still chanted like any other martyrs, but the mourners also knew that Roh had a complicated life. That is to say, people commemorate Roh as symbol. They choose to be silent spontaneously but covertly so his death could remain political. Yarimar Bonilla (2011) reports a mode of “peripatetic commemoration” in Guadeloupe, involving “a particular kind of historical engagement—one immediately linked to space, feeling, and action” (Bonilla, 2011, p. 315). “The walk” in her article is to create counter-memory; it is anecdotal or even forgetting. “Rather than becoming *lieux de mémoire* (realms of memory), these sites have become *lieux d’oubli* (realms of forgetting), material evidence of a forsaken and deteriorating past” (Bonilla, 2011, p. 320). Jack Santino (2004) also notes a performative mode of memorization and commemoration in the sites he calls “spontaneous shrines.” Whereas all rituals are “public” (Santino, 2004, p. 365) there are certain

forms of commemoration that are voluntary, spontaneous, and declarative. Santino employs a performative notion of "spontaneous shrines" that emphasizes their transformative possibilities and privileges human agency. Instead of prepared and repeated commemoration, Santino depicts the phenomenon of non-official, "vernacular responses to untimely death" (p. 1) that he argues are increasingly popular in contemporary culture. Santino's work focuses on how social actors engage the places and discourses of memory that structure their everyday lives. His collected cases of spontaneous shrines are potentially political, "communicative" acts of resistance, rather then simply public expressions of private grief. Given this, *noje* of Roh can still be thought as an event, that of remembering. This remembering is not based on authentic historicity that has obliged to recollect certain past memories. Although it lost the authenticity in memory-signs, it reveals unreleased emotion, such as anxiety, concern, worry and rancor to the present politics. The funeral and commemoration for false martyr, Roh, can be a mnemonic performance of the people who have limited sovereignty for their own interpretation of history. What the *noje* of Roh shows us a possibility of solitary memories beyond the chronology.

Thus, unlike the past *noje*, where activists displayed the names and pictures of other *yŏlsa*s who had shared the same political agenda, the *noje* in 2009 was inclusive of all other struggles, which all were against what seemed to be larger than themselves. The memory of Roh on cultural display at the *noje* was the reflection of this mourning, of Roh as well as other invitees. The circle drawn to distinguish inner and outer from their temporary alliance was large. The emotional upset of that time, *han*, was unresolved, but it reproduced threats to life in general. Roh's suicide, although its real motivation was not apparent, was recognized as another case in meta-memory of *han,* that of the defeated, struggling underdogs. Like a Möbius strip, it seemed the mourning of Roh delivered an ever-expanding community confronting what imagined to be outside of the line. The *noje* functioned as a frequently offered vertex.

With graphic illustration, in *A Thousand Plateaus* (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987), Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari take the notion of *ritornello* from musicology and deliver it to politics.

> A child in the dark, gripped with fear, comforts himself by singing under his breath. . . . Lost, he takes shelter, or orients himself with his little song as best he can. The song is like a rough sketch of a calming and stabilizing, calm and stable, center in the heart of

> chaos. . . . Now, we are at home. But home does not preexist: it was necessary to draw a circle around that uncertain and fragile center, to organize a limited space. The forces of chaos are kept outside as much as possible, and the interior space protects the germinal forces of a task to fulfill or a deed to do. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 311)

Ritornello, which can be imperfectly translated as refrain in English, refers to, by the definition of *The Oxford Companion to Music*, "anything 'returned to'" (Scholes 1970, 883). It is a continuous repetition, or returning, instead of the delivery of a progression of rhythm (*motif*) and melody (*conterpoints*). In Deleuze and Guattari's political concept, the term signifies rhythmical repetition different from one to another iteration but with something noticeable in common. It is a way of life as play, emphasizing repetitional pleasure from/against daily struggle; this also supposes an eventually communal unity of solitary subjects.

Individuals become connected in a temporal sense while singing *ritornello*, beginning with a child and then inviting a housewife and anyone who has a will to open the circle. Ritornello is continually performed, like our memory with its continual return from forgetfulness. This is also a memory that one can share with empathy, so that others with similar but different memories can connect together, not that which needed to be kept outside but that which calls us to be inside together. The us thus created is not uniform, nor does it share collective identity. It is an empirical us that includes me and may include those who have tasted the rather intoxicating power of the critical stance. This is an "attempt [at] some kind of artificial reterritorialization that would hopefully 'save' me from what is part of my own (constructed) identity" (Stengers, 2008, p. 42).

> I was sitting at the square when I first heard the story [of Roh's death]. I was sad all day, then I decided to visit the square, because I saw a blog entry that somebody else would be there too. While many were going through emotional chaos, they commemorated Roh in their own way. I heard a song over the crying. I think it made me sad too, but somehow it was more manageable. I don't know. I was different from what I felt at home. I felt more like I was doing something. I was protecting the place where the other people could visit and express their sadness. —Interviewee D

The 2009 *noje* was, conceivably, a singing this song of *ritornello*. The repetition of brutalities, whether government directed or not, expressed a kind of return. In his examination of the

phenomenological context of spacetime, historian Reinhart Koselleck identifies the moment that allows the groundbreaking realization of a subject's previous understanding. In *Future Past* (Koselleck, 2004), he suggests two conceptual spaces of the experience of time: "the space of experience" and a "horizon of expectation."[10] In this schema, historical changes can be oriented from within the subject's consciousness of time. However, this realization comes to be through an experience where time is not and will not be as anticipated. That is, change does not stem from protention, as Gadamer and Husserl suggested, but from experience that contradicts prediction. This is an experience of rupture, which dislocates one from the timeline they thought they were living in. He observed that the former frustration of such experience, in fact, can motivate social change in a dialectical movement. When the gap between experience and expectations broadens, this difference allows one to acknowledge the real gap between history itself and modernity and offers the birth of a new horizon, which is often linked with political action (Koselleck, 2004).

With the forgetting of Roh's concrete past to fashion of him a mere symbol, the *noje* may have been an act of irony that results in a new projection in time. Other memories then coinhabit its space. Repetition here should be understood as the possibility of transformation, changing now as qualitative time into a dramatic *kairos* (Peters, 2015, p. 213). The memory of 1987 served here as a *basso continuo* that delivered not the main melody but provides the references for the chords that the players should play in an improvisational manner (Latham, 2011). While the 1980s repertoire was being played, the 2009 *noje* also exhibited a practice of overt silence, the exercise of not saying what can be said. In active forgetting, a spare space of plurality is enabled. This may create a community, which is not based singular by in identity but in a multiplicity of truths, or, more precisely, a community which, Alain Badiou characterizes, based on "the only ethics [that] is of processes of truth, of labor that brings some truth into the world" (Badiou, 2001, p. 28). Here the pivot of community is not a single collective memory but many memories in one condition: all sufferers at the current time were invited. Some showed an almost ironic representation of memories but still welcomed, presented, and shared a sense of emptiness.

[10] These pairing ideas are notably inspired by Hans Georg Gadamer's theorization of the horizon in *Truth and Method* (2004; see Olsen, 2012). Gadamer, of course, considered the individual horizon of understanding to be limited but continually expansive through the experience of the other, making it thus ever dynamic (Gadamer, 2004, pp. 9–11).

Conclusion: A pro-democratic movement in democratic society.

In this chapter, I have reflected upon the social experience of time in funerals, specifically that of a former President Roh of South Korea. Memories of Roh, especially of him as a martyr of democracy, resulted through the people's sense of the now, the present, as participating in a historical narrative, with a relatively coherent version of the past as a flow of time divided into epochs or periods and punctuated by particular events and people. Here, these memories were not accounted for by the historical aspects of known facts; however, they served as a tool to construct a political space through prefigurative practices. The funeral was the event at which to proclaim repeated time. In particular, the *noje* framed the exhibit as the historical necessity of the re-continuation of a local struggle against the government. The point of rupture was settled in gaining these meanings.

During the funeral, specific practices of mediating different temporalities were employed: for example, the commemoration resembled particular methods of protest during the 1980s, making the past present, in daily life and political protest. Participants may have experienced different time-senses, *kairoi*, not by Roh's death itself, but by returning the present to a temporal sense from the past. Commemoration practices were thus practical and more cyclical. Songs, costumes, eulogies, and the means of dealing with participants' emotions were re-performed to make historical time present.

While forgetting acted as a knot to pull memories together, the repertoires of the 1980s pro-democratic movement significantly contributed: this was one memory that could offer a center or a meta-memory (Conway, 2003, p. 306) wherein it is easy to find a shared sense of the emotions of sadness, being lost, or resentment. In 2009, with Moo-hyun Roh's death ritual, the unspoken, and not properly mourned deaths of others were brought together. Those memories targeted the government's necropolitics (Mbembe, 2003), whose governance relied on policing.

Tentatively, I propose that such invitations could be enacted through a promise or assertion of discontinuity and rupture, even when events may not have been experienced in this way during the time itself. Unidentifiable sadness and an unnamable sense of guilt and revenge offer us the ability to read participants' emotional challenges, which will remain in the present, as examined in the following chapters.

Prologue Three. “We shouldn’t have let him go like that!”

Once, I gave a presentation about Moo-hyun Roh’s funeral in a class for my graduate coursework. After the talk, a Korean student approached me in the corridor to talk about my ideas. With a small tear in her eyes, she concluded: “We shouldn’t have let him go like that.” I wanted to ask why she used the word “we”; how did she think “we” had such a right? But I could not speak.

Chapter Three. Afterlife Memories of Moo-hyun Roh



Figure 1 (left). An image overlapping Moo-hyun Roh's face to King Sejong's body image (Ko, 2011).

Figure 2 (right). The first alleged image of "Rohala" in Ilbe (Panggaei, 2012).

Introduction — Two memories of Moo-hyun Roh in contest

In November 2011, the producers of a new TV drama, *Ppurigip'ŭn namu* ("Deep-rooted tree"), held a press conference. It was a rare occasion given the fact that the series was already on the air. The purpose of the conference was to reject a widely spreading speculation. In the statement, the writers claimed that their main character, King Sejong, was "not written bearing in mind Moo-hyun Roh" (U, 2011). However, the rumor continued and was well-received, as Figure 1 demonstrates, with fan-art created for the drama's main character with Roh's face.

A few months later, a user named *Panggaei* (2012). posted a brief entry with a new image he/she created on an online community called *Ilgan-best Jeojangso* (meaning "the storage for the daily best [post]," hereafter, *Ilbe*). The picture (Figure 2) was a composite image combining two existing photographs. One was Roh's face, and the other was the body of a koala. The user did

not provide details but left a short comment: “This is not a koala. Yes, it is Rohala. Yes, it is.” (Panggaei, 2012). Of all *Ilbe* users, 35,231 read this post and up-voted, and subsequently, more posts depicting Roh as a koala began to be uploaded.

The apparent contradictions in these two cases will frame this chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to consider in what conditions collective memories refuse to become broader and normative. Multiple memory scholars note the possibility and ask about the necessity of he reciprocal fusion of horizon in our understanding. As an exemplary case, in *Public Memory in Place and Time*, Edward Casey (2004) suggested what he termed “public memory” (p. 25). Using the prerequisite term “public,” he differentiated this concept from collective memory. This is a model of memory that is “collective” as well as “out in the open, in the *koinos cosmos* where discussion with others is possible” (Casey, 2004, p. 25). According to him, this communicative model would eventually serve “as an encircling horizon” of our understanding of the world, especially in a time of socio-political crisis (Casey, 2004, p. 25). Casey exemplified his contemporary memory of visiting a commemoration place at Penn Station in New York after 9/11, where he, although unanimous agreement had not been apparent, was able to sense an “ongoing interchange of ideas and thoughts, opinions, and beliefs” (p. 30). On a similar note, Avishai Margalit (2004), in his book *The Ethics of Memory*, coined a term “shared memory” that “requires communication” (p. 51). Harald Welzer (2008) also spoke of “communicative memory” based on a comparable concept of the memory that is conversational:

> Construct and test mental images of that which is being discussed; fill in gaps where something is left unsaid; anticipate the further course of the conversation; prepare the next answer; and, last but not least, draw on memories related to the topic. (p. 294)

For these illustrations, collective memory was imagined breaking what had been private, and emerged as a facilitator of social discussion. Margalit notes, the memory as common sense could “integrate and calibrate the different perspectives of those who remember the episode — for example, the memory of the people who were in the square, each experiencing only a fragment of what happened from their unique angle on events—into one version” (Margalit, 2004, p. 51). Although both understood that this particular mode of collective memories could not be static, they proposed a model of conversation that, in the precise moment after a series of debates, a memory becomes a history that provides a meaning.

The two examples I offer in this chapter will demonstrate something in contrast. The previous chapter illustrated two immediate attempts to construct the post-life memory of the late president. Both were variations from the original reference and were trying to dominate people's memory on Moo-hyun Roh after he committed suicide. As a further development, the cases in this chapter show that the colligated memory of Roh was in fact diversified while polarizing and detouring within a year after the erection of his memory in funeral. Many conversations as memory-making practices were actively placed and spontaneously circulated since his death, and perhaps the Internet and the networked communication made available such opportunities.[11] However they remained to be fragmented, partially forgotten, but not emergent.

As I will show later, users who still mourned Roh's death revealed their unstoppable passion of grasping at their hero's faint trace. However, the traces they claimed often remained indirect or less-relevant to Roh himself. For instance, against the writers' denial above, audiences of *Ppurigip'ŭn namu* left numerous blog articles with their conviction that they saw Roh in King Sejong on TV. Multiple audiences providing such connections can be proven by the placement of small visual elements or lines from the character. According to their interpretation, the appearance of yellow flowers in the last episode of the series, for instance, is a coded message to the thoughts of Roh, since "yellow is, as we all know, the color of Roh" (Kŭrigo, 2011).[12] Nevertheless, a contesting memory rivaled this. The users of *Ilber* rigorously attempted nullification, claiming Roh-mourners' blindness. They employed their skill to post memes online. By creating user-generated, funny but rough images (and other parody contents[13]), they attempted to impose a subversive impression on people's imagination of Roh. Expected

[11] For sharing memories, Casey (2004) noted that three conditions would be necessary: "(a) having had the same history, at least via the proxy of another family member; (b) there having been a common place in which that history was enacted and experienced; and (c) being able to bring the history in-that-place into words or other suitable means of communication and expression" (pp. 22–23). Although Casey hesitated to claim a direct relationship with his preconditions to a certain technology – as with this denial, "[w]hat matters is neither the exact technology nor the precise location" (pp. 22–23) – for us, the conditions infer almost automatically the most accessible space in our time, the Internet network.

[12] It is true that yellow was the most dominantly used color for Roh's *noje* as well as his election campaign in 2002. However, not all the yellow can be folded into such an intention.

[13] such as, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vYibVU6Wbas and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VeMF9kzIy8U

controversy came to them, especially from roaring mourners' sides.[14] The gap in remembering and forgetting seemed to be not encouraged to be communicative; therefore, encirclement as such would not be possible. Indeed, the context of the memory of Roh tends to be improvised instead of following a legitimate, unifying, and collective orthodoxy.

Observing these contrasting remembering-practices, this chapter will discuss what aspects of making memories of Roh failed to be a public memory. Unlike Casey's (2004) or Margalit's (2004) positivism on another level of collective memory, this chapter's collective memories seem neither to call for interpretive encirclement, nor to provide a sense of inter-connectivity and inter-subjectivity. Casey imagined that a public memory would provide "a *basso profundo* in the chorus of the body politic, its medley of voices" (Casey, 2004, p. 25). Instead, the melody played by memories was a *basso continuo*. While *basso profundo* symbolizes an arch-memory that would be a basis for other memory-practices, *basso continuo* is more a musical practice where a player improvises every moment from having only minimal references (see Chapter 1). Then, what did the remaining memories of him prevent in such an emerging role? Why were the memories parallel, contesting, and avoided being communicative?

Basso Continuo - The improvisations in people's memories of Moo-hyun Roh

The enshrinement of Roh's memory after 2009

From the immediate moment of his death in 2009, Roh's memories were thriving in various on-line locations. Soon after the news of suicide flashed, condolers flooded to reshape the network to be more responsive to their emotions. Millions urged online mega-portals, such as NAVER or DAUM, which both co-function as search engines as well as news outlets, to show their respect to the late president; together these resulted in an unusual update of the front page. Notably, the bright color of the logo was toned down to black and white, a short eulogy sentence was addressed on the front page, and a dedicated space where the users could leave comments was built and displayed in a most accessible place.

[14] Whenever each side had to meet there was harsh confrontation. In May 2013, the "Rohala" image was displayed in public at a shop in a small city. The high schooler who created this scandal took a picture of the scene with a finger sign of their community (Hani Online News Team, 2013). A small prank became national news, and the long-mourners were avid to discover who the culprit was and how they could punish him.



Figure 3. Changes in the logo(s) of Internet search engines (Pyŏlbitch'ŏrŏm, 2009).



Figure 4. The memorial page in NAVER - Comment Page (Pasŭt'op'ŭ, 2009).



Figure 5. The memorial page in DAUM - Comment Page (Pasŭt'op'ŭ, 2009).

Condolers' mourning practices also transformed what had been previously considered non-political space. For example, in several online-games, a collective demonstration was

organized for the tribute of Roh. Players met in front of a tree which they named “Roh’s tree” and rallied around the place while holding Roh’s image on their virtual self.



Figure 6. The gamers in *Mabinogi* rallied to remember Roh (Chimbabŭllo3, 2014).



Figure 7. The gamers in *Mabinogi* rallied to remember Roh (Chijiana, 2009).



Figure 8. Other online services (non-political) logo change (Pyŏlbitch’ŏrŏm, 2009).

In 2010, Roh’s memory was continuously recollected and updated in individual blogs and communities. Commemorations were spontaneously individual yet patterned to be collective: they usually occurred as an individual recalled one of Roh’s speeches or actions, which could be

applied to a current political agenda. Contrasting the one they could witness from the then current government, the memory here was a product of recreation as well as an imaginary reaction. For instance, in April 2010, the South Korean warship, the Cheonan, was split in half by an explosion and began sinking in the darkness with the loss of 46 lives. While North Korea had been the prime suspect, a user named *Hhhon* in *Ohmynews,* a participatory news platform, published an opinion that if Roh was alive, "there would not have been a battle in Cheonan that lost 46 lives" (Hhhon, 2010). In August, when a heavy rain storm happened, a user noted in a blog, "Roh had invested billions [to control the flood], but the current government canceled it all" (yTarzany, 2010). In November 2010, when North Korean artillery struck South Korean territory, Roh was summoned again as if he could control North Korea to stop such an act.[15] Though they were writing as if alternative history, (imaginary) images of Roh, a friendly politician of social underdogs, initially erected in *noje* was maintained persistently (see Chapter 2).

A deep-rooted memory — Interpreting almost everything as Roh's trace

One notable remembrance, among many located in users online, was reading Roh's trace through media texts. Since 2010, a trajectory of TV dramas and movies had developed with an apparently similar plot. While none of the production companies admitted that the narrative structure resonated Roh's life, the content's latent ambiguity dominated the audiences' interpretations in specific ways. This practice was even more frequent in the genre of the costume drama: the hero, who is the legitimate heir to the ruling power but taken by another vested class, making a few friends from the lower class. The lower class, or more precisely called the *minjung* class, doubts the hero at first then joins with him to co-fight for the people. Their adventure ends with the upper class' plot resulting in the deaths of many of the characters. The few surviving characters swear to the sky that their vision to revolutionize society will not be forgotten.

Pu-ri kip'ŭn Namu is a case in point: instead of depicting the main character, King Sejong, who in fact ruled the *Chosŏn* dynasty from 1418 to 1450, as a majestic and authoritative

[15] Indeed, due to political reality, it was not easy to make a physical monument during that day. The same government that had targeted their responsibility in terms of the people after Roh's death didn't want to erect new centers of memory, especially before the coming presidential election.

ruler of the new kingdom, the drama imagined him as a warm-hearted and good friend of the common people. In the drama, the king antagonizes continuously about the vassalage, which is illustrated as opposing the king's goodwill to create a more comfortable letter system through which the low social class attains literacy. His supporters are from the lower class, or young scholars who do not have much establishment but are sympathetic to the king's vision. In the end, dozens of characters are trapped and lose their lives to protect the king (SBS, n.d.).

Watching this, mainly in online spaces such as in blogs and fan-communities, audiences claimed it was Roh that the king represented. Moreover, speeches and behaviors were analyzed like crosswords, being matched with the remembered past of Roh's life. Some examples of their interpretations follow:

Table 1. Mourners' interpretation of costume drama and movie in relation with Moo-hyun Roh

Roles and Themes	Interpretation	*Kwanghae* ('Masquerade,' Movie, 2012)	*Kwansang* ('The Face Reader,' Movie, 2013)	*Pu-ri Kip'ŭn Namu* ('Deep Rooted Tree,' TV Drama, 2011)
Protagonist	Roh	A false king, Hasŏn	A high-rank general, Kim Chongsŏ	King Sejong
Antagonist	Conservative Party	The aristocrat and the real King, Kwanghae	Prince Suyang	The aristocrat and their secret society
The oppressed	Minjung	People of Chosŏn dynasty	People of Chosŏn dynasty	People of Chosŏn dynasty
Supporters	Minjung	A eunuch, a swordsman, and a scholar	A physiognomist	Young scholars, a swordsman, handmaidens
Complication	Pro-minjung policy	Tax reform	Stopping the dethronement of the rightful king	The proclamation newsletters for people's literacy
Conclusion	Roh's suicide	The hero flees while his supporters have been executed	All dead. Prince Suyang enthroned	All murdered, but the king succeeds
Box-office (or rating in TV)		12,323,595[16]	9,135,540[17]	9-23%

The plots were also maintained in many media narratives although in a modern setting. In many TV dramas and movies, a young and ambitious character from the lower-social class broke through the glass-ceiling. He/she dreamed of personal success, but then an event changed his/her goal of life for bigger causes. With help from the social underdog, he/she formed a pact with friends as well as his/her former enemies to build a society to be "better," such as by protecting human-rights or organizing successful anti-dictatorship movements. Then, like the previous genre, this genre also became a riddle to the audience.

[16] The movie recorded 3rd in all time box office ratings at that time, but currently is 10th.
[17] Then 10th, now in 24th place.

Table 2. Mourners' interpretation of modern drama and movies in relation to Moo-hyun Roh

Roles and Themes	In reality	*Pyŏnhoin* ('The Attorney,' Movie, 2013)	*Taemul* ('Big Thing,' TV drama, 2010)
Protagonist	Roh	Lawyer Song Usŏk	A female politician, Sŏ Hyerim
Antagonist	The conservative party and its government	Security police, prosecutors, and the secret intelligence agency	*Jaebeol* (corporate conglomerates) and the conservative
The oppressed	Minjung (people)	University students and activists	People
Supporters	Minjung	Song's friends	A prosecutor from a low social class
Complication	Pro-minjung policy	A legal suit against the nation	Hegemonic power struggle
Conclusion	Roh's suicide	Lost the trial	Sŏ's retirement
Box-office (or rating in TV)	-	11,375,944[18]	17-27%

For costume dramas and the modern ones above, the structure of the narrative seemed to be clearly inherited from minjung-narrative which was a popular and familiar way of developing the storyline in the 70s and 80s of South Korea. Experiencing rapid economic growth during this era, South Koreans were somewhat nostalgic about their historical suffering under feudalism, imperialism, and the cold-war. A movie, or TV series under this narrative themed a chronicle of the hero's endless pain. Commonly the hero in this structure is a pure male or female, and the perpetrators often symbolize suppressive social and political forces around heroes such as the noble, colonialism, cold-war politics, and global capitalism. The genre was successful during the era, becoming popular among "common people" and often inspiring university students and intellectuals who wished to suggest a counter-narrative against the state-driven modernization ideology.

In our examples, the idea of the suffering of minjung is continued but reshaped to be more projective of South Korean's post-dictatorship and representative political system. Now the hero's social class has elevated, for example, a ruler of the nation. However, in the storyline, the hero was denied the exercise of his/her political power, although the rightful legitimacy was due

[18] 9th in all time box office at that time. Now 15th.

to the pre-existing cartel. The hero was isolated and coerced to surrender his political power unjustly to the unsanctioned, not-people oriented therefore undemocratic political power. And this has been interpreted as a tale of Moo-hyun Roh, who was believed to be a politician chosen by the commoner and weakened by the elite.

Such inheritance seemed to have a good precedent. Movies and TV series went viral in the pre-social media era, and many captured the audience's attention which led to success in the box-office. As the table 1. shows, Kwanghae (2012), a fictional movie that was widely considered as a connotative story of Moo-hyun Roh set in the old dynasty, attracted more than 12 million audiences in theaters. It was the most successful movie of the year and the 3rd in all-time Korean box-office history. In the next year Pyŏnhoin (2013) in table 2., a film inspired by Moohyun's young legal protest against the state police gathered another 11 million South Korean viewers. This was the second most-viewed movie of that year, next to the Myŏngnyang (2013), a story of a naval admiral who defended the Japanese invasion in 1597. Pu-ri kip'ŭn Namu (2011) the TV series scored 25.4% in the ratings, the top among the programs at that time (SBS, n.d.).

By the audience's yet mournful mind, the symbolism of these contents were directly linked to Roh's implicit presence. The reviewing practices functioned to reinforce Roh's memories as the one's established in *noje*. In addition, the media industry continued to develop products of a similar storyline, since such installments guaranteed market success. The audience also confirmed their memories of Roh and even enhanced their mourning while watching this content. With various modes of interpretations in multiple blog entries, which were often thought to be arbitrary, Roh, after his death, was constantly recalled, marking him as living with afterlife memories:

> (For the movie *Kwanghae*) In one scene, Hasun, the protagonist, said, 'I cannot betray my wife. I would rather abstain.' This was homage to the man Roh Moo-hyun, who said, 'Do you mean that I have to throw away my wife to get elected the president?' (Hŏ, 2012).
>
> (For the movie *Kwanghae*) Hasun spoke to his retainer, stating, 'you should feel shame.' Who said that the king should send the troops to *Ming* China. Roh also said the same to the generals, who were opposed to retaking the wartime operational control in 2006 (Pak, 2012).

(For the TV drama *Ppu-ri Kip'ŭn Namu*) In the drama, Sejong often used swear words such as 'damn' and 'bull shit.' He also mentioned, 'I cannot do this job [king's work] anymore.' These all remind us of Roh's word usage in some sense. (…) [also] we can find the appearance of former President Roh, who had been talking with the prosecutors who opposed the prosecution reform in Sejong, standing in front of the public gate and talking to the noble, which is protesting against the Hangeul campaign (I Sŭlki, 2011).

(For the TV drama *Taemul*) Seeing the main character, Sŏ Hyerim, struggling in politics, it seems reasonable to recall what happened a day before the presidential election in 2002, when Mongchun Chŏng's revoked his earlier endorsement (Katshwin-dong, 2010).

Roh as the bronze statue, living through the *minjung* narrative

Observing these interpretations, we can notice the following: Roh, at least during the era between 2010-2014, was joined to other heroes who appeared repetitively narrated in South Korean society - *minjung* narrative. This was what the 2009 *noje* ritual intended to naturalize (see Chapter 2). The audiences' identification of Roh's trace in various storylines implied that now Moo-hyun Roh began colliding with other heroes in popular folktales. Thus, for them, it was not a problem of whether what they saw in the TV was dressed as the king of the dynasty five hundred years ago (*Pu-ri Kip'ŭn Namu*), or a woman who lost her husband in the second Iraqi war (*Taemul*). For any character who stood for struggling *minjung* (people), they would find Roh's trace, whether the creator of the story intended it or not. In other words, for those who mourn his death, Roh's memory became a symbol that haunts our memories; now the memory of Roh is omnipresent.

This symbolic status may mean the mourner/audience would define their experience of time by a given narrative. As Jens Brockmeier (2002) claimed, a narrative can guide one's experience. It is not just a more effective medium for presenting an event but also shapes temporal dimensions of the experience. Michael Carrithers (1992) also argued that narrative consists not merely of telling stories but also of understanding complex units of actions and events. In this view, the human capacity for planning and anticipating events is basically not different from narrative thought:

Human beings perceive any current action within a large temporal envelope, and within that envelope they perceive any given action, not as a response to the immediate

> circumstances or current mental state of an interlocutor, but as part of an unfolding story. (Carrithers, 1992, p. 82)

In other words, narrative endows the inherent historicity of human existence with cultural meanings. Thus, the decoding of TV drama and movies with given narratives is performed with the idea that the past is assembled through a simple act in the present. As if proving this point, in many reviews, the time in the narrative and the time in living experience exist as intertwined together:

> [In t]he appearance of King Sejong, I see President Roh Moo-hyun. Of course, for the KOR-US FTA I can not possibly say that President Roh Moo-hyun had no fault on it. [However,] like the noble class in the drama, the bureaucrats of our country, especially, the foreign affairs bureaucrats' US-friendly position, it is in fact selling our nation to the foreign interest. (Hŭidongi, 2011)

The above commentary tries to understand Roh's political decision (KOR-US Free Trade Agreement [FTA]) as a machination of Pro-US bureaucrats. Then, while the facts and the details behind each historical moment—KOR-US FTA by Roh and the invention of Hangul by King Sejong—were equally dismissed, two pasts, one on the screen, and the other near-past in reality are regarded as the "same." The unchallenged history remained the same for the bourgeois bureaucracy. This quasi-Marxist perspective to history, seeing it as a never-ending repetition, is a feature of *minjung* philosophy. In this theorem, *minjung* struggled under the unjust social exploitation in the past, and the hardship still exists for those who regard themselves as victimized by the noble class. As Jan Assmann (1998) asserted, Moses was a memory that may have survived, "obscured and distorted, but perhaps supported by individual members of the Priest cast through the ancient scripts" (p. 196). Here the people's attempt to read Moo-hyun Roh's presence in the media text, when even the producers' of the series denied its relationship, may prove that his memory at this stage became and was maintained to keep memory as the "bronze statue" on "the feet of clay" (Freud, 1961; Assmann, 1998, See Chapter 2).

Rohala — Another afterlife of Roh's memory

However, in opposition to this mournful practice, the other mode of the collective memory of Roh was hosted. Unlike the above case, this practice criticized some silence, especially the one "engineered" from *noje*'s intended forgetfulness.

This new remembering was created in *Ilbe* and circulated widely in several online bulletins. *Ilbe* was built in April 2010 to be a repository for some favorite but extreme posts from another well-known website named *Tissi Insaidŭ* (Kim, 2014). From around 2011-2012, users on this site began to question the society's "brain-dead adoration to Roh," And the mocking posts began soon after. As noted above, in 2012, the post of *Rohala* imagined Roh as a koala and uploaded the picture. A similar image, which was more famous for its polished appearance, was also posted in January 2013 (K'agawaunji, 2013). The boom on making such memorabilia of Roh has dominated that community ever since.

Figure 9. "Nohala (extremely hateful)" (K'agawaunji, 2013).

The image reflected the community's culture to indict the hypocrisy of their society. Moo-hyun Roh, at least in *Ilbe*'s discussion bulletin, was no more than the one who died because of feelings of shame. He was an irresponsible politician and disgraceful father of the family, yet the people outside, the left and the liberals, viewed him as if he was a hero of the age. They condemned the blindness of contemporary memories in which liberals viewed Roh as an idol and a false memory (H. Kim & N. Kim, 2009). In fact, the name *Rohala* (Figure 9) came from this logic. The name was a combination of Roh and Allah (see Figure 10). For *Ilbe* users, this image of Rohala can be an accurate representation of Roh because it revealed the authenticity behind

the cult of Roh. Through creating, sharing, and praising these seemingly meaningless practices, *Ilbe* users mocked the mourners' blindness to the past.

The same intention was well represented in other, less-humorous images. Figure 11 shows another composite image of a young and then older version of Roh. As a young parliament member, Roh appeared on the left saying, "You must not just take the money if you do not reward them back." However, the older image on the right shows Roh before the hearing, who defended himself by saying, "[I] didn't know." By stitching two different times of Roh into one place, the picture accused Roh's defection as well as his followers' blindness.



Figure 10. Roh as a fanatic terrorist (meme korea518, n.d.).

Figure 11. Conflicting message: From Roh in 1987 to Roh in 2009 (DJ nosi, 2016).

For the image's impoliteness, Hakchun Kim (2014) explained the method was based on the online community's culture. The users shared a strategy called *Ŏgŭ-ro*, from an English word "aggravation," which is a purposeful practice to make others angry, especially the ones who

often face harsh criticism. The main purpose of creating such images of Roh was to upset the many memories that decorated Roh as a hero. For them, the major purpose was to deny and de-constitute what the society regarded as the divine. As in the nature of humor and satire, the strategy does not recognize an absolute value, and the users of *Ilbe* used their "emotional energy" (Collins, 2005) through the pleasure of destroying the divine. For *Ilbe* users, all of these people who don't understand the self-contradiction of the divine are *Ssipsŏnbi*. This word consists of two Korean terms, one from a swear word "*ssip*-" and the other from "*sŏnbi,*" the scholars in the Confucius social class, who were often accused of moral hypocrisy. For *Ilbe* users, they are the hypocrites who do not have an ability to distinguish what was really wrong and what they (*Ilbe*) tried to do. They are "dyslexic" people who don't understand the mood and prevailing attitude in the community. The word is more frequently used to refer to the liberals of South Korean politics, who proclaimed Roh a hero against "the facts." *Ilbes*

> claimed to be logical and rational; members request evidence and calculation before any judgment. And these "facts" that they enthusiastically perused confirmed the fact those *'Ssipsŏnbi'*, who should have set morality and value ahead, in fact are "like us". Those who had monopolized the sacred value represented by democratization collapsed without hesitation and trembled before the cowardly attack of Ilbes. As a result, the users of *Ilbe* do not understand the criticism of "being demoralized for attacking the dead". Rather, the accusation itself is the reason why they have to push such practice more strongly, and behind this is the exhilaration and cynicism witnessing other's anger. (Kim, 2014, p. 140)

A user of *Ilbe,* in Hakchun Kim's study (2014) answered to the question why they shared the hate toward Roh enthusiastically:

> So, when we do satirize like Noala, those left-wingers are judgmental. But, what about the picture in last time, the one of President Park Geun-hye giving birth the Park Chung-hee? Isn't that the same kind of blasphemy? I don't understand why this picture is a satire while our image productions of Roh Moo-hyun is blasphemy. I just cannot understand this. Just accept both as satire, or they should accept what they were doing was the same kind of blasphemy. (Kim, 2014, p. 110)

One fact should be clarified here. If various *Ilbe*s' memory-representations of Roh were to contest people's forgetfulness of Roh when he lived, their reproductions should be regarded as

mnemonic practices equally originated from an archival drive. Although rough artistic representations, *Ilbe* images are an interpretation of Roh, which should be qualified as a mode of remembering him. The images confront archived memories at that time. Nevertheless, the *noje* was performed as a temporal archive of memories, inviting and collecting peoples' other recollections (Chapter 2). In contrast, *Ilbe* images collected particular images that confronted the memories gathered during *noje* and its prosthetic extensions inside popular culture during their era. It allows a politically expanded territory, and that is the power of having space. The function of the very existence of such images makes Roh susceptible to being vulnerable.

The cartography of Roh's memories drawn during 2010-2014 can be summarized as follows. On the one hand, there is an aura of remembrance, from the *noje* of 2009. After this media event, people tried to locate signs of him, the memory's presence, in the narratives they could find. Roh's struggle inside *noje*-related memories became universalized. Roh became one of the other heroes who had repeatedly been betrayed throughout history. On the other hand, we have new memories from *Ilbe*, which attempted to trace back to the source and challenge pre-existing memorial practices. The two memories' relationship reminds us of the connection between trace and aura in Walter Benjamin's (2002) thought:

> Trace and aura. The trace is appearance of a nearness, however far removed the thing that left it behind may be. The aura is appearance of a distance, however close the thing that calls it forth. In the trace, we gain possession of the thing; in the aura, it takes possession of us. (M 16a, 4) (Benjamin, 2002, p. 447)

In aura, as Benjamin outlines, we found that the people's recognition of time and history that has been circular and repetitive will create a victim in the near-future. In trace, we found the "fact" that attempted to nullify the memory of now; the practices aimed for cancellation of the aura from memory in order to make a counter memory. To put it differently, for those who see Roh through the *minjung* meta-narrative, Roh is an omnipresent hero from "our" collective memory; the fact that Roh's memory revealed its existence is almost beyond space-time. In every moment of audience interpretations, the decoder could claim they found another of Roh's story. *Ilbe* memories of Roh attempt to make that sacred collective memory to be profane. By humanizing and humiliating Roh's memory, they instead purposed to cut the tie in their era's imagination between the meta-narrative of *minjung* and that of meta-memory, with *han* from Moohyun Roh.

The Failure of Acknowledging the Other Memory

The last proposition of this chapter is to test the reasons why Roh's collective memory could not be "public." Earlier, Casey (2004) and Margalit (2004) characterized the idea of public memory as interpretive encirclement of collective memory, which would provide a sense of inter-connectivity and inter-subjectivity. Moo-hyun Roh could achieve such a grounding position, since regardless of what he did, his suicide shocked and was mourned by the nation as a "flashbulb memory" (Brown & Kulik, 1977).[19] As Chapter 2 of this dissertation mentioned, there were "spontaneous shrines" to commemorate him as well as any memories of suffering (Santino, 2006). Then, as this chapter observes, as memories of Roh were widely reproduced, he seemed to have the potential to be the symbolic figure triggering society's recollections in positive terms.

However, memories of Roh during the period of our observation were rather floating in dissonance between those two bases. Each attempted to involve the other's memory-institutionalizing process. From the beginning, *Ilbe*'s Roh-memory was established as a denial to the *noje*'s intended memory. Then, when these mirroring memories became viral through incidents such as displaying *Rohala* in public places, mourning memories attacked such mnemonic practices as depravity (see footnote 4 in this chapter).

What does this mean for the studies of collective memory? In one perspective, for Jacques Derrida (1989) remembering the deceased with rightfully shared language is an impossible mission. Collective memory, for him, is not collective from the beginning. Our commemoration of the dead remains unavoidably an activity of assuming the face hidden under the *prosopopoeia*; memories are solely owned by the individual mourner, not by the one in the coffin. What we can share about the dead should be an individual trace of private interpretation and cannot be of collective memory. Thus, any recollection creates constant slippages in interpretation (Derrida, 1989, p. 28). By summoning different moments, faces, and participants, individuals "of the present" create a unique attachment to the diverse past.

However, I will address what could be otherwise. On one hand, Derrida's doubt on collective memory is rooted in his discrediting of (written) language. In his prime work *Of Grammatology*, Derrida's (2015) concern was to find the underlying "condition of all linguistic

[19] The term refers to a mode of memory characterized as accurate, long lasting, and detailed for highly significant, emotional events.

systems" (p. 60). For him, the minimal unit of language (which Derrida calls "grammatology") is to be always an iterable trace. A "trace" is a mark remaining after the moment of its inscription, and this means that after that moment, an established meaning during one instance can be dismissed by creating another trace on it. But in this paper, I will begin my argument from the assumption that what remains in our memory can be agreeable by many who shared the same remembrance. For this opening and before making common sense of this particular time-memory, we can consider the tradition of hermeneutics that claims "individual memory is shaped and maintained in and through communal action, in and through tradition" (Ruin, 2015, p. 212), both in and through "the language that we are" (Gadamer, 2004, p. 470). Of course, the cases we observed in this chapter could not achieve such a point. However, by checking the condition of memory's communicative mediation, I will identify the circumstances other than the impossibility from the aperture in between two contesting memory practices.

Different Languages in Remembering Moo-hyun Roh

The choice of language should be a foremost ground to access memories. In "The Social Frameworks of Memory," Maurice Halbwachs (1992) contended that language is "the most elementary and the stable framework" because it is how human beings process, translate, and articulate memory (p. 45). He underlined how the reciprocal relationship between language and memory forms a more complex, personal knowledgebase over time. In addition, language triggers recall, and people use language to identify and make sense of what they see in both stored and present images. For example, memory gives words meaning, while names conjure particular meanings developed from previous social interaction and experiences; therefore, "words" and "relations with others" give us the ability to remember (Halbwachs, 1992, p. 45).

In coining the term "shared memory," Avishai Margalit (2004) also underlined the importance of language. But here language takes a bigger position. In the passage, he differentiated his notion from "a common memory" because shared memory would be mediating. The simple mode of aggregated memory cannot be "shared" because it does not apply the language of communication. He explained:

> A shared memory… requires communication. A shared memory integrates and calibrates the different perspectives of those who remember the episode … each experiencing only a fragment of what happened from their unique angle on events … into one version.

> Other people in the community who were not there at the time may then be plugged into the experience of those who were in the square, through channels of description rather that by direct experience. Shared memory is built on a division of mnemonic labor. (Margalit, 2004, pp. 51-52)

Hence, what he calls "shared memory" will be accomplished by on-going communication actions, which make other memories inclusive to a dialogue. "Flashbulb memory," the memory of a dramatic event, is not enough and must be involved with a conversation. Edward Casey (2004) also required "direct communication" in a place that "nurtures (or at least allows) communal presence" for his notion of "public memory" (p. 33). Furthermore, Casey noted, "The praxis of public memory is primarily discursive" (p. 33). Already in his repeatedly referenced book *Remembering* (2000), Casey argued that our reminiscing casts us back into the past which trying to relive it and is most often done in the company of others, through the medium of language. The role of language in this situation is to articulate what might have remained sequestered and undiscussed, held in private thoughts or emotions. Discourse, spoken or written, enables memories that concern many to appear in a common arena of appearance that is tantamount to a shared reality.

However, in two cases of Roh's afterlife memories, we see that the languages used in both groups were not a means of communication with the other. As noted, for example, *Ilbe* users named Roh's sympathizers *Ssip-sŏnbi* as insulting to their blind remembering. Similarly, the term *minjuhwa* refers to democratization and is also used as a vulgarism on their site, for they claimed the term has been used everywhere, with and without the right context by Roh's sympathizers. *Unji*, the term originally referring to "moving the finger", was used as a way to mock the way of Roh's death. Also, Roh's mourners (sympathizers) called the users of *Ilbe* as *Ilbech'ung*, the insects in *Ilbe*, looking down on their online activities. The mourner's obsessive language to trace Roh's image, literally everywhere, served to isolate their space; hence, the others outside the circle named these people *noppa*, the group of enthusiasts of Roh. The language both use, terms and the expressions of Moo-hyun Roh, seemed quite intentional, making the deifying of Roh more than evident. Each used words that were decontextualized and deviated from universal use, often attacking the other's mind.

Indeed, while these words are undoubtedly insulting, as well as morally and ethically unjustifiable, there have been cultures like this where the high rate of anonymity and relative absence of rules creates an environment where "anything goes," and where one is "likely to encounter pornography, gore, misogyny racism, homophobia, or any combination of the above" (Mitchell, 2012, p. 277ft). One might be able to say, as Bernstein et al. (2011) noted, the anonymity of Internet sites creates the conditions under which strange and progressive modes of expression, political and otherwise, can take place. As such, one can point out that the new technicality of our age produced this change, which we must consider natural. As I demonstrated in Chapter 1, the language that we use in the present has added more complexity in itself. As such, our use of new technology does not merely facilitate the efficiency of mediation but reveals more "complexity and flexibility of technology … by a wider range of actors" (Feenberg, 2000, p. 449). The language under these circumstances has been deeply associated with the presence of new technology, which can be a condition as well as a possibility for being that is given to us and imagined by us (Dreyfus, 2009; Heidegger, 1977a, 1977b; Ihde, 1990). As Heidegger (1998) advised us:

> With the unconditional reign of modern technology there is an increase in the power — the demand as well as the performance — of the technological language that was devised for the widest possible spread of information. Because this [power] is scattered in systems of formalized reports and signals, the technological language is the severest and most menacing attack on what is peculiar to language: saying as showing and as the letting-appear of what is present and what is absent, of reality in the widest sense. (p. 141)

The language of trauma against the language of play

In our two contesting remembrances, the precise dissonance in their languages rests on the point that they do not acknowledge the presence of the other in memory-practices. Perhaps, the language in our day has changed as proposed above. However, this does not justify the immorality of the hostile comments. It is not my intention here that we consider any facet of the revealing of modern technology to be a "problem" that must be "solved". Nevertheless, I suggest instead to think about the nature of language.

Hermeneutics like those of Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Paul Ricoeur underlines articulations on understanding, language, and the world established upon our ability of communication. For them, one's understanding of lived experiences enables one to, in turn, pose further questions about the experience of being-in-the-world that is our communicative life. For instance, according to Heidegger's articulation, the essence of language and the relationship of *Dasein* and the world imply that media and the means of representation are not merely instruments of communication or secondary phenomena that relate information about entities already "out there." Rather, they are direct and active participants in revealing the being of those things that we subsequently think they merely represent. In other words, the precise issue in communication is not just about how we speak, but more importantly, also about how we are spoken to. Communication should be principally "letting someone see with us what we have pointed out by way of giving it a definite character" (Heidegger, 1968, p. 197). This type of understanding transpires as an "occurrence" rather than an "act," and *Dasein* is the "opening" or "clearing" where this event takes place. In that sense, the very experience of communication is the discovery of what is being unconcealed before us, rather than corresponding to an extended reality.

Also, for Gadamer (2004), the ethical aspect of language is crucial because dialogue occurs in language, and that understanding is always mediated by language, which is itself formed in the process of dialogue. For him, hermeneutical endeavor entails broadening our perspectives through the fusion of horizons, which can only occur when one is open, so the other can challenge one's own perspectives. As Gadamer pointed out, "The fusion of horizons that takes place in understanding is actually the achievement of language" (p. 370). Thus, only through language do humans have a world at all. In this procedure, the openness of the self can be sensed through language; within language anything to be understood is interpreted, and similarly, it is within language that we encounter ourselves and others (Gill, 2015). In this regard, language is dialogue and is, in part, human's being-in-the-world. The guidance of the hermeneutical experience determines that our mode of being in the world is through our being in language. On one hand, like Heidegger, Gadamer also considered language as the foremost ground of understanding, since language discloses the world (p. 370). On the other hand, according to Gadamer, the world overflows the categories of language (p. 421). This insight explains why unexpected experiences can overwhelm us to the extent that we fail to find the

words to describe them. As a result of his analysis, Gadamer argued that language both discloses and hides the world. This double-edged quality of language can be seen in the distinction between the said and the unsaid.

Communication, if following Paul Hedges's (2016) interpretation of Gadamer (2004; see also Vilhauer, 2010) is a play of this circumstance. Play is something which is non-serious but also possesses a state of intensity. We may become lost in fascination as we are taken over by the game itself, and if played fully, we live within the game world. With the "primacy of play over the consciousness of the player" (Gadamer, 2004, p. 94), play is something outside of the "normal seriousness" of the world, and its work-a-day habits and routines, become almost a counter or reversal. In addition to this, Gadamer says play "represents an order in which the to-and-fro motion of play follows of itself" (p. 94). Between an active (sense of agent as doer) and passive (acted upon), play is an event in which both the players and the play (and other players) co-create the play. Moreover, play is medial; it is neither (or not solely either) active nor passive, but part of a middle place. The player does not "actively control" the play because the player is within the rules; at the same time the very play is also constituted merely because there is a player willing to play and who is also involved in determining and potentially changing those rules. Therefore, the player is not simply passively receiving the game. In relation to hermeneutics, this mediality might be related to understanding because any interpreter is both receiving (taking in information) and creating (developing an understanding). Neither partner controls the dialogue, but rather it is a co-created activity.

The language of play or dialogue must assume the presence of the other. Gadamer (2004) argued that through this medial, co-creative activity of dialogue (through play), the "unsaid" is the "more" that frames the proposition of the text. Here, Gadamer stresses openness rather than closure (which, of course, can never be excluded as long as we are finite beings). While we can never transcend the realm of prejudices (because we are always implicated in our understanding), we can transcend those that have proven inept or fruitless. Gadamer contended, "All this shows that a conversation has a spirit of its own and that the language used in it bears its truth within it, that is, that it reveals something which henceforth exists" (p. 345). In other words, a new realization, new interpretation, or a re-creation comes about through the conversation that stands on the other's side:

> In human relations the important thing is, as we have seen, to experience the Thou truly as a Thou—i.e., not to overlook his claim but to let him really say something to us. Here is where openness belongs. …Without such openness to one another there is no genuine human bond. (Gadamer, 2004, p. 361)

Consequently, it is language that broadens one's range of horizon. One's horizon is not static as long as one is in conversation. This does not mean either giving up one's framework or abandoning it to the other (as empathy would suggest), but it does mean participating in a "higher universality," which the concept of "horizon" denotes. Meanings in any communication situation are constantly redefined as the expression of the values, beliefs, customs, and social practices of the community, or the world of the community and the community's experience of the world.

Contrasting this hermeneutics' position to the dialogues, the memories of Roh, represented and repeatedly remediated, seemed to be out of this conversational play-norm. For both sides, expansive reproductions of their interpretation of Roh remains inward, although they see more or less their own practices as a play (H. Kim, 2014). For Roh's mourners, this remained just a taboo from those "who do not know anything about him." This also troubles one of the social norms that existed in South Korea, as to mock and tease the dead is traditionally considered taboo (Alford, 1999; S. Kim, 2009). *Ilbe*'s opinion to the sympathizers stood in similarly negative position. Calling them *Chwajom*, the brainless zombies of the left, they themselves kept justifying their own mocking behavior (I, 2013). Meanwhile, the name *Ilbe* became an insult to the mourners, and *Noppa* did similarly to the *Ilbes*. The moniker was a play, but it was neither communal nor medial for refusing to acknowledge the other. In contrast, the name just enhanced the preexisting norms of reproducing their own memory, which would be considered as an affront by the other.

Perhaps Gadamer's (2004) solution would be acknowledging the negative aspect of the hermeneutic experience. On his account, experience in general is a process that is essentially negative. By "negative," Gadamer means that our expectations of what something is or means are regularly disappointed and disconfirmed. As Gadamer explained, experience "cannot be described simply as the unbroken generation of typical universals. Rather, this generation takes place as false generalizations are continually refuted by experience and what was regarded as

typical is shown not to be so" (p. 353). To put it another way, when we are surprised, we begin to see things from a new perspective and come to know them with more clarity; then we experience what experience is: "Thus the negativity of experience has a curiously productive meaning" (Gadamer, 2004, p. 353).

However, this idealization should expect several barriers. The first issue is on the power relation outside the two groups. As commonly known and accepted, both neo-Marxist cultural studies and the Frankfurt School provided the logic that language and power are organized around economic and political structures of domination, and changes in such structures also entail the promise of power-free communication. For cultural studies, the relationship between meaning and power takes the form of ideological domination; "hegemony" focuses precisely on language as an instrument for constructing the common sense of culture, rather than considering economic interests to be the driving force of social dynamics (Lewis & Jhally, 1994). The Frankfurt School, similarly, has focused upon the analysis of social power and culture, with important contributions to the study of mass popular culture and the emergence of consumer and media culture in capitalist modernity. Therefore, these lines of thinking introduce a cultural-linguistic perspective into political analysis and render culture a significant battleground for social and political change. Jürgen Habermas (1977) also shared this point and actively participated in the discussion of the issue. Habermas's specific criticism of Gadamer's (2004) approach to the "hermeneutic" theory of knowledge centers on the idealization of "tradition." For him, the concept of "tradition" leads one to ignore significant dimensions of ideology, which may come with hegemonic power, and the sway that powerful allies, forces, and domineering groups within a tradition (textual, authorial, religious, cultural) have over the development of social justice and transformations anticipated in the conversations (Habermas, 1977; Mendelson, 1979).

Having in mind this argument, we can identify whose languages they are speaking. For *Ilbe*, while they claimed their reproductions of memories were for the fun of making counter-memories, what they eventually spoke behind those memory objects would be, in fact, what had not been spoken by the then-government. In an earlier chapter, I described the government's attempts to silence the death in *yŏnggyŏlsik*, to mute Roh's sympathizers. In *Ilbes*' mocking languages, such desire was expressed similarly. Memories gathered in the *Ilbe* site, therefore,

served to nullify what Foucault (1977) called “counter-memory” (p. 18). While *noje* memories performed as the *loci* of anti-archive against the government’s institutionalizing memory, *Ilbe*’s memory practices can be thought of as creating an anti-anti-archive that serves the hegemon of the era. The mnemonic practices they were playing here were with the assured excellence of the dominant political power. Their archive would function as an alternative institutional memory; it would create a vacuum by the elimination of symbolic memory. Here is a reminder by Pierre Bourdieu about the language in public discussion with the invisible presence of power.

> [E]xcellence, in most societies, is the art of playing with the rules of the game, using this playing with the rules of the game to render a supreme homage to the game. The controlled transgressor is the complete opposite of the heretic. The dominant group co-opts members on minimal indexes of behaviour that are the art of respecting the rules of the game in the regulated transgressions of these rules: correct behaviour, bearing. In Nicolas de Chamfort's famous phrase, "The vicar-general can smile at a statement against religion, the bishop can actually laugh, and the cardinal can add a word of his own"[20]. The higher you rise in the hierarchy of dignitaries, the more you can play with the rules of the game, but ex officio, on the basis of a position that is beyond any doubt. The cardinal's anti-clerical humour is supremely clerical. (Bourdieu, 2014)

Ricoeur contended that the foremost question of memory is to think of whose memory it is (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 4). While the memory of Roh is from *noje*, even though it was loosely related to history, it served as a symbolic connecting link to other memories. Mourners’ identifications in this chapter, although they were based on the imagined remembrance, were responding to their ongoing political struggle. As noted earlier, Roh’s memories were recalled when there was a crisis on a social or political level (p. 9 of this chapter). On the other hand, *Ilbe*s was trying to make a symbolic link to be perceived as void. Their remembrance was for the cancellation of the solidarity among many other unvocalized memories under the banner of

[20] The original text was by Nicolas de Chamfort, *Maximes et pensees* (1795), foot-noted in the same book (Bourdieu, 2014, p. 387ft29). The English edition of the book used a shorten passage: “the priest must believe, the canon may have doubts, the cardinal can be an atheist” (Bourdieu, 2014, p. 62). Since the French essay, *La Fabrique Des Débats Publics* (Bourdieu, 2012), used the same text on the footnote, I replaced the quote above.

Roh's imaginative appearance. The issues regarding power and whose memories should be vocalized were prominent here.

Moreover, for the sympathizers' minds, Roh is more the serious object of mourning rather than a play. Aleida Assmann (2001) indicated three (collective) memory anchors: affect, symbol, and trauma. By identifying Roh in terms of (pseudo) memory-objects, sympathizers connect their memories of the past in an intimate way that recalls the time as having uniquely identifiable referents. Their equating of Roh with the tragic heroes in narratives, indeed, cannot be a play. Rather, by this process, the mourner, who is internally re-experiencing the past in a rite of individual remembering, conveys in detail as media content the scene of events and the emotions he/she associates with them to his/her interlocutor. As Sigmund Freud (1914) explained, their "way of remembering" is the compulsion to repeat a "motive for remembering" (p. 154), or more precisely an "impulsion to remember" (p. 151). Through this practice, they are re-experiencing their past via the frequent use of activated forms that index the cognitive status of themselves, while recounting the memories and their current center of attention. This repeated intrusion of past events into the sympathizers' present awareness is indicative of traumatic memory, as well as their way of working through that trauma by giving triggers of recollections to it and seeking the empathy of what Anna Green (2004) referred to as an "affective community" (p. 38). Having a dialogue with the ones who mourners think are on the murderers' side would be quite painful and create an unacceptable imagination.

Contesting in Parallel without Forgetting

Inspired by Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida (2000a, 2000b) considered the ethic of hospitality for two different types. The first is conditional (Derrida, 2000a, pp. 3–5, 2000b, p. 25). Receiving the visitors, the others, in this case should accord to more or less formalized rules. There should be an invitation from the host always, and the guest should accept it. This is an agreement, a pact that allows both of them to coexist safely. While the invitation initially appears as a gesture of openness and acceptance of the otherness, it very quickly becomes a clear presentation of the conditions of the agreement that the newcomer should abide by.

One of the crucial norms in conditional hospitality is that language is necessary to formulate the invitation (Derrida, 2000a, p. 5, 2000b, pp. 17, 53, 135). In The *Gift of Death*

(1996), Derrida notes “The first effect or first destination of language therefore involves depriving me of, or delivering me from, my singularity” (p. 60). Once the host speaks, he is no longer himself, “alone and unique.” Hence, the language of the host is the code (Derrida, 2000a, p. 6, 2000b, p. 139). Using common, understandable vocabulary, both sides may achieve a sense of familiarity and security, as desired by family members facing a stranger’s visit. Using common vocabulary, the host removes the unfamiliar “otherness” of the invitee out of sight. However, Derrida also pointed out that the language should be enforced to the stranger. Making the other person use the same language is intended to fill in the terrifying abyss of estrangement, to neutralize the separateness of the unknown, of a nameless stranger or foreigner.

Derrida further points out that there is another type of hospitality that is unconditional (Derrida, 2000b, pp. 75–83). This is hospitality based on ignorance; it rejects the codes of rules, laws, conventions, and courtesy, to authentically invite the “other” to its house. The host does not know—and will not know—whom they give shelter to. Instead, the host should simultaneously enter what is unstable, flickering, dynamic, and only ambiguously outlined on the horizon of thought. In this way, one can open oneself totally to the unknown, not seeking at all costs to understand and domesticate the newcomer. Nonetheless, one waits for the unexpected, the ignorance that is to come, *à venir*.

Absolute hospitality does not need words; what is more, it shuns them, because unconditional hospitality uses the speech of silence. As noted, Derrida thinks that as soon as the host starts to speak, to use common vocabulary, use the institution of language, he or she ceases to be a stranger, the idiomatic other. “[The one who speaks is] neither a separate entity, nor myself any longer” (Marzec, 2011, p. 22). Abandoning a common language, hosts cannot define conventions, set conditions for receiving strangers, place restrictions on them, sign contracts with them, or ask for compensation for hospitality.

While it is true that this absolute hospitality without saying a word was more a challenge posed to us as “the possibility of the impossible” (Marzec, 2011, p. 22), I propose that this is another way of conscious by forgetting through actively performing silence. In the earlier section, we witnessed two groups’ political positions that created an obsessive repertoire of turning Roh’s memory into objects that stood in a hostile manner to each other. Another difficulty is that two memories have gone in parallel without diminishing the trace in time. The

desire of remembering Roh met with digital *hypomnemata* (Stiegler, 2010, p. 85) of unforgettability. Of course, the new complexity that the advanced technology brought is not merely a total recall. As illustrated in Chapter 1, the question on the possibility of forgetting can be more perplexing. However, at least in each groups' memory-reproductions, with seemingly the limitless availability of technology, the images have been reproduced and circulated continuously for nearly a decade. With repeated commemorative-practice from both sides, the time and the emotion—the feeling of loss for one, and the cynicism for the other—were constantly stamped again in the present. The contestation, as not-involving the conversation, continues to be re-inscribed in the present.

As I have discussed in this project, forgetting is a prerequisite of historical life (considered in the wholeness of its aspects and width) as the element per excellence that contributes to the alleviation of the burden of historical existence. Nietzsche (1997) made this argument, using this graphic metaphor:

> All acting requires forgetting, as not only light but also night is required by all organisms. A man who would feel everything historically would resemble someone who refrained from sleeping, or an animal expected to live only on ruminating and ever repeated ruminating. (p. 10)

If, while much memory will be redeemed, not everything can or should be exchanged, and that which cannot be redeemed should be forgotten. The conversation was never placed. If the authentic memory were "dismembered" (Connerton, 2008, p. 70) even only temporally, it could bring more openness to the horizon, inviting other memories to create a sense of common, bonding memories. Although he eventually highlighted the obligation of remembering, Paul Ricoeur (2004) proposed the concept of "receding horizons" as complementary to Gadamer's "fusion of horizons," in an attempt to counterbalance what was the pre-dominant discourse of understanding (p. 413). In Ricoeur, suggestive forgetting is not the erasure of memory traces. On the contrary, it is the latency of the trace as unconsciously inscribed. Latency as a mode of preservation forms the basis for Ricoeur's notion of forgetting "held in reserve," *l'oubli de réserve* (p. 428). To him, if an indestructible past may cause a dialogic issue, latency as a mode of remaining anticipates the reanimation of traces and evinces the idea of a mind without discernible borders. Although he later described his position as the concept of forgetting held in

reserve (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 501), at least in his last chapter, Ricouer seemed to suggest that forgetting "is a primordial attribute of affections to survive, to persist, to remain, to endure, while keeping the mark of absence and distance" (p. 427).

In contrast to these suggestive conceptualizations, what we witness in Roh's after-life memories is Freud's (1914) unwavering counter-Nietzschean assumption of forgetting, who said it was far from being productive: "Forgetting impressions, scenes or experiences nearly always reduces itself to shutting them off" (p. 148). For both mourners and accusers of Roh, with their actively reproduced afterlife memory-reproductions, they remained to work simultaneously at strengthening their loopholes. A repeatedly circulated and strengthened way of remembering in my perspective would not consign this humane mode of forgiving memory to oblivion. For both, communicating inside a given territory, using their own language, and being surrounded by repetitively reproduced mnemonic discourse, resulted in a closed and haunting interpretation of the past in the present. Under this circumstance the memories remained rigid and resilient. Thus, unlike Casey's idealization to public memory, what we can find instead is an inert disavowal, but not a contestation.

Given this, we can understand, in the languages of the two, their dissonance was predestined. Instead of making one image to the past after a series of conversations, the technologically expanded space created a larger loop to monologues—one is full of sadness, the other is full of cynicism. Nonetheless, the result is a memory of Roh that remains prominent in many spaces in South Korea, with neither communicative nor aggregated into the same horizon of understanding. Also, their repetitive practices circulated online created hard-to-forget traces and failed to generate the suspension of emotional unsettlement toward each other.

Conclusion

This chapter depicts how the reproduction of Moo-hyun Roh's memories from 2010 remained deinstitutionalized as well as decentered. Focusing on three core objectives, I attempted to demonstrate (1) the integration of various modes of memory and (hi)stories of Roh after his death, (2) the telling of (hi)stories from an experiential vantage point in order to make the past come alive and in doing so, highlighting and celebrating the particular and (3) the language of two contesting memories of Roh created two parallel understanding of the past.

Rather than emerging differences into one, both parties' remembering practices only strengthened the self-affirmative memory which they had.

With their memory-practices, the language of neither the *Ilbe*'s nor Roh's sympathizers was open to communication, which many have pointed to as the foremost condition of public memory. Repeatedly reproduced Roh's memories were prevailing in many spaces of South Korea. Confirmation bias in remembering Roh by two different parties was widely separated. Unlike Casey (2004), who considered *basso profundo* to be the arch-memory for all other collective memory practices, the melody that memories of Roh played during this era remained *basso continuo*, momentarily improvised from minimally given references.

Prologue Four. Silence on Display

One day in late autumn 2017, I stood at the Tongdaegu station waiting for a transfer to the Jinyeong station. It would take another hour from there for me to reach my final destination: a town called Bongha, the village where Moo-hyun Roh was born and where he died.

During this trip I was presented with many small mysteries. For example, I could not find any rational explanation of why such a small town would have a station on a train line with the most luxurious stops. Some argued that the three small cities combined – Jinyeong, Bongha, and Kimhae – generated a fair number of passengers; however, the station only serves about 47,000 people, which is far less than the other stations (Tongdaegu, for instance, has a population of 2.5 million). The rumor was that Jinyeong had a station on that line because Bongha is located nearby. In fact, a parliament member proposed changing the name of the station to "Roh Moo-hyun Station" after Roh's death, a motion that no other members would visibly support (Kim, 2010).

Another mystery is that instead of displaying the locality (which would not be unusual for a South Korean rail station), Jinyeong station chose to decorate their building in a muted fashion, with abundant greys and blues in keeping with the design scheme of the railroad corporation. There was no mention at the station about the nearby towns or the most famous figure from Bongha, Moo-hyun Roh. There was only one small photograph (about 10 by 12 inches) of the late president's restored home hanging in an odd place — in front of the men's restroom. I have no words to explain why there was only one picture, and why that picture was hanging in this particular spot.



Figure 12. A picture of Moo-Hyun Roh's old home in front of the men's restroom. Bongha, South Korea. October 26, 2017.

Silence dominated Bongha. On the way to the town, some memories were violently ruled out from the display. Sometimes memories appeared in unexpected places, like the picture in front of the toilet, while at other times there was complete taciturnity, like the taxi driver who took me to the village. When I climbed into the cab, I told him, "Please take me to Bongha," and he neither answered my request nor said a word during our short journey. A quiet taxi-drive is somewhat rare in Korean culture. Instead of talking, I saw his eyes scanning me through the rearview mirror two or three times.

Was this because of Moo-hyun Roh, a liberal candidate in one of South Korea's most conservative regions? Did the taxi driver feel as though asking him to drive to Bongha – although it was his job – was akin to asking him which side he was on? In that case, going to Bongha after nine years would say something about me. The driver answered to my "going" by his silence.

In Bongha, some spoken memories were even intended to be eternal, like the pavestones in the graveyard. It is said that upon the construction of his tomb, Roh Moo-Hyun's foundation

asked for donations from people who wanted to carve a message and 15,000 requests were solicited (Song, 2009). There was some guidance provided for choosing a message on the carving (the foundation rejected any messages if they were religious, prayers for fortune, or swore revenge); many included terms like “resurrection” and “Maitreya (bodhisattva).” In the graveyard, a gigantic black flagpole stood, hoisting the national flag. Interviewers asked tourists whether they would return if the town had a bigger museum.



Figure 13. The pavement outside Roh Moo-Hyun’s tomb. Bongha, South Korea. October 26, 2017.



Figure 14. A pavestone in the graveyard that reads “Come live again to the mind of the commoner.” Bongha, South Korea. October 26, 2017.

Behind what was spoken, there was an absence that one could easily sense. While all the visitors were able to identify where the Roh’s death site, the site erased any sign of how he died. There was no mark of “Owl’s Rock” in the legend, nor in the tourist map. Climbing up to the cliff, an official fence with barbed-wire had a sign that said, “By the order of Gimhae Police Station, entering this area is forbidden.” That wall stood to make his death materially, symbolically, and ritually empty, vacant, and, void. It involved the scattering or diasporization of memory.



Figure 15. The wall which prevents access Owl's Rock. Bongha, South Korea. October 26, 2017.

Silence was not all I found there. On that day, with clear sky and humming birds flitting nearby, I stood near the wall, watching as a few tourists came and went. The prohibition created a shared silence between us, but, in a sense, it gave us a thrill too. It was as if we were having a silent conversation about how and why he died through surreptitious glances and clandestine expressions, much like my non-conversation with the taxi driver. In our shared silence, memories which had been passed over, unnamed, unmarked, not built up as taboo places, found a brief moment to come to the surface, as if our quietness were a ritual act. Standing there was our ritual for the memories of Roh. But it was for breaking the curse. Instead, I felt, it was to be haunted by the memories of his life after the death.

Chapter Four: Talking to the Small Tableau - Indebtedness and Obligation in Bongha

Introduction — Entering to Bongha

Ironically located in the deep south of South Korea,[21] a small suburban town named Bongha is a living museum of Roh's memory. Designed as a place that can put Roh's past to rest and imagine the future, the village, where his birthplace as well as the place of death occurred, serves following an enduring tradition of archival sites as the prosthetics of our creating the oblivious. Every year, a million people dressed in black and holding a chrysanthemum try not to laugh out loud, while travelling to this remote town to access such memories (Lee, 2017). Visitors perform, by walking through the streets and standing before Roh's graveyard, constructing the experience so the "lived present holds a past and a future within its thickness" (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 321).

For Roh's supporters, visiting Bongha is desirable for confirming their cultural memories that are juxtaposed with media spectacle as well as with their unsettled emotions. From the time when the town gains media attention as a background for Roh's rise and fall, and when those images are reproduced repeatedly in the media, Bongha co-presents with Moo-hyun Roh his activity, his speech, and his death. Like the tourists whom I encountered during my field trip, a million may have wanted to confirm their memories, like with any other popular destinations:

> I feel like Bongha is my second home. I once visited here when Roh was alive. Back then if you were lucky, you could meet him. I was not that lucky enough, but I remember this field, rice pads and birds, all of this scenery here. As soon as I saw the town on TV when he was gone, I just could not sit at home; so I came to this town at that day, too. Including those trips, today will be my fourth or fifth time to be here. I feel secure as well as melancholy when I come here. I will meet Roh (pay my tribute) and go back home shortly. — Interviewee A

[21] Not just geographically, but the region is also well-known as one of the most politically conservative areas in South Korea.

In the landscape of Bongha, there are invisible but notably present codes of remembering, which delineate certain performativity to the place's visitors. For describing Roh's death, the word has been carefully replaced with "passed away," rather than signifying what could be a more accurate way of death, such as suicide. Mourners, in many cases unknown to each other, take a picture at the same place standing in the same pose. This shared code is also applied to their oblivious gesture: no one dares to speak about what is absent on the wall of the museum, explaining why and how he died. Additionally, visitors share a desire to climb up the owl's rock while sharing the silence, as if they are adventuring into the forbidden place. That is, in the village, they perform with Moo-hyun Roh's most glorified memory intersecting with their past. They see the desired present from this crossroad and predict the future with certainty, but only by mere and selective memories, which they believe they have just witnessed.

To engage the dimensions of the most contemporary mode of memories in the ways Roh's memory can interact with South Koreans, in this chapter I will draw attention to the memory performance of the site of commemoration which prescribes specific modes of behavior to the place. Chapter 4 has two aims. First, I will attempt to demonstrate how the town functioned as a large scale of memory-*depositif*. There was a clear irony to build this town as a memorial site, which was directly contradictory to the late president's last wish. My other goal in the second part of this essay will illustrate how the visitors' performativity has been drawn to the space of commemoration. I will use my personal experience as well as observe the materials which the other visitors produced. The chapter will concentrate exclusively on those aspects of significance and relevance in people's remembering of Roh, and what forgetting allows them as recourse to a past, through which, I suspect, it provides the feeling of indebtedness.

"Only a small tableau" — Museumification of Bongha

Social place of commemoration

After reading Chapter 1, we by now understand that remembrance is not a simple restoration of the memorized object; *anamnesis* is engaged with the subject's acknowledgement as awakening. To create the moment of awakening, ironically, forgetting is required because memory has the unusual characteristic of contracting the past, of compressing a massive wealth of material into the temporal present (Benjamin, 2002, p. 481 (K15, 1)). This opens up an even

broader sense of memory-recollection: “Where thinking suddenly stops in a configuration pregnant with tensions, it gives that configuration a shock, by which it crystallizes into a monad” (Benjamin, 1968, pp. 262–263). For this moment, remembrance holds the future open by paradoxically looking to the past, as not yet-unleashed and unrealized possibilities.

However, contemporary commemorations did not plan for such an experience, that of an open-text. The forms and modes of public commemoration include not only public gatherings, ceremonies, and media events, but also artifacts like ordered material, prizes, books, films, and exhibits. Even more, a cemetery is understood as the place where the dead rests, that is, as the space of our socio-culturally defined ways of remembering and dealing with the past in the present (Vanderstraeten, 2014). Furthermore, we commemorate the dead not privately or quietly. Instead, we do so publicly and visibly, so that what we do (or not do) can be noticed by the public (Durkheim, 1995, pp. 49–58). Mourners, by this mnemonic practice, “experience a past that is collectively commemorated not collectively experienced” (Bavidge, 2013, p. 321). As Jay Winter (1995) wrote, memorials “were built, as places where people could mourn. And be seen to mourn” (p. 93). Cemeteries are places which were already carved out of the natural environment. The artifacts that make up a cemetery reveal underlying social and cultural sensitivities.

“A small tableau” committee

The same understanding and intention can be found in the museumification in Bongha for Roh’s collective memory. The small town, where Moo-hyun Roh was born in 1946 and his coming-back location after the end of his term in 2008, is intended to be a symbolic space. A year after his suicide, which happened at a rocky hill called Owl’s Rock behind his house, Roh’s graveyard was erected in the same town. Roh could have been buried in the national cemetery as the former president of the nation. There were some other dramatic moments in his life that occurred elsewhere, such as in Seoul or Busan, where he began his career as a humanitarian lawyer. Nevertheless, Bongha remained the most palpable location of his memory in the nation.

He famously wished not to be remembered. In the note he left before his purposeful death, Roh specified how he wanted to be buried: “I want to be cremated. And only leave a small tableau nearby my home” (2009b). Given the fact that cremation still “remained something of a social taboo” (Park, 2010, p. 22), this wish resonated with his other last writing. Admitting that

his family members violated the law, he noted that his life should be forgotten: "You should forget me. You should step forward after me. No longer can I be a symbol of the value which you should protect" (Roh, 2009a). Not having a tomb may also be, along with his choice of suicide, reflective of his moving into oblivion.

Against Roh's wishes, what followed after his national funeral was the museumification of Bongha. Soon after his suicide, a group of famous architects, art historians, and cultural critics organized what was named "a small tableau committee." By them, Roh's graveyard was designed to be far more extensive than "a small tableau" that Roh wished for. In the letter to Roh as a statement of finishing the construction, the chairman of "a tiny tableau committee," Hongchun Yu (2010) cried:

> Have you seen in heaven the tide of mourning for your death by people? …. Which sentence has written such mournful grief, and which artist has shown such a magnificent installation art? If the mind of the people is this way, how is it to leave only one "small tableau"? We decided not to make monuments. Instead, we decided to leave this unforgettable memorial scene as a space of history that can be forever remembered. (Yu, 2010)

As promised in Yu's emotional speech, architect H-Sang Seung designed Roh's graveyard to make a timely, vivid, and memorable experience. In the post-construction note, Seung recalled that Roh's graveyard aimed to be a "landscape of experiencing the sublime and telling a narrative about life and death." His design referenced other prominent figures' sanctuaries such as "Gandhi, … Lenin and Mao Zedong's," where collective commemoration was centered and yet imagined identity to their nation-state was mediated (Seung, 2010). By his hand, the cemetery occupies now up to 4000 square yards, and an 80 x 80 x 15 inch stone lays at the middle. To get there visitors have to walk down a path which leads them slightly below the ground level; by this trick, if one looks into in the distance, Roh's grave appears to be a small tombstone. However, once visitors get close to it, there sits a giant flat dolmen (Seung, 2010). "Anyway, it is a tableau. It is a [tomb]stone," Yu replied to the reporters who asked whether this was not what Roh wanted (Nomuhyŏnjaedan, 2009). The tombstone, as well as the other space, for sure, was not to be forgotten but remembered.



Figure 16. Roh's "tableau," Bongha, South Korea. October 26, 2017.

As a result, Bongha in 2017 possesses various mnemonic apparatuses, and these guide the reciprocal exigencies of visitors as they participate in the memories, that is, in the imaginary and various mediatized, scripted, and embodied mnemonic performances. The village — as the place in reality as well as a much mediatized place — provides such an experience to its visitors. As the birthplace as well as the death place, it is clear that Bongha is entangled with a living, highly mediated, and material past.

The design to follow a narrative

Being already carved out of the natural environment (Durkheim, 1995, pp. 49–58), Bongha easily fits what is called a heritage. A heritage, Vida Bajc (2006) explained, is "a medium through which cultural and historical particularity and distinctiveness can be constructed, and then attributed to a particular place and its people as distinctive from all others"

(p. 11). Bongha is a cultural place of memory, where specific kinds of environments and precise objects are arranged to make them conducive to visitors' awareness of the experience of a particular narrative. As multiple scholars clarify, a location as such associates how these objects and their narratives are exhibited, displayed, enacted, and otherwise interpreted, and they facilitate a relation, a link between the tourists and that which is being remembered (Casey, 2000; Edensor, 1998; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 2005).

Bongha was designed to guide visitors to identify a narrative from selective memories out of Roh's life. Currently, the village consists of a restored house of Roh's old home, his late-home, a museum, a memorial park, a graveyard, and a souvenir shop. Although the village is located on open land, the architectural design makes visitors' movement flow to deliver a coherent experience that represents his life story in chronological order. To illustrate, for the usual sequence of visits, from the only bus-stop of the village, visitors enter the site by encountering Roh's old home, which is a restored thatched hut made of mud.[22] After the souvenir shop, there is the house where he lived until his last day, now publicly accessible. Across from the house, there is a museum that displays Roh's glorious past, such as the days when he was a famous humanitarian lawyer and when he won the presidential election. The black and white pictures, the posters of elections, and supporters' letters to him are on display. Then, as the final destination of this short pilgrimage, visitors arrive at the graveyard located right below Owl's Rock, the nationally acclaimed mountain-hill where Roh threw himself off the cliff. The experience of this sequence sketches a narration, which is one of the first endeavors of tourism (Bendix, 2002).

[22] Roh's old home was already undergoing restoration by the local government to make the town a tourist attraction.



Figure 17. The map of Bongha (Bongha, South Korea). October 26, 2017.

Indeed, as the most famous narrative of Roh originated from the *noje* (Chapter 2), some of the crucial scenes of his life remained in silence. Roh's memory is revealed in accordance to the already popularized route of remembrance, such as the erection of the landscape that highlights such moments as his humble birth, life as a humanitarian lawyer, a dramatic presidential election, and his death spectacle; they are actively practiced in silence. Here, Roh's memory is (re)enforced as the symbol of anti-dictatorship. Like other examples of collective memorial sites, the expectations that visitors bring to the cultural places of memory are shaped through a shared past and articulated through familiar narrative and particular symbolic expressions.

Display of mediatized memories

Many memories from visitors seemed to rely on what has been mediatized. Although the tourists were visiting the place to confirm and witness the landscape, what they were seeing had already been dominated by the impact of mediatized memories. Sabine Marscha (2012) confirms that memory can be "a […] decisive factor in people's travel choice" (p. 323). Regarding our choices, she points out, the experience of a landscape can be exclusively under the expectations from preexisting knowledge. In fact, "experience" should be closely related to memory itself (Erll, 2011, p. 111). As Kember and Zylinska (2015) argued, media not only creates representations of the world but is involved in "enacting" or "performing" the social-ecological world. This approach to the relationality of mediation, social practice, and the environment echoes recent moves toward more-than-representational theories that draw attention to the

interplay of discourse, the effect, and the embodied performances of humans and non-human nature (Nash, 2000).

Media images of Bongha circulated through various media sources, even before the death of Roh. It was known that Roh was from the area, but the specific location was not popular until his retirement. For 15 months after Roh's return, the images of the village began to become popular throughout the country. For the first year until early 2009, Bongha was on the Internet showing Roh's retirement life, such as bicycling with his grandchild or sliding from the hill. Then from February 2009, when the prosecutor's investigation began, the press pictured all the corners of his hometown to find any glimpse of Roh's reaction to the charges. Even Roh asked the press to be a bit prudent. There was one rumor televised on the TV news that his family members "dumped" an expensive watch at a rice pad, and people used to talk about visiting there to find that abandoned treasure (Chosun Ilbo, 2009).

Then, when his suicide happened, the media brought the reality of death rather too close for comfort. The last shot of his presumptive presence in the ambulance and the Owl's Rock behind his house were repeatedly and widely circulated in the media. Considerable coverage was given to how Roh' s death had attracted the attention of the media itself. It was reported that the news was covered even in Japan, China, and the U.S. Shortly thereafter, the media began to prepare for his funeral, and one of the hottest topics of speculation was the question of when and where the funeral would be held. Additionally, the grief of mourners received extensive coverage. Mourners of all ages were interviewed across the country, but one of the main spectacles was an endless line of people in Bongha, gathered from everywhere. Many seemed deeply upset about what had happened and wanted to attend the various events arranged to celebrate Roh's life there. His death had mobilized the masses, and Bongha became the center of mediatized spectacle.

In the present day, some of the memory-artifacts in museumified Bongha are deliberately associated with selective mediatized memory. For instance, visitors are able to see a bicycle in a museum that can be readily identifiable as the one in a famous picture of Roh with his grandchild. A straw hat and farming clothes are also symbolic representation of mediated memory. Furthermore, selective scenes from movies and documentaries are present, and visitors may conjure up mediatized memories. Explicitly, for instance, the museum displays a memorable

quote from the famous film *Pyŏnhoin* (2013), saying "(from this moment) I will not live cowardly," which he spoke to the victims of the state's violence in 1981.

In Bongha, tourists become secondary witnesses to Roh's life up to his suicide. Artifacts and displays in the landscape secure "a" collective memory. Experiencing places falls into a matter of experiencing mediations, and physical encounters reactivate a series of mediated memories (Bærenholdt, Haldrup, Larsen, & Urry, 2004; Crouch, Jackson, & Thompson, 2005; Lagerkvist, 2013). This is what Astrid Erll (2009) termed "premediation," that is, "the use of existent patterns and paradigms to transform contingent events into meaningful images and narratives" (p. 114). While she used as examples the colonial wars that premediated the experience of the First World War, which in turn became a model for understanding the Second World War, Erll (2009) also highlighted; "but it is not only representations of earlier events that shape our understanding and remembrance of later events. Media which belong to more remote cultural spheres, such as art, mythology, religion or law, can exert great power as premediators too" (p. 111). Likewise, in Bongha, coherently designed experience that affords a visceral, emotive and imaginative sense in visitors of having traveled in time—both forward and backward—with some invisible absences. Visitors are encouraged to relive, "remember," and replay a particular past simultaneously.

Touring the indebtedness — (Re)experiencing emotional unsettlement

Mediating the code of self and emotion

One mourner reported, "It was just regrettable that he's gone like that. I do feel that now too" (Interviewee B). Another responded, "I am sorry that we cannot protect him; we could not save him from that pitfall…. Whenever I came here, I feel that and found myself tearing" (Interviewee A). There has been a discussion incited by an enigma: Why do particular gestures come so easily to visitors in certain memorial settings? How do visitors know how to easily, almost effortlessly, acclimatize to the memorial sites and engage in gestures and behavior there? Does mediation or the media have anything to do with the emotion visitors feel in the memorial place, or does the space itself set off these feelings (cf. Assmann, 2011, p. 281; cf. Treib, 2009)?

For Edward Casey (2000), being in a place means to be situated and oriented concerning where we are in the world and what kind of memories can be attached to the objects we see around us (pp. 181–210). To be located in a place means to be sheltered, held, and contained by a boundary which encloses us so that our awareness is not dispersed in time or beyond the horizons of that place (Heidegger, 1971). A place that allows us to be held within it acts as a grid with points of attachment onto which particular memories can be connected. In addition, the act of attaching a particular kind of image or narrative to one specific object transforms the experience of imagining that narrative into the experience of reliving the story. According to the explanation by Bajc (2006), for tourism, such places are cultural environments created through the effort to preserve particular objects and arrange them in place in such a way as to invite particular memories and discourage others. The experience of being in such a position can subsequently be revisited in one's mind through a narrative order that follows the recalling of the order of objects in that place.

At the heart of the questions posed above, there is a problem that has long been of concern to sociologists and anthropologists; it boils down to the relationship between structure and agency or between scenario and performance/ritual. In one of the defining works by Erving Goffman (1956), he noted that the social world functions as a scene, where social roles are performed according to customary scenarios that adhere to specific inner regions. Here the experience of visiting Bongha occurs through what Goffman called "teamwork" (Goffman, 1956, pp. 77-105). In other words, memory agents work together to produce, recall, and re-enact an imagined past. These memory practices are non-commemorative forms of social memory (Schudson, 1997) in the sense that they are not always consciously keeping the past alive; yet this is the result of those residues of the past within us, the hauntologies of both the spatial imaginary and of the place itself. As Goffman (1956) put it, "A given social front tends to become institutionalized, in terms of the general stereotyped expectations to which it gives rise, and tends to take on a meaning and stability apart from the specific tasks which happen at the time to be performed in its name. The front becomes a 'collective representation' and a fact in its own right" (Goffman, 1956, p. 27).

There is, however, something more in seeing Bongha than just visiting a media spectacle. By deciding to visit there, not just to witness a sensational site itself, the journey the tourists take

is also involved with their sense of self. Previous researchers (Coman, 2011, p. 284; Doss, 1999; Rojek, 2001) of celebrity studies argue that the famous, such as Elvis Presley or Michael Jackson, should be perceived as having iconic abilities, and thus the potential to satisfy spiritual needs and respond to personal notions of what we could call contemporary piety (see also Macklin, 2005). Pilgrimage as an example of mediatized ritual practice can thus be interpreted as a replacement strategy that promises order, meaning, and solidarity (all essential functions of ritual) among the devoted (e.g., the fans) in an era when traditional institutions such as world religions no longer carry out these functions (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). Here, media audiences can actively contribute to producing completely new ritual practices that then become mediatized rituals. Also, understanding Bongha visitors as the fan base may confirm the easiness of their emotional reaction to the place.

Not delivering just a single narrative that is being displayed, Bongha also allows an immensely emotional experience for its tourists. During my second trip, I witnessed visitors' expectations of a narration. They attempted to write down their experience into a predestined route. The emotions of the visitors were followed by the changes in sites, which was designed by Roh's life story. Here, tourists did not dare to juggle their actual experience against the promised experiences that have been paid for. When they arrived at Roh's old house, people smiled, took pictures, talked about old lifestyles, and found Roh's home was no different from their own. In the museum, they listened to his speech and identified with the nostalgic atmosphere. At the tombstone, they were speechless, spending a considerable amount of time reading carved messages in the paved stones. Some offered a mum, which they bought at the gate of the village. In Owl's Rock, they acted as if facing a secret; many were muffled to speak to each other. On the 20 minute trip to Owl's Rock, they also kept a certain level of silence.

Another clue to the singularity of touring memory can be found in the use of cameras. Taking photographs is common practice as people are at tourist destinations. On one hand, tourists have shared identically similar frames of pictures. Figure 18-20 and Figure 21 and 22 are pictures taken at distinct times by different tourists. The homogenized reproduction of images by visitors might symbolize that their touring experiences remained somewhat mechanical.

Figure 18. Roh's old home 1 (Cjnews, 2009).



Figure 19. Roh's old home 2 (Kwangbaek'o, 2011).

Figure 20. Roh's old home 3 (Namch'ŏn'gang, 2009).



Figure 21. Pavestone 1 (Kŭlbinmoe Kimgwangsan, 2010).



Figure 22. Pavestone 2 (P'eiji, 2013).

However, there are other notable behaviors. Specifically, during multiple visits to the memorials, I observed no posed photos with friends or family smiling at the lens, which is still the most common facial reaction before any lens. If tourists were to take such pictures, they would no doubt earn disapproving looks from fellow tourists. The context of the site is part of the photographic experience. The setting is so loaded with significance that something as common as taking a picture can engender introspection, if not in the tourist with the camera, then in other tourists observing the scene.

As if there were an authentic attitude to the site, visitors participated in what is a dynamic memory of Roh. When they take the picture, when they cry for the late president, and when they read the messages on the paving stones, their reactions are somewhat coherent and almost unified. In Bongha, visitors seemed to behave as if their role was that of inheritors. They acted as "the agents of memory" (Vinitzky-Seroussi, 2002) who take the lead in complex decisions about what is to be forgotten and what must be remembered. Moreover, tourists remind themselves to dress appropriately, speak softly, and not to call unwanted attention to themselves. They reproduce Bongha, in cooperation with the place's apparatus, as being indexed through mediated memories; knowledge from the memories identifies the tourists' relationship to codes of conduct that tourist sites enunciate (Reynolds, 2016). In Richard Meyer's (1993) explanation, "Far more than … space … set aside for the burial of the dead, cemeteries are … open texts, there to be read … by anyone who takes the time to learn … their special language" (p. 3; see also Vanderstraeten, 2014).

Visiting the site where one can find his/her own emotional debt

Furthermore, a visitor's journey also may be about dealing with his or her sense of obligation. In *Memory, History, Forgetting*, Paul Ricoeur (2004) elaborated on his conception of social cohesion and collective memory: "It is only by analogy, and in relation to individual consciousness and its memory, that collective memory is held to be a collection of traces left by the events that have affected the course of the history of the groups concerned, and that it is accorded the power to place on stage these common memories, on the occasion of holidays, rites and public celebrations" (p. 119). This analogical relation between individuals and groups comes to expression in the two principal categories of analysis of memory that Ricoeur (2004) adopted: on the one hand, the moral category of the "debt" (p. 89) and of the "obligation to remember" (p. 88); on the other hand, the psychological concept of the "work of memory" modeled on psychoanalytic therapy (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 88).

Such obligations and the feeling of indebtedness had been dominant from the moment when the suicide was announced on TV nationwide, as we already observed in Chapter 2. Visiting Bongha may originate from visitors' this sense of duty. This duty may be instigated by the emotional unsettlement called *Han*, that is Nietzschean *ressentiment* as we discussed earlier in Chapters 2 and 3. That unsettlement was represented in *noje*, enabling Roh to be an irresistible but ironic martyr of the 21st century, a symbol of the democratic movement in post-democratic South Korean politics. That indebtedness was carved with different languages on the pavement stones in *Bongha.* There, they inscribed their regrets, guilt, and wishes to be forgiven. The indebtedness was also displayed as religious language, asking for Roh's resurrection (Figures 23-25).



Figure 23. “Come alive to the heard of the People” (Mincho). Bongha, South Korea. October 26, 2017.



Figure 24. “Moohyun Roh, the Buddha!” Bongha, South Korea. October 26, 2017.



Figure 25. “To our baby: please remember him.” Bongha, South Korea. October 26, 2017.

In an earlier mentioned book, Ricoeur (1999) situated the duty to remember as a relationship between the past, present, and future. He wrote, “[t]he duty to remember consists not only in having a deep concern for the past, but in transmitting the meaning of the past to the next generation” (p. 9). The duty to remember is less of a forced or enforceable mandate than an obligation to be responsible to and for the dead. He also notes that the work of memory and mourning is an “exercise in *telling otherwise*, and also in letting others tell their history, especially the founding events which are the ground of a collective memory” (Ricoeur, 1999, p. 9). Ricoeur casts the responsible use of memory in terms of a debt to the past in which we recognize an obligation to preserve and take up the unfulfilled hopes and broken promises that others have made in our name, as well as accept responsibility for our forbearers’ actions that resulted in the unredeemed suffering of others, so that their suffering can be underlined *otherwise*.

We can suspect that the reason the mourners went through their emotional journey to Bongha is to forgive. By forgetting a partial life of Roh, by covertly silencing his twisted years, they may attempt to forgive him, as well as themselves. This is forgiving *otherwise*. Again, Ricoeur (1996) developed his notion of forgiving as follow: “Forgiveness is a specific form of the revision of the past … a specific form of that mutual revision, the most precious result of

which is the liberation of promises of the past which have not been kept" (p. 9). Forgiving complements the exchange of memories in that it is an exchange of memories of suffering—both those inflicted and those endured. Ricoeur claimed that it is through this exchange that the "debt" can be shattered. This shattering of the debt, owed on account of suffering inflicted, lifts a burden that has driven a person or a community into isolation; it is not the abolition of the debt and certainly not its forgetting. Rather, forgiveness consists in lifting the pain of the debt (Ricoeur, 1996, p. 10). Hence, forgiveness can be linked to the gift: "I want to consider the particular structure of the dilemmas of forgiveness along with the difficulties that result from extending the problematic of forgiveness to a model of exchange tied to the concept of the gift. The etymology and the semantics of numerous languages encourage this comparison: *don-pardon*, *gift-forgiving*, *dono-perdono*, *Geben-Vergeben*" (Ricoeur, 2004, pp. 479–480). Forgiveness, realized through the exchange of memories of suffering, has the poetic power to change the past in the present. Ricoeur offered various examples of such moments of forgiveness which do not annihilate the past but rather release a community from the shackles of the past into the freedom of imagining a new future: Willy Brandt at Warsaw or Sadat in Jerusalem. These events are not part of the political order and are not "institutional" as such. Rather, they take on meaning due to their "exceptional character" (Ricoeur, 2004, pp. 477–478). In essence, the events effectively rupture an existing political order, creating something new in political space.

Given this understanding of the memory-*dispositif* in Bongha and their practitioners, the visitors are negotiated in the interplay between the social and individual organization of memory. On one hand, Bongha is designed to function as delivering a single narrative centered with a heroic image of Roh, who is martyrized. On the other hand, the visitors' indebtedness makes them coordinate their behavior, spontaneously silencing the past. This is "a process of co-narration, a social process of telling and enacting in which teller and listener are not stable and permanent positions but moments of an interplay whose outcome remains open" (Brockmeier, 2002, p. 35).

The tourists attempt to intertwine this performative narrative with Roh's graveyard. They attempt to forgive Roh as well as to be forgiven by him by acting with coded practices. Although Bongha as a memory-*dispositif* attempted not to include Roh's end, the absence of signs did not make them forget why and how he died. Apparently this is what the landscape of Bongha

suggests: signs of absence and of something missing, ciphers of a void that cannot even be filled by memory, and traces of an attempt of forgetting through forgiving. If Bongha's original design was to establish a specific narrative as a particular sign system, a semiotic order, what the visitors actually made is a narrative as a performative or discursive order. In their mind, they would meet Roh as neither a sinner nor a forgiver, but as the one who shared similar burdens before the brutality of the contemporary time. As Ricoeur (2004) thought, forgetting is always more than a dysfunction of memory, or the purging of memory at will from unpleasant and disturbing contents and the consequent creation of some "happy memory" through the exercise of the *ars oblivionis* (p. 413). For the visitors, Bongha may be the place of forgiving, as the most elevated form of forgetting, where they can leave only "happy memor[ies]" behind.

Conclusion

The tour to Bongha aligns the reconfirmation of mediatized memory with physical performativity. Indeed, this performativity of memory also captures how performances and re-enactments may occur in a variety of ways and without any given finale. They are in this sense unpredictable, since both performances and performed spaces are complex and uncertain (Gregson & Rose, 2000). Diana Taylor's (2003) concept of the scenario works as an intermediary between the archive and the repertoire. Taylor suggested that some cultural memories may be non-verbalized, and yet they are invoked in certain settings and situations: they belong to the scenario. Taylor further stresses that the intriguing aspect about the scenario is that it "predates the script and allows for many possible 'endings'" (p. 28). Taylor also defined the scenario as open to the radical possibility of change, critique, and detachment. The performances are defined as reflecting particular pre-established behaviors in social situations and everyday life, repeated individually or collectively. Repetition and reiteration are probably the keys for thoroughly understanding memory practices. In Bongha, we can suppose by constituting themselves through stylized repetitions of acts (Butler, 1988), the mourners reenact a mythic presence of Roh's memory and identity as followers of his legacy. This aspect, which relates to learning, refers to what Henri Lefebvre (2004) discerned through the notion of training: "To enter into a society, a group, a nationality is to accept values (that are taught), to learn a trade by following the right channels, but also to bend oneself (to be bent) to its ways" (p. 39).

The willingness of surrender to given performativity may have arisen from the mourners' feeling of indebtedness to Roh, as well as the collective sense of obligation to remember him. Seemingly, the act of atonement and engaging in a pilgrimage to this remote town, played with the pre-given memories of Roh. Their coordinated performative practices incorporated with explicit memory-*depositif* as well as implicit silence. The feeling of obligation guided such behaviors at the site, and by this, they dreamed that Roh memories would be transferred to South Korean collectives as shared memory. In this case, supplementing Connerton's deliberations on how societies remember, memories may be conceived of as "awaiting" a remembering agent to become activated (cf. (Bærenholdt et al., 2004; Erll & Nünning, 2010; Möckel-Rieke, 1998). Thus, through embodied practice in certain settings, mediated memories become alive and significant.

Some questions should remain unanswered. Can a collective memory that has been re-scripted provide an epicenter to the social movement cohesively? In the previous chapter, we mentioned already that there were different perspectives about Roh that noticed inner contradiction and mocked such blindness. Can this collectiveness be sustainable? The answers to these questions cannot be known yet. Perhaps Roh, as in the other cases (cf. Basu, 2012; Rigney, 2012), can survive over the period of collectiveness by transforming its shape and territory. Alternatively, he can be entered into oblivion in the near future, which would ultimately be the fulfillment of Moo-hyun Roh's last wish.

Conclusion

This final chapter discusses the overall findings of this dissertation.

Summary of the Previous Chapters

This work is the first to analyze much of the vast body of Roh memory representations, which is an important step for understanding how he is understood by those within his country, caught among multiple scenes of remembering and forgetting.

Over the course of the different chapters of this dissertation, we traversed extensive territory, guided by Roh's memory. I used various instances of the presence of Roh's memory over the period from 2009 to 2015 to highlight how the memory of this same figure can be shifted and forgotten by changes in temporal perspective. Each chapter was intended to contribute to the philosophical basis of the concept of collective memory, delimiting the scope of this concept in relation to active forgetting. This is also intended to depict living examples of covert silence about contradictory images of Roh from the past. The exploration of many faces in a single case has allowed us to shed light on complex processes of remembering and forgetting, which are implied in the intertwining of temporality and media technology so frequently discussed.

The initial premise of this dissertation was that an ongoing remembering and forgetting is underway of Moo-hyun Roh's memory, as it is held in various modes by South Korea. The cultural memory of Roh is composed of a tangle of medial, temporal, and political relations, revolving around his personage. South Koreans invest him with certain identities, and in turn, he provides transformation and proliferation of those identities. Most notably, memory as such is composed in good part as forgetting: remembering via *dispositif* and the identities it produces change over time. On the one hand, memories must always be anchored in the past; in this case, the other figures of the *minjung* movement form a "fixed point" of cultural memory (Assmann, 1995, p. 129). On the other hand, those identities that are linked to the imagined nation that are generated are more hallucinatory. The memories of Roh are multiple and, what is more, thoroughly contradictory.

In Chapter One, I argued that forgetting should be regarded as a lens for interpreting memory and temporality. The work of several philosophers on memory was examined, and it was recalled that *anamnesis* is categorized as remembering tied now to action. In this remembering, forgetting is not a bankruptcy of human capability, but the product of a time which often entails that parts of the past be omitted. Here, oblivion, as we imagined it existing in remembering, is a way of molding one's identity as well as giving oneself a greater degree of choice in the flux between selective tradition and the sense of now. As Martin Heidegger (2004, p. 140, 2008) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1997) suggest, forgetting is the process of forging the realization of now-time behind a perceptive yesterday.

The later part of that chapter explores the possible meanings of the fact that contemporary media technology has the power to reshape our ways of remembering and forgetting. Contemporary new technology is rooted in digital *hypomnemata* (Stiegler, 2010, p. 85), meaning that, on the one hand, we can more easily remember by inscribing and recall by re-accessing our memories. However, this cannot secure complete recollection of the past, as changes impose other issues onto our sense of the timeline. Instead of there now being a completely linear time, we now possess plural time spaces. Thanks to this plurality, I argue, the sense of now is blurred and is no longer a singularity. In a way that techno-positivists do not recognize, thanks to the new *hypomnemata*, we are as likely to forget the past as the present.

This theoretical excursion brought us to a point where we could begin to understand the way Roh was memorialized in May 2009, in particular, the *noje* ceremony, not as to efface him but to remember him in a different way, which was the core of Chapter Two. To deal with an issue of political urgency, Roh's mourners chose to covertly silence the past (Vinitzky-Seroussi & Teeger, 2010). His image was emptied out, and its contents were replaced by another truth. During *noje*, sympathizers imagined Roh using the tropes of collective *ressentiment*, called *han*, and thought of him as a member of the *minjung*, or an oppressed class maintaining an unsettled emotion. To create the imagination of Moo-hyun Roh’s life, the ceremony was performed using particular aesthetics. Notably, during the ceremony, many parts of Roh’s life that appeared to contradict this freshly imagined memory were silenced. However, with this forgetting practice, room was spared to invite other memories. Here, *noje* functioned as a hallowed symbol, inducing other emotions tied to other unsettled memories of the near past, rather than to Roh’s life itself.

Chapter Three depicted a pair of contested memories of Roh that emerged following the funeral. That is, the memory of Roh, which was maintained and strengthened through dialectics between truth and myth, became layered in his mourners by 2010, through the interpretation in popular media content as a variation of Roh's narrative. However, there also began to appear other memories of him. The radical meanings hidden in the memories of Roh, centered in the online community *Ilbe,* were attacked to neutralize them by parodying the contradiction between the real figure and the memory of him. With this practice, opponents attempted to skim the aura from Roh's memory, which was largely done by sympathizers of the government. For them, Roh should not have a role in the present social imaginary. Thus, the mediatized memory of Roh became political, on the one hand, while on the other, it did not function as a stabilizer for further social conversation. Instead of being a publicly owned object (Casey, 2004), Roh's memory existed as fragmented, antagonistically forgotten by different groups of people who refused to talk to each other.

Chapter Four examined the way Bongha constructs the tourist experience, using continually maintained silence regarding certain aspects of the past. This town serves as memory-*dispositif*, putting forward memory aids for Roh that are chosen to selectively highlight his life. The most important point is the following: from my observation of the site, visitors participate in this covert silence by coordinating their behavior into unscripted but noticeable norms. Touring Bongha brings one into an encounter with mediated memory, and the mourners atone and engage in a pilgrimage to this remote site, full of pre-given memories of Roh.

Why Does This Matter?

Active Forgetting for Reclaiming the Political Sovereignty

This dissertation aimed to illustrate how a collective memory was selected under the norms of covert silence. The selective nature of memory has been known from the beginning; it remained a question how the process of memory's intertwining with forgetting is actually enacted. While the dominant Platonic "mnemic subjectivity" tradition had made forgetting an irresponsible and unreliable human fallacy, I instead wanted to promote the idea that memory and forgetting do not stand as a simple contradiction but as mutually enabling and constitutive factors. As Aristotle (2004) suggests, remembering is the process of recollection that requires our being able to attend

to the differentiation of magnitudes or proportions of the interval between “now” and “before” (p. 177 [452b7]). For any given search of our memory, as anyone who has dug through archives can tell, there is always the possibility of finding something unexpectedly forgotten, going down the wrong path, or finding nothing at all. Traversing a particular interval of time through recollection is ultimately a form of reasoning because it follows a chain of inferences from the starting point of a recollection to a successfully recalled event or object.

Based on this way of thinking, I attempted to draw out the possibility not of remembering but of forgetting. As noted in chapter 1, always future-oriented, Nietzsche (1989) attempts to secure us against the indigestible (that is, against trauma) by championing forgetfulness as a “positive faculty of repression” that allows us to “make room for new things” (Nietzsche, 1989, pp. 57–58). In more ways than one, therefore, he is a natural ally of all those concerned about the surfeit of memory and the need to begin anew. And here, as Muldoon (2017) notes, forgetting was Nietzsche’s designated possibility for the future of humanity; we should close the door on the past and make a new beginning. This is to embrace life as it is, that Kaufmann highlighted to *amor fati* (1989, p. 11). After Nietzsche, a series of philosophers’ ideas contributed scopes on forgetting as the momentum to rediscover the time of now, and to reconsider the surroundings. Forgetting is an identity-creating behavior. It is thus a spontaneous gesture of subversive social activity. Forgetting, like remembering, can offer a space for a new sense of temporality; for Heidegger, this is even an essential process, behind everyday sensation for realizing things anew.

The concept of active forgetting allows considerations of the memory–identity–politics nexus of contemporary South Korea. This project shows that identity is, in fact, never purely faithful to the past, but is always trans- and sub-formative for the given conditions, and forgetting plays a role in constructing identity, which is always on the move. Some traces of Roh were erased to provide a pivotal space, open to the other memories. The memory of Roh was influenced by the ongoing events of the present. In other words, remembering Roh by South Koreans becomes a focus of political struggle among the then-government and the various groups of people including mourners, *ilbes*, as well as the strangers who were participating as they were looking for a sole cast to sculpture their desired memories in the real world. Roh and a large group of sympathizers were produced as antithetical to the then-government, especially its policing policy, reinforcing the identification with the *minjung* movement for the collective

emotional memory that has been reproduced continually since the 1970s. Notably, the memory of Roh is based on forgotten memories. With this empty signifier, it opened up the possibility for other memories to become vocalized, through the very community it constructed. Through the practice of active forgetting, individuals in South Korean society undertook their political sovereignty. It also proves that if collective memory were the memory of the contemporary, forgetting would be a huge contribution that makes remembering to be contemporary. By selectively delinking the past, forgetting edits the memory for "making sense" of the present. Not shaping the present by the past conversely, with selective remembering as well as silently performed active forgetting, collective memory serves the desire of the present. Their divergent interpretations of the past and of emerging events keep bringing up contentions about the personal history of Moohyun Roh, as he who lived in this world with a level of complexity. Regardless of who he really was, the remembering practice to a large extent empowered individual authority to shape an ongoing event, enabling individuals to challenge institutional narratives.

South Korean *Minjung* Identity in the Post-*Minjung* Era

In this work, I wanted to depict a particular emotion named *han* as surviving in the era of post-*minjung* of 2009. During the 1980s, the ideologues of the *minjung* movement illustrated that *minjung*'s mind was dominated by what they named *han.* This is a collective memory that has accumulated through a series of generational experiences, such as unjust violence by those in power and the locals' failed resistances (Abelmann, 1996, p. 39; cf. Doucette, 2013; Kang, 2010; Lee, 2009; Manabe, 2015). Reminding ourselves of Nietzschean *ressentiment* (Nietzsche, 1989; see also, Fassin, 2013, p. 252), *han* is the emotion out of historical alienation; it relates to long-term oppression and the effects of domination and, in most cases, can be generational.

With the 1987's democratization, the era of *Minjung* movement passed in South Korea (Doucette, 2013). But this emotional memory from historical alienation survived, and was reshaped by the socio-historical condition. In 2009, at Moo-hyun Roh's *noje* funeral, we saw that the memory invited all other memories of being the underdogs of the nation. Claims of oblivion, instead of being what they are generally understood to be — a deficit in human capability — can, in fact, be used as a subversive gesture against power. In the past, political suicides created political rituals which provided a powerful historic motivation of *minjung* movements by

established diachronic linking of memories, maintaining the continuity. Then, in the late 2000s, memories of the deaths were rather synchronic and "portable" (Kockelman & Bernstein, 2012, p. 326). In *Noje* a number of unmourned deaths were each situated in different, or only loosely-related contexts (Chapter 2). Here gathered memories responded to Roh's sympathizers' empathic gesture.

Contemporary people's remembering of Roh provided a baseline to commemorate not just Roh but also these mobilized deaths at the time. The mourning was for a false martyr. However, by this mnemonic performance, South Koreans who had limited sovereignty attempted to reclaim their own interpretation of history. Forgetting was an actively coordinated silence for this cause. By this, mourners were able to create a link of empathetic emotion which "does not lead the subject (…) to seek to enter into the shoes of the individual experiencing trauma and to take his or her place. Instead, it brings him to identify precisely with the traumatic dimension of his existence" (Goldberg, 2015, p. 61). Empathic unsettlement compels us to react empathetically to "others" while being fully aware of their otherness, and at the same time helps us to recognize the component of trauma that prevents any structure, narrative, or relationship from reaching wholeness and closure. As Dominick LaCapra notes, empathic unsettlement in response to traumatic events should be discursively registered in the historical text, but as a creative and unpredictable process, which is oriented at gaining some control of the trauma while at the same time convincing the historian to relinquish the fantasy of completely mastering it. "A posttraumatic response of unsettlement becomes questionable when it is routinized in a methodology or style" (LaCapra, 2001, p. 47). This made Roh's memory to function as a sort of *basso continuo*, a ground providing other South Koreans a reason for joining the solidarity, although they had not shared the same feeling to Moo-hyun Roh as a living person. Their memory-practices in contrast to what really happened revealed South Koreans' unreleased emotion, such as anxiety, concernment, worrisomeness and rancor over the present politics. The findings here draw contrasts with two major perspectives on Minjung and South Korean society in the twenty-first century. Neither *minjung* and *han* become the things of the past (Hayes, 2005; Lee, 2009) nor preserve the past as it has been (Chae, 2015; Ko, 2007). The memory survived with more flexibility, being capable of vocalizing all the "people's remembering" (Doucette, 2013).

From the perspective of performative theory, it can be said that democracy is not a pre-given structure but rather needs to be constructed repeatedly. "The people" is a heterogeneous, open, and dynamic entity. Thus democracy is the politics of the people who are not a coherent entity. Politics in democracy is an effect produced by repetitive performative acts and "the people" is produced as the source of democratic sovereignty. For a democracy to be recognized and maintained as such, it needs to be performed by participants, such as citizens, institutions, office-holders, the media. Acts made by these players – voting, demonstrating, and law-making – give form to the abstract concept of democracy, thus producing it as their (imagined) source. Effective performative democracy processes having to do with the forms and genres of speech, broadly understood, constitute public action and bring about change. There is, indeed, no finite set of actions that can determine once and for all that a social structure is indeed the democracy, for the regime is not a stable and pre-given structure, but instead produced and imagined through a multitude of acts and procedures.

Out of this democratic performativity, such acts have been associated with South Korean modern political history. Democracy, although a short history, has been understood as the power of people who exercise their sovereignty with visibility. Especially in the case of commemorations of political deaths and suicide, there is collective symbolism associated with the "death(s) of the young guiltless soul(s)" (S Kim 2009, p. 67). This symbolism has been imprinted since May 1991 on the hearts of the Korean people during the agonizing process of democratization (or, even in the entire history of "Korean *moralpolitik*") and often exercises itself as a mobilizing power for the Korean public (S Kim, 2009 p. 67). For instance, in his last wish before political suicide, Sang-jin Kim wrote:

> There is no time left to hesitate or to contemplate … you know democracy is not a product of knowledge but struggles. Instead of being regretful of yesterday or frustrated about tomorrow, let us charge toward the castle of this horrible dictatorship, with thoughtful reason and unyielding determination… If this is the way for the nation and history, if this is the way for achieving democracy for our loving country, and if this is the way for realizing social justice forever, I will not hesitate to sacrifice my life." (Sang-Jin Kim, in H Kim, 2008, p. 566)

The sense of urgency has been requested for many historic moments of political change, including the *noje* of 2009 and the following “remembering through forgetting” of Moo-hyun Roh. People's anger and feeling of loss arose not just because of his death. It was more directed to the other deaths, including suicides and sacrifices around 2007-2009. The emotion was notably elevated by their witnessing those deaths. Then, as Kim Sungmoon (2008) notes, "Uri-responsibility" as collective moral responsibility contributes a multitude of otherwise separated and disjointed "I"s into a common forum and impels them to reflect upon their sociopolitical identity through various forms of talk, and, finally, helps them revitalize citizenship by reconstructing "our" world (S Kim, 2008, p. 73).

The Role of Media Technology in Collective Memory

It should also be noticed that this dissertation aims to understand the role of technology in collective memories in the process of remembering as well as that of forgetting. On the one hand, it is undeniable that media technology made such an outcome. Structured, instrumentalised, and familiarised media helps us remember as a society. It may frame how a past is more recalled than other possibilities. The speed and coverage of technology may guarantee enhanced visibility of a time's collective memory, and this could make a notable political change which otherwise would take a much more extended period of time. In fact, much emerging research seems to regard media-technology as the decisive power for creating a collective memory. A number of studies concentrated on how the memory became possible in relation to the media’s decisive role in the capturing storing, retrieving, reactivating, preserving, (re)constituting, and shaping of collective memories and understandings of the past (Connerton, 1989; Halbwachs, 1992; Han, 2016; Hoskins, 2014; Landsberg, 2004; Neiger, Meyers, & Zandberg, 2011). Others such as Kuhn (2010) and Lagerkvist (2013) consider the media’s utility as a methodological entrance through which to explore how personal, individual memory intersects with shared, collective, cultural, public forms of memory.

In this dissertation, my argument was instead that memory is enacted and performed with media and these processes are intrinsically linked to issues of identity, power, and agency in the competition to privilege one's own remembering (see, Sturken, 1997). Capturing the past is becoming increasingly sophisticated, and memory tools such as television, film, photocopiers, digital archives, photographic albums, camcorders, scanners, mobile phones and social network

sites help us to remember. Media cannot be the foremost, decisive, and preemptive reason of the mode of remembering. As Joanne Garde-Hansen notes (2009), memory is a physical and mental process and is unique to each of us. It is this uniqueness and differentiation that often makes it difficult to generalise about memory's relationship with media. Memory is emotive, creative, empathetic, cognitive and sensory.

The case I discussed here proves that technology functions as the mean, which brought an unexpected end. As noted in the second half of the first chapter, the use of technology existed as another *dispositif* of memory that mediates the experience of collective memory, including the images forgotten. Through various media activities, from *noje* to writing blog entries, individual media products that together develop and maintain the collective memory of Roh continuously assert their authority and bid for authenticity. These were not just fighting for representation, but also were time-defining practices among the possible plurality of our reality. People's communication in new technical forms opens them to connect the particular past to their present, to find the other similar thoughts on the space, and maintain their resilient and persistent memory-preserving practices. However, this also contributed to the rise of hate, withdrawal of the dialogue, and seemingly blind obsession with the symbol itself. As in the writings of Micheal De Certeau that I quoted at the beginning of chapter 1, the collective memory of Roh rose by "using the means, the circuitry already in place, but reemploying them in the service of an anxiety that comes from afar, unanticipated" (De Certeau, 2000, p. 1). The media assisted the process of remembering, and perhaps enhanced modern technology made this broader and more rapid than ever before.

However, in the collective remembering of Roh with silent forgetting, the contemporary media were facilitated for the people but unexpectedly exploited. At first, the role of technology was to pave a way for the willpower of those who were looking for a symbol so they could express their own sense of the unjustness and unsettlement of their time. For this necessity, forgetting was required and it was actively performed by the mourners. In that sense, "[t]hese languages of social anxiety seem to reject both the limits of a present and the real conditions of its future. Like scars that mark for a new illness the spot of an earlier one, they designate in advance the signs and location of a flight (or return?) of time" (De Certeau, 2000, p. 1). Accordingly, we found two contesting memories of Roh, in chapter 3. While communication

should be principally "letting someone see with us what we have pointed out by way of giving it a definite character" (Heidegger, 1968, p. 197), the new media environment, which supposedly provides a space of free-exchange of ideas through enhanced accessibility of dialogues, could not contribute by creating an emerging horizon for the people's memory of Roh after his death (Chapter 3). It seemed, unlike some of the descriptions of the omnipotent role of media-technology in memory-making, recollection, together with remembering and forgetting, are in ever-in-search, easily decontextualized and recontextualized, with outcomes immediate. The sense of time here instead reaches to be synchronous. People relate historical memories less clearly but more relatively.

Epilogue - Seeing Fireflies in A Dark Night

The dissertation may be fruitfully extended in multiple directions, whether in media or memory studies. The process of how forgetting can be imposed on voluntary participants in memory making may prove highly valuable to the field; it allows us to look at exactly how memories are made, maintained, and neglected and multiply within a society. This work also depicts how the different modes are developed over time. Further, I hope this dissertation can open new dimensions for existing ideas within media studies, such as closer consideration of the multitemporality of new technology and its relation to memory and aphasia. Likewise, the introduction of the ideas of how memory holders engage in a memory-site might further our understanding of how memory and forgetting can present performativity, thereby illuminating the broader workings of power and agency. This study also phenomenologically analyzed the intersections between mediation, temporality, and power relations, which are fundamental to the composition of cultural memories, and further work could be done in this regard. An important next step would be the study of how more discursive aspects are linked with social actors, the agents involved in memory work.

Like a cenotaph –- a word that means empty tomb and is the monument for an individual or group whose remains are elsewhere — Roh's hollowed memories highlight how narratives are constructed and can reinforce South Korean identity. The lack of a corpse in a cenotaph preserves a fundamental absence. Jay Winter describes the Cenotaph in London as "elemental in form and structure" (Winter, 1995, p. 103). With mathematical and geometrical precision, it lacks

ornamentation and overt symbolism. This lack of decoration evokes the mood of collective loss and bereavement. Winter suggests that its form is “a form on which anyone could inscribe his or her own thoughts, reveries, sadnesses;” it nevertheless helps to evoke absence and loss that underlie the traumatic experience of war (Winter, 1995, p. 103). According to Jenny Edkins, “it represents the lack, the trauma” of the Great War and “the impossibility of closure” in the wake of the destruction and horror of that war (Edkins, 2003, p. 66). The lack of closure and the inability to fill the tomb with meaning ensures that its significance is not the property of any single individual or political group. That is, this empty tomb can be filled with meaning made from mourners’ mnemonic practices.

Our response to such memory has significant implications for our understanding of ourselves as a community. Like this empty tomb, with Roh’s memory, we can reinterpret meaning and alter selfhood; the identity that arises from a particular understanding of what happened is not final or restricted. The lack of a clear, central meaning for Roh’s memory preserves a fundamental absence, allowing sympathizers to identify, modify, and change their relationship to the past and to the meaning of the past in the light of our hopes for reconciliation. This vision of hope is thus to be understood as part of a community’s practices and is directed toward the possibility of regenerating freedom in anticipation of a revived humanity. To paraphrase Immanuel Kant[23], memory without hope is dead, hope without memory is blind.

In the people who have forgotten Roh's lived past, I see a desire not to be blind to the hope of their time. But, what hope? The hope was out of despair; it was from the people's wish "in spite of all" (George Didi-Huberman, 2012c). We should separate this from a blind hope. It is only that the memories of Moo-hyun Roh prepared a small and temporal victory from the transient solidarity that lightens the dark only for a moment. With this light, although being faint, survivors could have a space for enduring against suffering. Georges Didi-Huberman illustrates a similar moment for describing the attempt of *Sonderkommando*, those who were forced to work in the gas chamber of Auschwitz as Jewish prisoners. For the hope they had, Didi-Huberman compares the light of fireflies on a dark night. It does not bring the day sooner, but it helps to live the time of darkness. Then it testifies later how the time was after *Sonderkommandos* were gone.

[23] “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (Kant, 2013 A5I/B75)

> Only in the moments of messianic exaltation, perhaps, it is possible to dream of a horizon that would make visible all the images. This is what rarely appears in Walter Benjamin when it comes to a well-hypothetical story coming to its ends. Where each moment – each image – could be summoned in the absolute, paradoxical duration of the final judgment: (…) But that “day” is not given to us. What is given to us is instead sweet glows of the fireflies crossed by the cruel ray of the reflectors. (Georges Didi-Huberman, 2012b, pp. 89–90)[24]

Perhaps, as in Didi-Hubermans' description, collective memory was never that "day". It may not provide a solid and undeniable understanding of our past. As an alternative against the written history, collective memory is rather colligated individual attempts at remembering and forgetting to deal with the darkness we are facing. Given this, active forgetting may have a small function to ignore the "cruel ray of the reflectors" before the cruelty of political struggle (Georges Didi-Huberman, 2012b, p. 90). If these small memories were "on the move", it might be evading the search-light of the official. By filling the empty Cenotaph, people attempted to forget who Roh was because it was more crucial to find a right room to endure their time. South Koreans from 2009 to 2015 practiced a spontaneous and vernacular mode of silence while creating Moo-hyun Roh's apotheosized memory. From 2017, their memory-practices turned into a call for a sense of political purism, but this is remembering toward the future which would be outside the purview of our research.

[24] The quotation here is translated from the Spanish edition (Georges Didi-Huberman, 2012b) then checked with the Korean translation (Georges Didi-Huberman, 2012a). The English translation of the book is forthcoming.

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